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Abstract
This thesis offers a concrete and practically applicable answer to the question of how
to increase the legitimacy of the UN’s decision-making procedures on issues of global
peace and security. In order to provide this answer, it connects the minutia of
institutional design with the abstract principals of democratic theory in a systematic
and reproducible method, thereby enabling a clear normative evaluation of even the
smallest technical detail of reform. The thesis elaborates criteria for the evaluation of
both the normative desirability as well as the political feasibility of individual reform
proposals and applies these to a compilation of all the relevant proposals in four issue-
areas: Security Council (SC) membership and voting, SC working methods, relations
between the SC and the General Assembly, and relations between the SC and civil
society. This evaluation demonstrates that there is a range of feasible proposals for
reform that could improve the SC’s accountability both to the GA and to the general
public, that could increase the opportunities for effective input from the UN
membership and NGOs, and that would thereby promote the UN’s decision-making
procedures on issues of global peace and security as a more inclusive, coherent and
decisive deliberative system.
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The necessity of a reform of the United Nations (UN) can be approached from two
different but compatible angles: Firstly, political institutions in general need to adapt
to changing environments in order to continue functioning appropriately over the
course of time. The fact that the most enduring constitutions contain procedures for
their amendment testifies both to the wisdom of preparing for unforeseeable future
developments as well as to the necessity of institutional adaptation. It could be argued
that the founding of the UN was in itself such a process of institutional adaption: at
the end of the Second World War, the founders of the UN used the institutional
framework of the League of Nations as the primary point of reference in negative as
well as in positive terms and modified it in a way that reflected their perception of the
necessities imposed by their contemporary environment. Almost seven decades have
passed since then, and today’s environment poses a very different challenge to the
UN’s decision-making bodies.
The institutional procedures for the UN’s decision-making on issues of global peace
and security, first and foremost the Security Council (SC), were conceived with the
objective of enabling a swift but internationally coordinated response to irregular
situations of crises. Today, however, the UN is constantly involved in situations of
conflict and has expanded its range of activities well beyond the role of an
international fire brigade. This is but one example of the remarkable change in
demands the UN’s decision-making bodies have been facing over the past decades.1
Opinions vary on how well the organization has managed to adapt to these changing
1 For an overview of the changing context of global peace and security, see, e.g., United Nations
General Assembly, “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility”, UN Doc No. A/59/565, 2004,
pp. 16-22.
6circumstances, but virtually everyone would agree that the need for adaptation
remains a constant challenge. Should the UN’s decision-making procedures fail to
adapt to the requirements posed by their changing environment, the organization
could lose its effectiveness and risk becoming irrelevant to global politics. From this
perspective, UN reform is a matter of ensuring the effectiveness and relevance of its
decision-making procedures.
Secondly, international organizations play a crucial role in the democratization of
global politics. Both the creation of the League of Nations as well as that of the UN
were inspired by principles of democratic decision-making, and voting procedures
became the key mechanism for collective decision-making in these organizations.
Although the establishment of these organizations constituted a considerable advance
in the institutionalization of democracy in intergovernmental relations, the application
of principles of democracy in their design was severely limited by the political and
social fragmentation of their respective memberships. The exclusive veto right of the
five permanent members of the SC is the most prominent manifestation of this
limitation. Opinions vary on whether the political and social environment today is any
more permissive to the democratization of institutions of decision-making than in the
past, but most commentators would agree that such democratization is desirable in
principle. From this perspective, UN reform is a matter of pushing the limits of
democratic decision-making in global politics.
The individual UN Member States have, of course, their very own interests with
regard to the reform of the organization’s decision-making procedures on issues of
global peace and security. In his many articles, monographs and book chapters on the
7subject, Edward Luck has applied his in-depth knowledge of the UN, acquired
through years of practical engagement, in order to lay bare these interests and to
analyze the political dynamics in the UN membership. By infusing the academic
debate with a sobering sense of the realities at the UN and by pointing out the political
limits any attempt at reform has to take into account, his work has become
fundamental to any systematic treatise on the subject, but it does not provide any
concrete and positive direction to UN reform.
As Luck writes with regard to the SC in general, “few institutions have generated so
much commentary yet so little systematic analysis.”2 This situation is amplified if the
subject of inquiry is narrowed down to the question of institutional reform. Dimitrios
Bourantonis’ work is a remarkable exemption: with The History and Politics of UN
Security Council Reform he provides a detailed and extraordinarily well researched
historic analysis of the subject.3 He does not, however, point out the direction for
present attempts at reform. With his extensive knowledge and succinct analysis of the
wider UN system, Thomas Weiss has shaped much of the academic debate on UN
reform. But while, e.g., his monograph What is Wrong with the UN and How to Fix it
clearly identifies the underlying trends and root problems regarding institutional
change and categorically elaborates a conceptual fundament for successful attempts at
reform, it does not provide the type of concrete and directly applicable guidance the
title alludes to.4
2 Edward Luck, UN Security Council: Practice and Promise, London; New York: Routledge 2006, p.
xv.
3 Dimitris Bourantonis, The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform, London; New York:
Routledge 2005.
4 Thomas Weiss, What’s Wrong with the United Nations and How to Fix it, Cambridge; Malden, MA:
Polity Press 2009.
8Essentially, the reason for this lack of practical-minded and specific guidance on how
to reform the UN’s decision-making procedures on issues of global peace and security
is that the relevant literature does not take an explicitly normative approach to the
subject and does not, therefore, engage in a thorough elaboration of a theoretical
standpoint from which to evaluate the desirability of specific proposals for reform.
The fact that, as Kimberly Hutchings points out, “international relations theory is not
only about politics, it also is itself political”5 is not openly addressed. Conversely, this
thesis will provide an approach to the evaluation of reform proposals that bridges
theory and practice and connects the minutia of institutional design with the abstract
principals of democratic theory in a systematic and reproducible method, thereby
enabling a clear normative evaluation of even the smallest technical detail of reform.
It will offer a concrete and practically applicable answer to the question of how to
increase the legitimacy of the UN’s decision-making procedures on issues of global
peace and security.
In bridging the gap between theory and practice, this thesis also contributes to the
‘practical turn’ in the academic debate on deliberative democracy. One of the most
salient criticisms of deliberative democracy has been that it gave no practical
guidance on how to design political institutions.6 This criticism brought about what
Dryzek terms the ‘practical turn’ in deliberative democracy “where the emphasis is on
the strengthening or introduction of deliberative democracy in the real world of
politics.”7 While today much work has been done with regard to the application of
5 Kimberly Hutchings, International Political Theory: Rethinking Ethics in A Global Era, London
1999, p. 69.
6 Anthony McGrew, “Transnational Democracy”, in: April Carter and Geoffrey Stokes (eds.),
Democratic Theory Today, Cambridge: Polity 2002, p. 279.
7 Dryzek, John, Foundations and Frontiers of Deliberative Governance, Oxford; New York: Oxford
University Press 2010, p. 9.
9principles of deliberative democracy in the institutional design of national parliaments
and mini-publics such as citizens’ juries, and although Dryzek et al. outlined the
design of a ‘Global Deliberative Citizens’ Assembly’,8 previous attempts to address
the question of how to reform already existing international organizations have not led
to any concrete and readily implementable recommendations.9
This thesis will review and evaluate all those proposals for UN reform which concern
exclusively its decision-making procedures on issues of global peace and security.
Such limitation of scope is necessary in order to guarantee a focused and coherent
analysis. As a result, all proposals aiming at a reform of the composition and
procedures of the Security Council will be included and, naturally, since it bears the
“primary responsibility for international peace and security,”10 much of the analysis
will focus on this institution. Proposals to reform other institutions of the UN will
only be considered if they are directed either at the relationship of these bodies with
the SC or at internal procedures and responsibilities exclusive to decision-making on
issues of global peace and security.
This generous limitation of scope will entail the evaluation of a multitude of proposals
for reform. The thesis will, therefore, produce an unprecedented comprehensive and
categorical overview of all such proposals put forward at the UN and in the academic
debate. Reflecting the thesis’ focus on an improvement of the normative legitimacy of
the UN as such, rather than on the interests of its Member States, this overview will
8 Dryzek, John, André Bächtiger and Karolina Milewicz, “Toward a Global Deliberative Citizens’
Assembly”, Global Policy, 2 (1), 2011, pp. 33-42.
9 See, e.g., Patrizia Nanz and Jens Steffek, “Global Governance, Participation and the Public Sphere”,
Government and Opposition, 39 (2), 2004, pp. 314-335; Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel, “Global
Democracy?”, NYU Journal of International Law and Politics, 37 (4), 2005, pp. 763-798.
10 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter V, Article 24:
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter5.shtml
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be structured in terms of the institutional target of the reform proposal, rather than
according to their source, and will serve as the schematic skeleton of the evaluation.
As such, it also provides the reader with easy selective access to information on
specific institutional issue areas within the wider reform debate.
Since this comprehensive outlook on reform entails a wide array of proposals, it is
necessary to fashion methodological tools that enable a systematic and comparative
evaluation of the many individual proposals. The thesis will elaborate criteria for the
evaluation of both the normative desirability as well as the political feasibility of the
proposals and quantify their level of fulfillment of these criteria, producing two
comprehensive indicators: the ‘Desirability Score’ and the ‘Feasibility Score’.
Although these indicators are developed against the specific background of the UN’s
decision-making procedures on issues of international peace and security, they are
transferable and may be applied in, or inspire the evaluation of efforts at reform of
decision-making procedures in other institutional contexts.
The existing studies on the reform of the UN’s decision-making procedures and those
on the legitimacy of international organizations in general tend to single out a
decision-making body and treat it as a unitary actor. Even though Allen Buchanan and
Robert Keohane, e.g., go one step further and consider an organization’s links to
external actors and institutions, they elaborate these links only with regard to
‘contestation and revisability’, i.e., they focus on the question of how the latter can
give feedback to the decision-making of the former instead of considering external
11
input in the decision-making itself.11 By approaching the UN’s decision-making
procedures in terms of a deliberative system, this thesis will emphasize the
interconnections between individual institutions and explore the opportunities and
challenges inherent in inter-institutional input. This systemic outlook will bring into
focus the relations between the SC and the General Assembly (GA) as well as those
between the SC and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).
The latter relationship, particularly, has been largely disregarded in the academic
literature, leaving a lacuna in the study of the UN’s decision-making. The only
exception to this is James Paul who provides a historic overview of the relationship
between the SC and NGOs. However, while Paul offers an enlightening introduction
to the subject and convincingly explains why and how this relationship has become
more important since the end of the Cold War, he does not offer a systematic analysis
of the institutional procedures involved.12 Others, such as Jonathan Graubart, have
analyzed this relationship in terms of policy implementation, but not in terms of
decision-making.13
The comprehensive and systemic approach will not only entail a broadening but also a
deepening of the outlook on the reform of the UN’s decision-making procedures. So
far, the academic literature has largely focused on the debate regarding an expansion
of the membership of the SC and the modification of its voting procedures. But, as
11 Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane, “The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions”, Ethics &
International Affairs, 20 (4), 2006, p. 432.
12 James Paul, “Working with Nongovernmental Organizations”, in: David Malone (ed.), The UN
Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, Boulder, CO; London: Lynne Rienner 2004,
pp. 373-390.
13 Jonathan Graubart, “NGOs and the Security Council: Authority all Around but for Whose Benefit?”,
in: Bruce Cronin and Ian Hurd (eds.), The UN Security Council and the Politics of International
Authority, London; New York: Routledge 2008, pp. 154-172.
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Thomas Weiss and Karen Young point out, the area in which reform is the most likely
is in its working methods: “The potential to foster them and to invent new ones is a
more promising way to improve Security Council accountability and effectiveness
than overly optimistic notions about amending the Charter.”14
There are two exceptions to the dearth of systematic analyses of the Council’s
working methods: Sydney Bailey and Sam Daws’ monograph, The Procedure of the
UN Security Council,15 and Susan Hulton’s chapter on Council Working Methods and
Procedures in David Malone’s The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the
21st Century.16 Both of these contributions to the literature are, however, somewhat
outdated. Not only has the political context of the debate on working methods
changed, but it is also the one area of reform in which there is a palpable dynamic of
institutional progress. Ian Hurd17 and Jochen Prantl18 have elaborated on particular
phenomena of this progress, but a comprehensive and up-to-date analytical overview
of the dynamics in the Council’s working methods is lacking. By shedding light on
this progress, this thesis counters the impression that the UN is incapable of adjusting
its decision-making procedures, and it thereby also attempts to defuse the correlated
danger of a reform fatigue among both practitioners and academics that could hamper
further progress altogether.
14 Thomas Weiss and Karen Young, “Compromise and Credibility: Security Council Reform?”,
Security Dialogue, 36 (2), 2005, p. 152.
15 Sydney Bailey and Sam Daws, The Procedure of the UN Security Council, Oxford: Clarendon Press
1998.
16 Susan Hulton, “Council Working Methods and Procedures”, in: David Malone (ed.), The UN
Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, Boulder; London: Lynne Rienner 2004, p.
237-251.
17 Ian Hurd, “Security Council Reform: Informal Membership and Practice”, in: Bruce Russett (ed.),
The Once and Future Security Council, New York: St. Martin’s Press 1997, pp. 135-152.
18 Jochen Prantl, The UN Security Council and Informal Groups of States: Complementing or
Competing for Governance?, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006.
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This thesis addresses both audiences, academics as well as practitioners, and makes
specific policy recommendations. In this regard, it attempts to provide useful insights
and may prove to be helpful to the process of setting priorities in efforts for reform.
The thesis is, in general, action-oriented and offers a particular take on the future of
the UN’s decision-making procedures on issues of global peace and security.
Since there is scarce academic literature on many of the issue areas touched upon,
primary sources will play a salient role in this thesis. On the one hand, it will make
extensive use of the meeting records and other reports in the UN’s archives, and on
the other hand, it will integrate various perspectives and insights gathered in a number
of interviews with practitioners as well as some of the personal experiences I made
while working at the UN. While some of the interviews with NGO representatives
will be attributed directly, all of the interviews with UN staff and representatives of
the Member States are off the record. The interviews were conducted in person in the
UN Secretariat as well as in various permanent representations and NGO offices in
New York in the course of October and November of 2010 and in June of 2012.
The first part of the thesis will establish the framework for the evaluation of the
reform proposals. On the one hand, it will conduct an inquiry into democratic theory
and its applicability to international organizations such as the UN, resulting in the
elaboration of an analytical tool for the evaluation of the normative desirability of
individual reform proposals: the Desirability Score. On the other hand, it will
scrutinize the political dynamics of the reform debate at the UN, crystalize the
challenges and opportunities that reform efforts face in this environment, and create
an analytical tool for the evaluation of the feasibility of individual reform proposals:
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the Feasibility Score. The second part of the thesis will apply these analytical tools to
the full range of relevant reform proposals in order to determine their desirability and
their feasibility. It will begin with those proposals that concern the membership and
the voting procedures of the SC, continue with those targeting its working methods,
then move on to those that aim at the Council’s relationship with the GA, and
conclude with the evaluation of those that address the SC’s relationship with Civil
Society.
The key findings of the thesis will be that there is, first of all, a range of feasible
proposals for reform that could improve the SC’s accountability both to the GA and
the general public, that could increase the opportunities for effective input from the
UN membership and NGOs, and that would thereby promote the UN’s decision-
making procedures on issues of global peace and security as a more inclusive,
coherent and decisive deliberative system. In addition, there are several significant
improvements that are unlikely in the immediate future, but that might be possible in
the mid-term. This process of promoting a deliberative system is not one of
revolutionary change, but a sequence of incremental innovations.
Secondly, the analysis will demonstrate that the SC is not the static and torpid
institution of the past as it is often portrayed,19 but a highly adaptable and vivid
decision-making body, i.e., the ‘Polymorph Security Council’. Since the prospects for
a formal reshaping of its membership and voting arrangements are very low, the
Council has learned to use informal procedures in order to adapt to the changing
demands of its institutional and socio-political environment.
19 For a compilation of these opinions, see Ian Hurd, “Myths of Membership: The Politics of
Legitimation in UN Security Council Reform”, Global Governance, 14 (2), 2008, p. 201.
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Thirdly, much as with the common perspective on SC reform, the thesis will show
that there is too much emphasis on the formal inclusion of civil society in the UN’s
decision-making procedures on issues of global peace and security as opposed to
more flexible informal arrangements. Instead of overregulating the channels for input
by establishing civil society assemblies, it would be more appropriate to multiply and
diversify the opportunities for interaction. There are some feasible innovations
through which the SC itself could enhance its engagement with civil society, but the





I. Promoting a Deliberative System: The Desirability Score
Introduction
How can one evaluate the potential of reform proposals to increase the legitimacy of
the United Nations’ decision-making? In this chapter, I will lay out my Habermasian
approach to conceptualizing the UN’s decision-making procedures on issues of global
peace and security as a deliberative system. The promotion of such a system is both
normatively desirable and empirically feasible. The fundamental argument is that,
rather than considering the Security Council in isolation, a comprehensive evaluation
of the potential of reform proposals to increase the democratic legitimacy of the
United Nations’ governance of issues of international peace and security must be
based on its conceptualization in terms of a deliberative system. On the basis of this
argument, I will elaborate a procedure to determine the ‘Desirability Score’ of
individual reform proposals.
The chapter will begin with an discussion of the public sphere and democracy,
continue with an explanation of how deliberative synergy can create deliberative
systems that increase the democratic legitimacy of a decision-making process,
proceed to an analysis of the UN as a deliberative system and, finally, determine how
to evaluate the potential of proposals for institutional reform to promote the UN as a
deliberative system of decision-making.
The Public Sphere and Democratic Legitimacy
According to Jürgen Habermas, every society is based on the construction of
communicative coherence in the lifeworld, which is the domain of informal and
unmarketized life. The unregulated everyday communication with family and friends
18
ensures a repository of meaning and understanding that serves as the glue of society.
The default modus of communication in the lifeworld is a consensus oriented
coordination of collective action, i.e., communicative action. The latter is based on
discourse, the rational give and take of reasons, which is, in general, the only
alternative to coercion in bridging a breakdown of consensus between members of a
society. As with the syntactics of a language, the practice of discourse requires the
implicit and often unconscious acknowledgment of certain rules of discourse. Just as
much as it is impossible to effectively communicate linguistically without the
adherence to a syntax, it is impossible to successfully engage in discourse without the
adherence to its pragmatic presuppositions.
Habermas identifies the following pragmatic presuppositions for discourse: Firstly,
there are logical rules, such as the principles of non-contradiction and consistency that
structure discourse. Secondly, there are procedural rules including the requirement for
truthfulness and accountability, i.e., the readiness to justify one’s assertions by
providing adequate reasons. Finally, there are the rules that guarantee the exclusion of
coercion from the process of deliberation: everyone has to be allowed to freely
participate in the discourse by asking questions, by introducing assertions as well as
by expressing attitudes, desires and needs.20 The aim of reaching a completely
uncoerced consensus is an idealization of empirical processes which are usually only
approximations to this ideal.
I shall return to the full range of pragmatic presuppositions further below. At this
point, the focus must be on the third set of presuppositions that immunize discourse
20 Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Cambridge: Polity Press 1990,
p. 89.
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against coercion. In this regard, the question of equal participation takes on special
significance in the context of international organizations. As mentioned above,
societal consensus must be rooted in communicative action; the behavior of
individuals has to be coordinated by the discursive creation and affirmation of norms.
In the traditional case of decision-making within the political framework of the state,
the objective of norm-setting is the coordination of the social interaction of the state’s
citizens, which is why only said citizens need to be afforded the opportunity to
participate in the discourses that shape the decision-making within the state. It is only
they who have to be guarded against coercion: since outsiders will not be affected by
the decisions being made, there is, logically, no danger that they might be coerced.
Consequently, Habermas’ discourse principle states that “only those action norms are
valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational
discourse.”21
The case is, of course, not as straight forward with respect to the decision-making of
international organizations. Most international organizations are limited legally in the
reach of their governance: the International Criminal Court, e.g., has no jurisdiction
over citizens of the United States and other non-state parties to the Rome Statute (that
is, unless they commit crimes within the territory of a state party), and its decisions,
therefore, can only legally affect a defined population. In the case of the UN’s
decision-making procedures on global peace and security, the situation is different.
Since the decisions of the Security Council are binding upon all the member states of
the UN and since, at present, there is virtually no internationally acknowledged state
outside of the UN framework, its decisions are imperative to all of humanity.
21 Translated from Jürgen Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung: Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts
und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 1994, p. 107.
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Consequently, when dealing with such an international organization whose decisions
potentially affect all of humanity, the question must be how to determine whether all
of humanity could agree to these decisions as participants in rational discourse?
In order to answer this question, it is necessary to first review Habermas’ conception
of the public sphere and its role in modern societies. The public sphere is a
communicatively constructed and reproduced social space in which societal problems
are identified, analyzed and discussed. It is the space in which people communicate
with each other on matters of public concern, be it directly or via media such as
newspapers or the internet. As it grows out of the lifeworld, the public sphere is
characterized by communicative action unrestrained by the imperatives of monetary
and administrative systems. Although there is an implicit aim to reach common
judgment, the public sphere is not the locus of definitive decision-making. Its main
purpose, instead, is to remain constantly flexible and open to any input from the
lifeworld which it filters through a process of public reasoning.
Ultimately, it is from the public sphere that political institutions gain their legitimacy:
the more open the decision-making procedures of these institutions are to the input of
the public sphere, the more legitimate they are. This input must be ensured through
the institution’s proactive engagement with the arguments put forward in the public
sphere and with decision-making that is rationally coherent with these debates, on the
one hand, and, on the other hand, through a process of decision-making that is
transparent to the public, so that the latter can check the institution’s decision for
consistency with the respective discourse in the public sphere. It is the public sphere
that affords every potentially affected person the opportunity to engage in the
21
discourses that - via public institutions - produce the laws that govern society.
Before I can discuss the concept of the public sphere in the specific context of
international organizations, it is necessary to elaborate Nancy Fraser’s concept of
multiple publics. In Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, Habermas conceptualized the
public sphere in its bourgeois appearance.22 As such, this public sphere has two
characteristics that are of importance here: Firstly, the bourgeois conception of the
public sphere claims it to be the only public sphere existent in society, and secondly,
it claims to be something fundamentally different from the state and categorically
separate from it. Fraser, in contrast, argues that there always have been alternative
public spheres alongside the bourgeois public sphere and that today we must think in
terms of multiple and overlapping spheres: instead of there being a singular sphere,
there exist dominant, subaltern, comprehensive and many more types of public
spheres.23 Moreover, Fraser problematizes the clear-cut separation between the public
sphere and the state.
These two arguments are combined and best explained in the concept of ‘strong’ and
‘weak’ public spheres. According to Fraser, a weak public sphere is one that enables
the discursive formation of public opinion in an informal and virtually unrestricted
fashion without encompassing any type of authoritative decision-making. The
bourgeois public sphere is an example of such a weak public sphere. A strong public
sphere, on the other hand, is characterized by the combination of formalized
discursive opinion formation with the ability to translate these opinions into
22 Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der
bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp 1990.
23 Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing
Democracy”, in: Craig Calhoun (ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere, Cambridge (MA); London:
MIT Press 1992, pp. 122-123.
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authoritative decisions. Sovereign parliaments are an example of strong public
spheres as they engage both in public deliberation as well as in authoritative decision-
making.24 In doing so, they also cut through the categorical distinction between the
state and the public sphere. In Faktizität und Geltung, Habermas adopts both Fraser’s
idea of multiple public spheres in general and her differentiation between strong and
weak public spheres in particular.25
In theorizing the globalization of democracy without a state, Hauke Brunkhorst adapts
the theme of strong and weak public spheres. Brunkhorst, however, takes a conceptual
step away from the way Fraser and Habermas conceive of this distinction. He writes
that “key elements of a strong public are not only - and here I depart from Fraser and
Habermas - democratic parliaments and other spaces of highly formalised discourse
such as court procedures and decisions, but also a diverse network of public debates,
publications, advertising, television talk-shows, teach-ins, political demonstrations,
protest movements, associations, political parties, unions, cooperative public
administration and the like.”26 As is evident from this section, the difference between
Brunkhorst’s conception of weak and public spheres to that of Fraser and Habermas is
actually more significant than he has spelled out. Brunkhorst conceives of a
democratic parliament, in this context, as being an element of a strong public sphere,
and the reader is left to believe Fraser and Habermas do the same, when really, in the
latter’s view, a democratic parliament is a strong public sphere in itself. The key is
that Brunkhorst conceives of the public sphere in the singular - what Fraser would call
the comprehensive public sphere - whereas Fraser developed the idea of strong and
24 Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere, pp. 133-135.
25 Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung, pp. 373-374.
26 Hauke Brunkhorst, “Globalizing Democracy Without the State: Weak Public, Strong Public, Global
Constitutionalism”, Millennium, 31 (3), 2002, p. 677.
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weak public spheres in the context of multiple public spheres within society.
Brunkhorst upholds the categorical separation of public sphere and state: in this
perspective the essential difference between a strong and a weak public sphere is that
the former’s opinion formation is interlinked with those institutions that produce
authoritative decisions, whereas that of the latter is not. More specifically, a strong
public sphere “is legally bound to procedures of decision making through rights and
organisational norms.”27 As noted above, in this perspective, a strong public sphere
also requires a diverse network of public debates, publications, advertising, etc.
Brunkhorst conceives of public spheres in this comprehensive manner because the
object of his inquiry is the global public sphere. Having clarified this crucial
distinction, I will adopt, for the present purposes, Brunkhorst’s conceptions of strong
and weak public spheres. The global public sphere is comprehensive in the sense that
it includes multitudes of spheres within itself and addresses virtually all of humanity
as an audience as well as attempting to be open to input from all of humanity. I will
return to Fraser’s distinction between strong and weak public spheres further below
and recast it in the light of John Dryzek’s work.
I agree with Brunkhorst’s case for the existence of a rudimentary global public sphere.
For both legal and social reasons, however, today’s global public sphere must
definitely be categorized as weak. Even though Brunkhorst argues that there is ‘a
strong global public in the making’, he also points out that the legal prerequisites for a
strong public sphere are far from being fulfilled. The opinion formation within the
global public sphere has virtually no direct legal linkages to the decision-making
27 Brunkhorst, Globalizing Democracy Without the State, p. 677.
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procedures of institutions such as the UN Security Council.28 Regarding the social
prerequisites – in Brunkhorst’s words ‘a diverse network of public debates,
publications, advertising, television talk-shows, teach-ins, political demonstrations,
protest movements, associations, political parties, unions, cooperative public
administration and the like’ – although some of these elements exist on the global
level and justify the argument for a weak public sphere, cumulatively, they do not live
up to the requirements of strong public spheres as they exist in the domestic societies
of constitutional states.
More importantly, the global public sphere is weak in the sense that access to it,
although world-wide, is partial rather than universal. This fact is very tellingly
visualized by a map created by Facebook of the global interconnections of its users:29
Whereas there are glowing connections between most of the world’s urban centers,
two black spots catch the eye. One of them is China, where Facebook is confronted
with political obstacles, and the other is Central Africa, where access to the internet is
sparse. There are still immense political and technological/economic obstacles
preventing the global public sphere from being truly inclusive in principal.
The weakness of the global public sphere brings with it the problem that the
legitimacy which it could bestow on institutional decision-making procedures whose
outcomes affect all of humanity is still very limited, especially when compared to the
legitimacy that strong domestic public spheres - reproduced by a plethora of fora for
inclusive public debate, rooted in constitutionally guaranteed rights, and with
institutionalized linkages to authoritative decision-making - bestow upon the
28 Brunkhorst, Globalizing Democracy Without the State, pp. 687-688.
29 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-11989723
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respective states. Habermas points out furthermore that “[t]oday any
conceptualization of a juridification of world politics must take as its starting point
individuals and states as the two categories of founding subjects of a world
constitution. The (as we would like to assume) legitimate constitutional states qualify
as founding members already in virtue of their current role in guaranteeing the
political self-determination of their citizens. In addition to the potential world
citizens, the states represent possible sources of legitimation because patriotic
citizens (in the best sense of ‘patriotic’) have an interest in preserving and improving
the respective national forms of life with which they identify and for which they feel
themselves responsible – in a self-critical way that also extends to their own national
history.”30
Habermas acknowledges at the same time that at present only a limited number of
states qualify as ‘legitimate constitutional states’, which means that the legitimacy
which international organizations can indirectly derive from strong domestic public
spheres via the state is also inherently limited. Consequentially, when conceptualizing
the legitimacy of international organizations whose decision-making potentially
affects all of humanity, one is left with two partial but inadequate streams of
legitimacy. On the one hand, such an organization can derive legitimacy from a weak
global public sphere, on the other hand, it can derive legitimacy from a limited
number of strong domestic public spheres via the respective states.
This means that in the present context of global politics, these organizations cannot
rely exclusively on one or the other source of legitimacy, but that they instead must
30 Jürgen Habermas, “The Constitutionalization of International Law and the Legitimation Problems of
a Constitution for World Society”, Constellations, 15 (4), 2008, p. 449.
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process the input of both in their decision-making. But how can the input from these
two sources be combined and reconciled with each other? Since global referenda are
infeasible in the near future,31 it is impossible to assign numeric values to the input
received from the global public sphere, which means that it cannot be weighted
quantitatively against the input received via the states. In fact, weighing the input of
different states against each other is itself already a somewhat arbitrary exercise.
The best solution for a process of decision-making which in principle is equally open
to the input both from states as well as from the weak global public sphere, without
categorically favoring one over the other, is a deliberative screening. Rather than
focusing entirely on the nature of the source, the input received needs to be evaluated
on its own merits, and instead of assigning fixed percentages to various sources of
input, deliberation enables a case-by-case screening of arguments and options in the
procedure of decision-making. This means that an international organization’s
capability to tap and combine both sources of legitimacy is dependent on the
deliberative quality of its decision-making procedures.
This emphasis on deliberation does not equal a disregard of aggregative procedures
and authoritative decision-making. Anthony McGrew criticizes that “there is
significant silence about how intractable conflicts of interests or values can be
resolved deliberatively without recourse to some authoritatively imposed solution.
Therefore, deliberative democracy may be of marginal value in dealing with many of
the most pressing global distributional or security issues - from debt relief to
31 Jan Aart Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction, Basingstoke: Macmillan 2000, pp. 270-271.
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humanitarian intervention - which figure on the world political agenda.”32 It is, of
course, essential for international organizations to arrive at legally binding decisions
at the pace that is required by the rapid development of events in global politics.
This critique assumes, however, that theorists of deliberative democracy contend that
political debates always have to be resolved by a wide consensus. But what Habermas
and others really are saying is simply that political debate is, in principle, only
possible under the assumption that consensus is an achievable option.33 If all the
parties to a dispute knew from the start that consensus is impossible, they would
resolve to act in a purely strategic fashion and the matter would be settled by the
‘tyranny of the majority’. The assumption that, under ideal circumstances of
deliberation, consensus would be achievable is the only alternative to the forceful
imposition of one party’s will upon the other and it does not exclude the recourse to a
vote should the less than ideal circumstances of the real world (time-pressure, lack of
resources, etc.) demand it. In general, deliberative democracy does not prevent the
possibility of settling issues by political authority. It concerns itself instead with the
questions of how much the decision-making process supports public deliberation and
how much, in turn, the decisions of political authorities are supported by public
deliberation. In this sense, the practical objective of reform should not be to ensure
deliberative decision-making, but to create space for deliberation in decision-making.
Democratization via the Promotion of a Deliberative System
How can we evaluate the potential of proposals for reform to enhance the deliberative
32 Anthony McGrew, “Transnational Democracy”, in: April Carter and Geoffrey Stokes (eds.),
Democratic Theory Today, Cambridge: Polity 2002, p. 280.
33 Rainer Schmalz-Bruns, “Deliberativer Supranationalismus: Demokratisches Regieren jenseits des
Nationalstaats”, Zeitschrift fürInternationale Beziehungen, 6 (2), 1999, p. 207.
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quality of the UN’s decision-making procedures and to thereby increase its
democratic legitimacy? Until the late nineties, deliberative democracy was a purely
theoretical issue dominated by philosophers. But with “the coming of age of
deliberative democracy”34, as James Bohman puts it, theorists have increasingly
developed interest in methods for its practical application. Robert Goodin points out
that various efforts by linguists, comparative politics experts and international
relations scholars to establish criteria for the evaluation of institutional deliberation
have had remarkably similar results, and thus there exists among them a broad
consensus on the key elements.35 He comes to this conclusion after comparing with
each other the respective works of philosopher of language Paul Grice, of a group of
scholars of international relations brought together by Knut Midgaard and of a team
of political scientists around Jürg Steiner. Even though Grice and Midgaard et al. base
their approach on John Austin, and Steiner et al. base theirs on Habermas’ pragmatic
suppositions for discourse, the differences between the criteria they elaborate are only
marginal and largely a matter of differing categorizations of similar content. Keeping
in line with my Habermasian approach, I will base the evaluation of the potential of
proposals for UN reform to increase the organizations democratic legitimacy on the
criteria of the ‘discourse quality index’ elaborated by Jürg Steiner et al.:36
The first criterion of the index is that of open participation, meaning that, in principle,
all individuals should have access to the deliberation. There is a significant difference
between the manner in which Steiner et al. and Goodin apply the criterion of open
participation. Whereas Steiner et al. are interested in determining the degree of
34 James Bohman, “The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy”, Journal of Political Philosophy,
6 (4), 1998, pp. 400–425.
35 Robert Goodin, “Sequencing Deliberative Moments“, Acta Politica, 40 (2), 2005, p. 183
36 Jürg Steiner et al., Deliberative Politics in Action: Analysing Parliamentary Discourse, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 2004, pp. 16-73.
29
participation within a specific debate, Goodin applies it as an indicator of general
access to a debate, i.e., with regard to the role of the public sphere.37 For the former, it
is mainly a matter of procedure, for the latter, it is more of a socio-political question.
This unexpressed difference is exemplary for the often overlooked difference between
issues of deliberative quality on the one hand and issues of deliberative democracy on
the other.
Secondly, there is the need to justify assertions and validity claims. The connection
between premises and conclusion should become clear through coherent
argumentation and the orderly exchange of information. Speakers should back up
their claims with generally comprehensible and reproducible reasoning rather than
merely utter demands. The possibility for engaging in extensive explanations and
justifications is also a question of the amount of time available.
Thirdly, participants in deliberation should feel some measure of solidarity with each
other in that they recognize that they are united in the endeavor to improve the
common good. Speakers should take into account not only their personal interests, but
also those of the partners in deliberation and should be able to justify any claim made
with reference to this common good.
The fourth criterion is that of respect. The deliberations should be based on the
equality of the participants, and all should acknowledge that some of the partners in
deliberation may be from social groups whose needs differ from one’s own and show
respect towards counterarguments. Negative statements about groups and their claims
37 Compare Steiner et al., Deliberative Politics in Action, pp. 56-57, and Goodin, Sequencing
Deliberative Moments, p. 184.
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inhibit the uncoerced exchange of arguments.
The fifth element is that of an orientation towards consensus. A discourse should aim
to reach a rationally motivated compromise that is acceptable to all its participants.
The ideal of deliberative decision-making is based on the Habermasian discourse
principle that all those affected could agree as participants in rational discourse.
Finally, all the statements and arguments should be made sincerely rather than
motivated by strategic calculation or with the aim of deceiving other participants.
Whereas Goodin applies the criterion of authenticity in his analysis, Steiner et al.
actually exclude it from their deliberative quality index. This exclusion is based on the
argument that authenticity “causes the greatest difficulties from a measurement
perspective. To judge if a speech act is truthful is to make a judgement about a
person’s true versus their stated preferences. This is exceedingly difficult, since true
preferences are not directly observable.”38
If these criteria were applied to individual decision-making bodies of an international
organizations such as the UN, it is reasonable to expect that none would come close to
fully satisfying the broad requirements of the index, resulting in the assessment that
no politically feasible reform could adequately improve their deliberative legitimacy.
This unitary model of evaluating decision-making bodies isolated from their
institutional framework has left many scholars of deliberative democracy unsatisfied
and has led to what recently has been dubbed the ‘systemic turn in deliberative
democracy’. The main characteristic of this development in scholarly thought is the
38 Steiner et al., Deliberative Politics in Action, p. 56.
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argument that one cannot sufficiently evaluate a political institution without taking
into account its effects on other institutions within a system of governance.39 Rather,
the systemic perspective makes it imperative to determine in how far the ‘deliberative
deficits’ of one decision-making body might be mitigated by its relationship with
another component of the system. Within a deliberative system, different deliberative
tasks can be delivered by different institutions. Much importance must then be given
to the appropriate sequencing of these deliberative moments.
Goodin gives the example of parliaments and parliamentary committees:40 Since
parliaments are usually large representative bodies which aim to give as many voices
as possible the chance to be heard and to place emphasis on the transparency of their
debates and decision-making procedures, it would be practically impossible for them
to collaboratively negotiate and elaborate the detailed phrasing of a particular law.
This is why parliaments create committees: these smaller and more informal
institutions enable a sort of cooperative creativity aimed at consensus which the large,
public and formally inflexible plenum cannot provide.41 Since, however, these
committees are usually composed of a small group of experts deliberating in camera,
they lack transparency and inclusiveness. This deliberative deficit is, in turn,
mitigated by the subsequent plenary debate in which the proposals worked out by the
committees are publicized and their acceptance or rejection is advocated and
rationalized in the light of the common good. In this way, the interplay between the
two institutions, i.e., the sequencing of two deliberative moments, mitigates the
distinct deliberative deficits of each.
39 This usage of the term system is not to be confused with the Habermasian concept of system, i.e., the
instrumental counterpart to the lifeworld.
40 Goodin, Sequencing Deliberative Moments, pp. 187-188.
41 Steiner et al., Deliberative Politics in Action, pp. 87-88.
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Goodin expands his model by placing the parliament and its committees into the
wider framework of a representative democracy. This framework is based on four
deliberative moments with differing tasks: the deliberations within the ‘caucus rooms’
of the political parties, the parliamentary debate, the election campaign, and ‘post-
election arguing and bargaining.’ A short and simplified summary of his argument is
that the caucus room fulfills the criterion of authenticity, the parliamentary debate
fulfills the criterion of justification, the election campaign fulfills the criteria of open
participation and consideration of the common good, whereas the post-election
bargaining fulfills the criteria of respect and orientation towards consensus. As these
deliberative moments are sequenced, they can be perceived as parts of a deliberative
system and, as such, they come closer to the deliberative ideal than any one of these
moments by itself.
Instead of evaluating each institution on its own terms, it is imperative to appreciate
that these institutions are merely the components of a deliberative system in which
they play a very specific and partial role in fulfilling the overall requirements of
deliberative democracy. Considering the enormous task of satisfying the discourse
quality index, the systemic outlook takes into account institutional specialization that
creates a systemic ‘division of labor’. Despite all of this, the ideal remains of having
all of the criteria of the deliberative quality index fulfilled by one deliberative
moment. Goodin’s point is, however, that “while we cannot seriously expect all the
deliberative virtues to be constantly on display at every step of the decision process in
a representative democracy, we can realistically expect that different deliberative
virtues might be on display at different steps of the process.”42 But what exactly is a
42 Goodin, Sequencing Deliberative Moments, p. 193.
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deliberative system? How can this division of deliberative tasks function?
Whereas Goodin provides examples of what the components of a deliberative system
should do, John Dryzek attempts to demonstrate what these components should be.
He creates a theoretical model of a deliberative system that aims at going beyond
developed liberal democracies and is meant to be applicable to a wider variety of
political systems, such as, e.g., transnational networks of governance. In his view, any
deliberative system consists of five core elements:43
Firstly, there has to be a public space that is as unrestricted as possible, enabling the
free flow of deliberation fuelled by a broad range of diverse viewpoints. It is the
public space in which issues within society are identified and ideas for solutions are
generated. Examples include the media, the internet, cafés, bars, citizen fora, etc.
Secondly, there is the need for an empowered space, an institution that produces
collective decisions. Examples are legislatures, constitutional courts or corporatist
councils.
The third element is that of transmission. The public space must be able to influence
the deliberations and decision-making of the empowered space. This element is
critical in holding the deliberative system together. Some of the various means of
achieving this are political campaigns, rhetoric, or cultural change brought about by
social movements.
43 John Dryzek, „Democratization as Deliberative Capacity Building”, Comparative Political Studies,
42 (11), 2009, pp. 1385-1386.
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The fourth element is accountability. The empowered space must, by some means, be
accountable to the public space. This category can overlap with that of transmission,
as political campaigning, e.g., can also be a means for ensuring accountability.
The final element of Dryzek’s model is decisiveness. All in all, the deliberative
system must be able, through its decision-making, to determine social outcomes.
Dryzek uses the political situation in Russia in the nineties when a ‘flourishing
deliberative chamber’, i.e., the parliament, had only little influence on president Boris
Yeltsin, who was ruling by decree, as a negative example of a deliberative system that
lacks decisiveness.
In my view, one of the advantages of the differentiation between public space and
empowered space is it’s comprehensiveness: It captures Fraser’s point about
deliberation within the state apparatus and is comparable to her differentiation
between weak and strong public spheres, but it also incorporates the fundamental
difference between unregulated and virtually unlimited communicative spaces on the
one hand and formalized and authoritative spaces on the other, which Brunkhorst has
in mind when he conceptualizes what Fraser calls weak and strong public spheres
solely as variants of the former.
My conceptualization of the UN as a deliberative system is, in essence, a combination
of Goodin’s idea of an institutional division of labor regarding the deliberative task, in
which each deliberative moment fulfills only some of the criteria of deliberative
democracy but together they complement each other, and Dryzek’s model of a
deliberative system, in which he specifies the necessary components of such a system.
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It must be the primary goal of any proposal for institutional reform to enhance the
deliberative synergy within such a system by strengthening the transmission and
accountability between its deliberative moments. This does not only enable a
complementary fulfillment of the deliberative task, but more importantly, it also
increases the input from various public spheres into the respective decision-making
procedures.
Deliberative Synergy via Transmission and Accountability
In order to assess a reform proposal’s prospects for increasing the deliberative
synergy within an international organization such as the UN, it is necessary to clarify
the particular contexts in which the deliberative moments are meant to be tied
together. The legitimacy that one moment can transfer to the other depends both upon
the nature of the actors involved and upon the specific mechanism of transmission.
Actors at the UN generally derive their legitimacy for partaking in decision-making
from their function as representatives, which means that the legitimacy of their input
into the respective deliberations depends upon the nature of their representativeness
and how it is maintained by means of accountability.
As a quality of social relations, accountability necessarily entails the question of
agency: who is accountable to whom? According to Ruth Grant and Robert Keohane,
the answer to this question depends on the model of accountability applied, i.e., either
the delegation model or the participation model.44 The former identifies those
individuals or institutions who have delegated authority to a social agent as those to
whom this agent is accountable. The participation model, in contrast, designates those
44 Ruth Grant and Robert Keohane, “Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics”, American
Political Science Review, 99 (1), 2005, p. 31.
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who are affected by the performance of the social agent as those to whom this agent is
accountable. Depending on which of these models is applied, some mechanisms of
accountability are more appropriate than others.
Grant and Keohane distinguish between seven mechanisms for accountability that
apply to the realm of international relations: hierarchical, supervisory, fiscal, legal,
market, peer, and public reputational accountability.45 Hierarchical accountability
applies to situations in which an agent is subordinate to an accountability holder who
has extensive authority to sanction the former. Supervisory accountability exists
between organizations that have principle-agent relationships. Fiscal accountability
characterizes the relationship between the individual or organization providing
funding and the funded agent. Legal accountability entails the obligation to follow
formalized rules and procedures and the subjection to the enquiry and verdict of
courts and quasi-judicial arenas. Market accountability is based on the ability of
investors and consumers to sanction agents in response to performance. Peer
accountability is the result of mutual evaluation among organizations on an equal
footing and may affect their willingness to cooperate with their counterparts. Public
reputational accountability applies to “situations in which reputation, widely and
publicly known, provides a mechanism for accountability even in the absence of other
mechanisms as well as in conjunction with them.”46 While all of these mechanisms are
important to both models of accountability, the hierarchical, supervisory, fiscal and
legal mechanisms are particularly important to the delegation model, whereas market,
peer, and public reputational accountability play a greater role in the participation
model.
45 Grant and Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, pp. 36-37.
46 Grant and Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, p. 37.
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Grant and Keohane do not include electoral accountability in their list because, in
their view, it has no relevance in the realm of international relations. Yet, Mathias
Koenig-Archibugi rightly objects that this exclusion of electoral accountability rests
on the assumption that elections necessarily must be democratic. But, in fact,
mechanisms of electoral accountability are common in the context of international
organizations. They are, however, usually characterized by institutionalized
inequality.47 Another point of critique raised by Koenig-Archibugi concerns the
distinction between the delegation model and the participation model. He argues that
claims for accountability which are based on the support given to an actor, such as
donations to a relief agency, do not fit into this dualistic framework. The same often
applies to legal mechanisms and horizontal mechanisms of accountability. Indeed,
support mechanisms and horizontal mechanisms such as peer accountability and
public reputational accountability do not seem to fit the participation model well.
Social agents can be held to account by their supporters, their peers or the general
public even if their performance does not have an impact on any of them. As Mark
Bovens argues, courts cannot be conceptualized in a principal-agent framework and,
therefore, legal accountability cannot be subsumed under the delegation model.48
Still, Grant and Keohane’s framework does not seem entirely implausible. The
argument that there is a categorical difference between mechanisms such as
hierarchical and supervisory accountability, on the one hand, and peer and public
reputational accountability, e.g., on the other, intuitively seems appealing. The
question is: what is it that distinguishes these mechanisms from each other? In my
47 Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, “Accountability in Transnational Relations: How Distinctive is it?”,
West European Politics, 33 (5), 2010, pp. 1142-1164.
48 Mark Bovens, “Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework”, European Law
Journal, 13 (4), 2007, p. 451.
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view, the key factor is the definition of the actors involved. In social relationships
characterized by mechanisms of hierarchical, supervisory or fiscal accountability, the
question of which agent has to give account to whom is well defined. The delegation
of authority is comparatively easy to trace. In typical hierarchical relationships, e.g.,
between business managers and their assistants, the performance of the latter will not
necessarily be evaluated in accordance to some transparent standard that transcends
their relationship. Managers might assess the performance of the assistants
accountable to them as unsatisfactory according to their own expectations which
might be opaque, arbitrary, or simply irrational to the latter. The principals of the
World Bank can hold its board of directors to account for not abiding by their will,
irrespective of the quality of its policies. In hierarchical, supervisory and fiscal
mechanisms of accountability, authority is delegated and held by well-defined social
actors.
With regard to mechanisms of legal, market, peer and public reputational
accountability, it is often hard to clearly identify the actors involved. Participation
cannot be the defining characteristic of these mechanisms. Instead, what these
mechanisms have in common is that there is a significant shift of focus from the
social actors to social norms and standards which are somewhat independent of those
people and organizations who are involved in these relationships of accountability. In
legal accountability, the agents are subject to the law, in market accountability they
are subject to the laws of the market, in peer accountability they are subject to the
norms of their social strata and in public reputational accountability they are subject
to the norms prevalent in the respective public. The accountability holdees are judged
according to standards embedded in discursive structures. Dryzek calls this
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‘discursive accountability’: social actors must act and communicate in terms that
make sense within the respective discourses.49 Hence, the relevant categories are not
delegation and participation, but delegation and discourse.
In order to better grasp the idea of discursive accountability, it is necessary to
understand the correlated concept of representation. Dryzek uses the example of rock
star Bono to illustrate discursive representation. The latter claims: “I represent a lot of
people [in Africa] who have no voice at all…They haven’t asked me to represent
them.”50 Obviously, Bono was not delegated any authority by those he claims to
represent. In fact, most of his assumed constituents probably have never heard of him.
Even though Bono himself would not necessarily agree with this analysis, what he
represents is not a certain set of people, but rather a specific discourse on Africa that
construes its inhabitants as victims of an unjust world and appeals to the
consciousness of the wealthy without implying major structural transformation. This
particular discourse is one of many that compete with each other regarding Western
attitudes and policies concerning poverty in Africa. Altogether they form an issue-
specific constellation of discourses in the public sphere.
Discourses have their roots in the public sphere, where, as Habermas calls it,
‘subjectless communication’ produces coherent sets of world views. Dryzek defines
them “as a shared way of comprehending the world embedded in language. In this
sense, a discourse is a set of concepts, categories, and ideas that will always feature
particular assumptions, judgments, contentions, dispositions, intentions, and
49 John Dryzek, Foundations and Frontiers of Deliberative Governance, Oxford; New York: Oxford
University Press 2010, p. 61.
50 Dryzek, Foundations and Frontiers, p. 43.
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capabilities.”51 Even though discourses necessarily bring a degree of organizing force
with them, they are not to be understood in the Foucauldian sense as imprisoning.
Instead, deliberation across discourses usually remains possible, albeit, at times, very
challenging.
Individuals can represent a specific discourse in political deliberations and decision-
making procedures if their attitudes and opinions are based on the respective concepts
and categories. If deliberation across discourses leads participants to change their
opinions, these modifications are either rationally justifiable on the foundations of the
discourses they represent or they break with them, in which case the participants
concerned no longer represent the discourse they started out with. Hence, the
representatives are accountable to a discourse in that they are bound by its rationale.
Dryzek’s concept of discursive accountability, however, remains unclear with regard
to the question of agency. If a discourse itself plays the role of the accountability
holder, transgressions of its boundaries by its purported representatives have to be
objectively verifiable, presupposing that the discourse is not only well-defined but
also equally transparent to all of the participants. Even in the ideal scenario in which
the occurrence of a transgression is undisputed to the degree of qualifying as
‘common sense’, accountability still rests on the implicit judgment of the people
involved. Coming full circle, we are left with the question of agency: who is to judge
the accountability holdee?
Dryzek attempts to get around this problem by bringing in the social scientist as deus
51 Dryzek, Foundations and Frontiers, p. 31.
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ex machina: observing the deliberations from the outside, scientists can measure the
representatives’ adherence to discourses according to pre-established formulas.52
Even if we disregard the ontological and epistemological questions such a method of
judgment raises (in how far does this method contradict the foundation of Dryzek’s
approach in discourse ethics?), we are still left with the problem of its practical
application. The political scenarios in which social scientists would be given such a
crucial role in decision-making procedures are very limited. This, however, would
defeat one of the main objectives of Dryzek’s approach, i.e., to create more flexible
models of representation and accountability applicable to the modern world.
Ultimately, discursive accountability, as well, depends on principal-agent
relationships. According to Dryzek “Accountability cannot in discursive
representation be induced by the representative's fear of sanction […] Discursive
accountability must be understood instead in communicative fashion.”53 Yet the
communicative fashion of accountability which he goes on to explain merely clarifies
what the representatives are expected to do, not how they can be held to account for it.
Instead, the disciplinary force of a discourse is always to some degree supported by
implicit threats of sanctions from other social actors. In legal accountability, agents
are governed by the respective society’s institutions of law-giving and judging; in
market accountability, they are subject to the judgments and reactions of the other
market actors, etc.
Dryzek’s neglect of the question of agency in discursive accountability does not,
however, diminish the concept’s significance. If relationships of accountability are
52 Dryzek, Foundations and Frontiers, pp. 59-61.
53 Dryzek, Foundations and Frontiers, p. 61.
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mediated through discourses, this alleviates the pressure to clearly define the social
actors involved. The more defined the discourse represented, the less need there is to
define the accountability holder. As transgressions of discursive boundaries in word
and deed become easier to trace and, therefore, judgments on them become less
controversial, the undefined mass of accountability holders will react more uniformly
and can thereby temporarily define itself in its collective response. Hence, the force of
discursive accountability depends upon the definition of the respective discourse, the
transparency of the accountability holdee’s rationale for action and the accountability
holdee’s dependency on the discourse’s supporters. The boundaries and imperatives
set by discourses are only one part of effective discursive accountability.
The distinction between accountability based on delegation on the one side and
accountability based on discourses on the other allows for a more univocal
categorization of electoral and supportive mechanisms. The former is a mechanism
based on delegation: voters have a choice of individuals or organizations to whom
they can delegate the authority to act on their behalf. Elections create clear hierarchies
of representation, and the elected can usually claim to be the sole representatives of
their voters in certain spheres of authority. In the case of supportive mechanisms, the
supporters do not have to define their choices and therefore cannot appoint a specific
individual or organization to represent them. One and the same individual can
theoretically choose to support organizations with contrasting agendas, and none of
them could claim that this individual has delegated authority to them. If individuals
decide to support a relief agency, this support is a statement in itself rather than an act
of authorization.
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Most people subscribe to various overlapping discourses, and their support of one or
more of them signals that they want the decision-makers to take the concerns related
to these discourses into consideration, rather than necessarily deciding between their
contesting interests themselves in every given situation. Support is usually centered
on discourses and the communicative action they entail, rather than on the actors
themselves. It would be interesting to know, e.g., how many of those who have
donated to Amnesty International or Greenpeace know the names of the heads of the
organizations they support. Instead, these organizations represent specific discourses
that appeal to those who support them.
There are several factors that need to be taken into consideration when assessing a
reform proposal’s prospects for enhancing the deliberative synergy within an
international organization such as the UN. Since for practical reasons the delegation
of authority is not always possible, some actors will base their representativeness on
discursive accountability. In these cases, however, the representatives in question
have not been delegated the authority to act on behalf of anybody else and can
therefore – in their capacity of representatives – neither delegate authority nor demand
mechanism of accountability based on delegation. Since, moreover, discursive
representation is dependent upon the judgment of a relatively undefined mass of
accountability holdees, it requires a high level of transparency. Have the
representatives been delegated authority, however, they can play the role of
accountability holders both in mechanisms based on delegation and in those based on
discourse. Hence, both accountability based on delegation as well as discursive
accountability are essential to strengthening the deliberative synergy in the UN
system.
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Deliberative Moments and Synergies in the UN System
This section will analyze the UN in terms of a deliberative system and discuss the
potential contributions of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the NGO
community at the UN to the legitimacy of its decision-making on issues of global
peace and security. It will begin be analyzing (1) the Security Council as the ultimate
decision-making body of the UN, continue with (2) the General Assembly and its
relationship to the SC and end with (3) the NGO community at the UN and its
relationship to the SC.
(1) The Security Council is the focal point of the UN’s decision-making procedures
on issues of global peace and security and functions as its empowered space par
excellence. It is made up of five permanent members, i.e. China, France, Russia, the
UK and the US, each of which have a veto right over all substantial decision-making,
and ten members with two year mandates which are elected by the General Assembly.
The UN Charter invests the Council with “the primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security.”54 Since in the Charter, moreover,
“[t]he Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of
the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter,”55 the Council’s
resolutions are binding by law, a characteristic that distinguishes it from any other
decision-making body of the UN. Finally, the SC is the only body that may authorize
the use of military force against a UN Member State.
54 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter V, Article 24:
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter5.shtml
55 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter V, Article 25:
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter5.shtml
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These remarkable competencies enable the SC to give clout to the UN’s decision-
making on issues of global peace and security and to thereby fulfill Dryzek’s
requirement of decisiveness. It is fairly easy to demonstrate that today, despite
incessant criticisms and premature obituaries, the SC continues to exercise a decisive
impact on global politics.56 Without this clout, the deliberations within the UN would
remain fruitless and it is, therefore, essential that the Council fulfill its function of
ensuring the decisiveness of this deliberative system. Hence, the more effective the
SC’s decision-making becomes, the more decisive the deliberative system will be as a
whole.
With regard to its deliberative qualities, it is an advantage that the structures of the
Council give relatively strong incentives to seek consensus in its deliberations. The
veto ensures that for any draft resolution to be successful, it necessarily has to take
into account a number of perspectives from diverse political blocs. It has been
demonstrated, moreover, that the function of the SC lies not only in determining the
legality of a policy measure, but primarily in sending out a signal to the world
concerning its political legitimacy.57 Thus there is a high incentive for the sponsors of
a draft resolution to obtain more than just the legally required number of votes. Every
additional vote in favor increases the symbolic strength of the resolution and
augments its compliance pull. In practice, the council members go to great lengths to
achieve consensus, and today most decisions are adopted unanimously.58
56 See, e.g., Mats Berdal, “The UN After Iraq“, Survival, 46 (3), 2004, pp. 83-102.
57 Inis Claude, “Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations”, International
Organization, 20 (3), 1966, pp. 367-379; Erik Voeten, „The Political Origins of the UN Security
Council’s Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force”, International Organization, 59 (3), 2005, pp. 527-
557.
58 Nico Krisch, “The Security Council and the Great Powers”, in: Vaughan Lowe et al. (eds.), The
Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945, Oxford: Oxford
University Press 2008, p. 139.
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There are two particularly problematic issues with regard to the legitimacy of the
Council: not only is it a highly exclusive forum for decision-making, but its internal
structures are also distinctively unequal. It is widely accepted that the Council does
not adequately represent the membership of the UN and lacks transparency to both
membership and to the wider public, which severely limits participation in its
deliberations.59 Furthermore, its two-tier system of permanent and elected
membership creates a difference in the quality of its members and induces the former
to take the latter less seriously. This is obviously anything but conducive to an
atmosphere of respect amongst equals in the Council’s deliberations.
(2) The General Assembly is universal in that it includes all of the Member States of
the UN, giving each an equal vote in its decision-making. GA resolutions are adopted
either by a simple majority or, should they be deemed “important questions”60, by a
two-thirds majority. Even though the Assembly’s resolutions are only
recommendations and not binding on the Member States and it is not, therefore, a
legislature in the strict sense, its discussions are the main intergovernmental forum for
the conception and evaluation of the principles and norms that are to govern
international relations.61 The resolutions of the GA define what is expected of
Member States and thereby exert peer pressure to comply.
A strong example for this type of process is the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights: Although it is not a legal treaty, and although a number of states have not
59 United Nations General Assembly, “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human
Rights for All. Report of the Secretary-General“, UN Doc No. A/59/2005, 2005, p. 41.
60 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter IV, Article 18;
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter4.shtml
61 Richard Falk, “On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly”, American Journal
of International Law, 60 (4), 1966, pp. 782-791.
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signed it, the Declaration has had considerable influence on global politics since its
adoption in 1948. Firstly, it defined the meaning of human rights and other related
terms, narrowing down alternative conceptions and the policy options that follow
from it. Secondly, by guiding states’ practice throughout the years, it has become a
significant part of international customary law and, thirdly, its global circulation as
one of the world’s most translated documents has enabled it to have a crucial impact
on the education of humanity. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is, of
course, exceptional in the level of influence it has on global politics, yet it exemplifies
the potential of Assembly resolutions and illustrates the effect they have – although
usually on a much smaller scale.
With regard to international peace and security, the Charter specifies that “[t]he
General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the
maintenance of international peace and security”62 and “shall initiate studies and
make recommendations for the purpose of promoting international co-operation in
the political field and encouraging the progressive development of international law
and its codification.”63 In specific cases of conflict, the Charter grants the Assembly
the right to call the attention of the Council to situations which are likely to endanger
international peace. It can, moreover, make recommendations on these types of
situations as long as the SC is not seized of the matter.
Although stated quite clearly in the Charter, this restriction was disputed early on and,
in practice, has not been followed consequentially by the GA. Only five years after
62 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter IV, Article 11;
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter4.shtml
63 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter IV, Article 13;
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter4.shtml
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the signature of the Charter, the Assembly passed the ‘Uniting For Peace’ resolution
in response to the Korean War, stating that: “If the Security Council, because of lack
of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears
to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General
Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate
recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a
breach of the peace or acts of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to
maintain or restore international peace and security.”64 Since then, the procedures of
the Uniting For Peace resolution have been invoked eleven times.65 In practice, issues
of international peace and security often dominate the agenda of the GA.66 It can only,
however, make recommendations with regard to a conflict and cannot authorize force
against a Member State. This remains the undisputed prerogative of the SC.
In article 15, the Charter establishes the accountability of the SC to the GA: “The
General Assembly shall receive and consider annual and special reports from the
Security Council; these reports shall include an account of the measures that the
Security Council has decided upon or taken to maintain international peace and
security.”67 Although the SC has strongly neglected the obligation to provide special
reports, the annual report to the Assembly always receives much attention, and its
submission routinely entails a general appraisal in the GA of the wider relationship
64 United Nations General Assembly, “Uniting For Peace”, UN Doc No. A/Res/377 (V)AA, 1950.
65 Dominik Zaum, “The Security Council, the General Assembly, and War: The Uniting for Peace
Resolution”, in: Vaughan Lowe et al. (eds.), The Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought
and Practice since 1945, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008, p. 159.
66 See Erskine Childers and Brian Urquhart, Renewing the United Nations System, Uppsala: Dag
Hammersköld Foundation 1994, p. 130.
67 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter IV, Article 14;
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter4.shtml
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between the two bodies. Independently of the instrumental use of its content, the
annual report is the primary manifestation of the SC’s accountability to the GA and it
is therefore valued very highly in the wider membership. With regard to
accountability, it should also be kept in mind that all of those states who at any point
of time compose the Council are also members of the Assembly, and most of their
representatives will participate in deliberations of both institutions. There is thus an
inbuilt personal connection between the two bodies, which entails an informal
relationship of accountability between them.
How can the GA’s participation increase the legitimacy of the UN’s decision-making
procedures on issues of global peace and security? What can its input add to the
deliberations in the SC?  Firstly, the fact that it includes every Member State means
that its deliberations are based on a much wider spectrum of democratically
legitimized input and it can, therefore, serve as the transistor for the legitimacy that
flows from various domestic public spheres to the UN via the state. While there are
many states in the Assembly that are not accountable to their domestic publics, this
should not lead to the disregard of the larger number of governments who can claim
varying degrees of democratic legitimacy. Many governments have been invested
with authority delegated to them through democratic elections. The facts that a
significant number of its members are not accountable to their domestic publics, and
that states with a gigantic population such as China have the same vote as minuscule
states such as Monaco, both have a negative impact on the question of who is
represented in the Assembly to what degree. Yet, the GA remains the most globally
representative political institution in the world, and the level of democratic input it
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receives needs to be acknowledged – especially when compared to the much less
representative Security Council.
As Bovens explains, in exemplary cases “accountability is exercised along the chain
of principal–agent relationships. Voters delegate their sovereignty to popular
representatives, who, in turn, at least in parliamentary democracies, delegate the
majority of their authorities to a cabinet of ministers. The ministers subsequently
delegate many of their authorities to their civil servants or to various, more or less
independent, administrative bodies.”68 The domestic authorization of its members, in
turn, enables the GA to delegate authority internationally. Thus, deliberative synergy
between the two bodies can be established not only via discursive mechanisms, but
also via mechanisms of delegation, i.e., hierarchical, supervisory, fiscal and electoral
mechanisms. The GA offers a platform for each Member State to voice its
perspectives on issues of peace and security and to justify its assertions and validity
claims in front of a global audience. It is the embodiment of the principal of sovereign
equality, excluding none and granting every state equal say and equal voting rights in
its decision-making. In this regard, the institutional structure of the GA is conducive
to an atmosphere of respect in its deliberations.
(3) Today, more than 3500 NGOs have consultative status with the UN. The number
of those that have one or more representatives based in New York is, however,
significantly smaller, and given the size of the NGO Working Group of the Security
Council and the complications it experiences in maintaining relations with the
68 Bovens, Analysing and Assessing Accountability, p. 455.
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Council, as well as the limited number of Arria-Formula69 meetings with NGO
representatives that the SC holds each year, it is reasonable to estimate that less than a
hundred, probably around fifty, NGOs have regular exchanges with the members of
the SC.
The NGO community at the UN provides a qualitatively different input to the
essentially particularistic and territorial perspectives of the Member States. Rather
than representing certain defined populations, they represent various discourses
present in an emerging global public sphere.70 In this sense, they constitute a
problematic yet indispensable issue-oriented substitute for the lack of more
overarching transnational representation based on the delegation of authority. The
representativeness of NGOs and the legitimacy of their input is qualitatively different
from, and complementary to, that of the General Assembly. In fact, none of the NGO
representatives I interviewed claimed to speak for some voiceless population, but
noticeably all of them based their representation on the values for which they stand as
an organization. Since they have not been delegated any authority, deliberative
synergy between the SC and NGOs cannot be based on delegation, but only on
discursive mechanisms.
One of the advantages of the NGOs is that they promise to bring a sincere
consideration of the common good into the UN’s deliberations on issues of global
peace and security. Unlike the Member States, these NGOs usually do not represent
69 The Arria Formula enables a member of the Council to invite other Council members to an informal
meeting, held outside of the Council chambers. The meeting is called for the purpose of a briefing
given by one or more persons, considered as expert in a matter of concern to the Council. At regular
Council meetings, traditionally only delegations and high government officials are allowed to speak.
70 John Dryzek, Deliberative Global Politics: Discourse and Democracy in a Divided World,
Cambridge; Malden, MA: Polity Press 2006.
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particular populations, but global discourses, and most of them define themselves
through the pursuit of universally applicable values. This frees them from the
necessity to value the well-being of one defined population over that of another and
allows them to engage in a more genuine and universal consideration of the common
good. As discursive representatives, these NGOs owe their status to the fact that they
follow a coherent normative rational, and they are therefore dependent upon the
promotion of the common good as envisioned by their particular discourse. In this
regard, the NGO community’s limitation to discursive accountability can be seen as
an advantage. On the other hand, the NGO representatives are wedded to the
discourses they represent and cannot, therefore, easily engage in compromise and
negotiation.
The NGO community at the UN can, moreover, serve as facilitator with regard to the
various types of discursive accountability: one of the their greatest potentials is to
provide the transparency that is required for market, peer, public reputational, legal
and support mechanisms of accountability to function adequately with regard to the
Security Council.71 As Grant and Keohane point out, while transparency is generally
important when it comes to accountability, it is especially vital to these particular
mechanisms of accountability.72 These mechanisms are inherently dependent upon the
widespread availability of information.
Generally speaking, there are two important roles the NGO community can and often
does play with regard to the transparency of the UN’s decision-making. Firstly, the
71 In the context of the Security Council, legal accountability falls squarely into the category of
discoursive mechanisms of accountability. The Council is not subjected to any type of judicial review,
but, instead, determines its own legal boundaries. This has been particularly evident in the self-driven
gradual expansion of its competencies since the end of the Cold War.
72 Grant and Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, p. 39.
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NGOs can attempt to shed light on the often obscure procedures of the UN’s decision-
making by filtering out diplomatic niceties and legal pedantism and thereby making
them more comprehensible for the wider public. Even the diplomats at the UN
themselves sometimes complain about the inaccessibility of UN reports and
resolutions. But more importantly, NGO representatives are often able to obtain
information on the contents and dynamics of those intergovernmental deliberations at
the UN that are closed to the public. Skilled NGO representatives can learn a great
deal about what is happening behind closed doors by engaging in bilateral
consultations with well-disposed governments, by using multilateral venues such as
the NGO Working Group on the Security Council or Arria-Formula meetings, and by
unofficial discussions with various acquaintances within and around the UN. In recent
years, the NGO Security Council Report has been particularly systematic and
industrious in its attempts to bring transparency to the content and dynamics of the
Council’s deliberations.73
Secondly, the NGO community can bring to the attention of the members of the SC
issues they do not know about, or do not want to know about, and provide the relevant
information from the ground. In this regard, some of the larger humanitarian NGOs
are especially important, as they often know more about the details of crises than do
many governments.74 Giving transparency to both deliberations within the UN as well
as to events on the ground enables the NGO community at the UN to expose the
connections between them and to construct a coherent political narrative tailored to
the wider public. In this way they are often able to put considerable public pressure on
73 http://www.securitycouncilreport.org
74 Interview with Cora Weiss, President, Hague Appeal For Peace, New York, 9 November 2010.
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the relevant governments. As James Paul explains: “the most effective strategy
combine[s] diplomacy in New York with world-wide public advocacy campaigns.”75
The Deliberative System in Action: Resolution 1325
Security Council resolution 1325 on the issue of ‘Women, Peace and Security’ is a
good example for how, under the right circumstances, both the NGO community and
the GA can have a strong and direct impact on the Council, creating deliberative
synergy within the UN and thereby increasing the legitimacy of its decision-making.
As Cora Weiss explains, “1325 was started by women in the field. It came out of
International Alert in London and the Hague Appeal for Peace conference in May
1999.”76 Momentum for a SC resolution had been building up in the NGO
community, and on International Women’s Day, March 8, 2000, they realized that the
time for action had come.
That day, in his capacity as the President of the SC, Ambassador Anwarul Chowdhury
of Bangladesh issued a press statement in which he emphasized the links between the
issues of gender and security.77 According to Chowdhury, this statement was
motivated by his personal engagement with the international women’s movement:
The “women, peace and security agenda came up forcefully in my dialogue with the
NGOs and this was something that I felt needed a boost in the work of the SC.”78 He had
even attempted to issue a presidential statement which, unlike the press statement given,
75 James Paul, “Working with Nongovernmental Organizations”, in: David Malone (ed.), The UN
Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, Boulder, CO; London: Lynne Rienner 2004,
p. 383.
76 Cora Weiss, Hague Appeal for Peace.
77 United Nations Security Council, “Peace Inextricably Linked with Equality Between Women and
Men Says Security Council, in International Women's Day Statement” Press Release SC/6816, 2000.
78 Quoted in Soumita Basu, Security through Transformations: The Case of the Passage of UN Security
Council Resolution 1325 on Women and Peace and Security, PhD Thesis at the Department of
International Politics, Aberystwyth University 2009, p. 173.
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would have been an official SC document. But, in his own words, “due to the lack of
support of the P-5, I had to reach a compromise for a Press Statement.”79 Within the
Council, Mali, Jamaica and Namibia had been supportive of his initiative. Felicity Hill
from the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) witnessed
the statement in the SC itself and approached Chowdhury afterwards in order to
explore possible venues for follow-up on the issue. Chowdhury’s engagement with
the issue encouraged the NGO community to solidify their networking and advocacy,
and in May 2000, the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security was
founded with the goal of achieving a SC resolution.
As a first step, the group created lists of experts on the subject, assembled the best
literature and compiled folders with summaries and other information which could be
handed to the SC members’ delegations in the meetings. The members of the group
then divided the country missions among themselves in order to engage in
individualized and targeted lobbying. A media strategy was put in place to maximize
attention on the issue.80 One of the first meetings the group had was with the
delegation of Namibia. As a host to a recent UN Department for Peacekeeping
Operations seminar that resulted in the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan
of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support
Operations, Nambia had been very much involved in the issue and, therefore, much
hope was placed in Ambassador Martin Andjaba to place it on the agenda of the
Council.81
79 Quoted in Basu, Security through Transformations, p. 173.
80 Sara Poehlman-Doumbouya and Felicity Hill, “Women and Peace in the United Nations”, New
Routes, 6 (3), 2001, p. 31.
81 Felicity Hill, Mikele Aboitiz and Sara Poehlman-Doumbouya, ”Nongovernmental Organizations’
Role in the Buildup and Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325”, Signs: Journal of
Women in Culture and Society, 28 (4), 2003, pp. 1258-1259.
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As one NGO representative puts it, the Council members “needed a lot of
convincing.”82 Over the summer, the group continued to hold meetings in an effort to
broaden support and win further allies on the SC. The group also mobilized domestic
NGOs to put pressure on the Council members in the respective state capitals.
Alongside the states mentioned above, the group eventually won the support of
Canada, the Netherlands and the UK. As a member of the P-5, the latter’s
involvement was especially important and, in the end, the UK even signed up as one
of the sponsors of the resolution.83
At the same time as the NGO Working Group was lobbying the members of the SC,
the GA convened in a special session entitled ‘Women 2000: gender equality,
development and peace for the twenty-first century.’ Its debates included a wide array
of contributions from Member States reflecting the diversity of the Assembly, and a
number of NGOs were invited to brief the GA on the topic. In June, the Assembly
issued a report on the subject, including two draft resolutions which were adopted in
the regular session later that year.84 The title is telling in that it already includes the
words ‘women’ and ‘peace’ – only one step away from including the logical corollary
‘and security’, which opens up the way to the SC. The French ambassador later
emphasized this point in the respective debate of the Council.85 Moreover, the
Assembly’s debates ensured that the issue stayed on the agenda of the Member States’
permanent missions, which made it easier for the NGOs to draw attention to their
related concerns.
82 Quoted in Basu, Security through Transformations, p. 176.
83 Basu, Security through Transformations, p. 144.
84 United Nations General Assembly, “Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Whole of the twenty-
third special session of the General Assembly”, UN Doc No. A/S-23/10/Rev.1, 2000.
85 United Nations Security Council, “Debate on Women and Peace and Security”, UN Doc No.
S/PV.4208, 2000.
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As momentum built up among the UN membership and the NGO community, the
Working Group decided to coordinate its approach with the relevant UN agencies.
With the help of Global Policy Forum, WILPF organized a meeting at the United
Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) in order to discuss the possibility
of SC action on the topic.86 In the beginning, the UNIFEM personnel were skeptical
of the group’s attempt to obtain a SC resolution, since, in their view, the members of
the Council were not disposed to such a measure. It was only after they realized that
the group had made inroads with regard to the Council members that UNIFEM
became an important actor in the process.87 Personnel of both UNIFEM and the
Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues aided the group in using the
appropriate draft language and “provided insight on the political strategy that was
adapted to support passage of the resolution.”88 UNIFEM also provided the venue for
the negotiations between the NGOs and the Council members. The ‘oval table’ in the
UNIFEM office provided the space in which the two sides could confer as equals.89
In early September, Namibia announced that the Security Council would hold an open
session on the topic of women, peace and security under Namibia’s upcoming
presidency. During the next couple of weeks, NGOs continued their efforts to lobby
the various SC members and composed and circulated a draft resolution. On October
23, the Security Council met with selected representatives of the WG on Woman,
Peace and Security in an Arria-formula briefing and in the following days it held an
open session: “the public gallery of the Security Council chamber was filled with
86 Interview with James Paul, Executive Director, Global Policy Forum, New York, 13 October 2010.
87 Cynthia Cockburn, From Where We Stand: War, Women’s Activism and Feminist Analysis, London:
Zed Books 2007, p. 140-141.
88 Carol Cohn, Helen Kinsella and Sheri Gibbings, “Women, Peace and Security: Resolution 1325”,
International Feminist Journal of Politics, 6 (1), 2004, p. 131.
89 Basu, Security through Transformations, p. 177.
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women. There was a lot of clapping—something unheard of in that particular
chamber—and the word historic was used repeatedly. At last, women’s perspectives
on war and peace became visible in the Security Council through more than forty
speeches. Some of the recommendations from the NGO Working Group, including
some of the language from the group’s draft resolution, were put into the text of the
resolution adopted on October 31.”90
In the months between March and October 2000, the NGO Working Group on
Women, Peace and Security had succeeded in turning a Security Council that would
not allow Chowdhury to issue a Presidential statement linking the issues of gender
and security into a Council that would adopt a historic resolution expressing and
emphasizing the importance of exactly this link. After having interviewed various
members of the group, UNIFEM officials and Security Council members, Soumita
Basu concludes that it is not only widely recognized that the group had prepared the
earlier drafts of the resolution, but they had also successfully ‘educated’ the Council
members on a topic of which the latter had had only little previous knowledge.91 She
argues, accordingly, that “the agency for the realization of SC 1325 lies
predominantly with civil society.”92
Laura Shepherd compares a letter to the Council, 23 October 2000, in which the NGO
WG on Women, Peace and Security outlines its expectations, with the eventual result
of the meetings: resolution 1325.93 She comes to the conclusion that many of the
group’s hopes had indeed been realized. It “was an historic and transformative
90 Hill et al., Nongovernmental Organizations’ Role, p. 1260.
91 Basu, Security through Transformations, p. 180.
92 Basu, Security through Transformations, p. 183.
93 United Nations Security Council, “SCR 1325 on Women and Peace and Security”, UN Doc No.
S/Res/1325, 2000.
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campaign on the behalf of the NGO WG. As evidenced in this section, the NGO WG
has a strong claim to author-ity over the Resolution […]”94 Weiss, who had
participated in both the Arria Formula briefing and the open session, can therefore
rightly claim: “I was one of the drafters of 1325.”95 Through the coordinated lobbying
at both the capitals and at the UN itself, the NGO community was successful in
bringing its consideration of the common good into the SC.
Resolution 1325 not only demonstrates the impact NGOs can have on the Council’s
decision-making, but also illustrates how the SC’s deliberations are defined and
predetermined by previous and simultaneous debates in the GA. In its preamble, the
resolution itself acknowledges the input of the GA by referring to the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)96 and,
more importantly in this case, to the report “Women 2000: gender equality,
development and peace for the twenty-first century.”97 Although the CEDAW had
been adopted 20 years earlier, its impact on resolution 1325 demonstrates the
potential of the GA to set lasting norms and discursive boundaries that define the SC’s
deliberations. The Women 2000 report of the GA, however, had a more direct impact
on the resolution. The report was part of a debate in the Assembly that took place
concurrently with the buildup of resolution 1325. Unsurprisingly, it is, therefore, also
related more closely in substance.
94 Laura Shepherd, “Power and Authority in the Production of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1325”, International Studies Quarterly, 52 (2), 2008, p. 192.
95 Cora Weiss, Hague Appeal for Peace.
96 United Nations General Assembly, “Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women”, UN Doc No. A/RES/34/180, 1979.
97 United Nations General Assembly, “Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Whole of the twenty-
third special session of the General Assembly”, UN Doc No. A/S-23/10/Rev.1, 2000.
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Not only did many of the statements refer to the debate in the GA, but a considerable
number of the speakers had taken part in it themselves. In fact, Theo-Ben Gurirab,
Foreign Minister of Namibia, who convened and presided over the open session of the
SC, had also chaired the respective debate in the GA. Obviously, the personal
connections between the debate in the Assembly and that in the Council were very
strong. The impact of the respective session of the GA is perhaps expressed most
clearly in the statement of the Chinese ambassador, who in the SC maintained that
“[t]oday’s open debate could be considered part of the follow-up of the June special
session.”98 By the time the Council convened, the issue had already been screened in
the GA, allowing for broader participation and requiring justification to a wider
audience.
Conclusion: The Desirability Score
In a discussion of the role of public spheres with regard to the legitimacy of
international organizations, I have come to the conclusion that, while there exists
today a weak global public sphere, the democratic legitimacy that an international
organization, whose decision-making potentially affects all of humanity, can directly
derive from it is low. The same applies to the democratic legitimacy which an
international organization such as the UN can derive from domestic public spheres via
state governments. This leaves these international organizations with two separately
inadequate sources of democratic legitimacy. Deliberative democracy has the
potential to combine and interlock the two streams of democratic legitimacy flowing
from the weak global public sphere and domestic public spheres respectively.
98 United Nations Security Council, “Debate on Women and Peace and Security”, UN Doc No.
S/PV.4208, 2000.
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The next step was a discussion of how models of deliberative democracy can guide
the reform of international organizations such as the UN. The criteria elaborated by
Steiner et al. provide the point of departure for the clarification of the objectives of
reform. By combining Goodin’s idea of sequencing deliberative moments and
Dryzek’s elements of a deliberative system, I have conceptualized the UN’s
governance of issues of peace and security as a deliberative system and discussed the
important role of transmission and accountability in creating deliberating synergy
within this system.
On the basis of this theoretical framework, I have then analyzed the sources of
legitimacy of the UN’s decision-making procedures and discussed how they can form
a deliberative system. SC resolution 1325 is a strong example of how deliberative
synergies can bind the various deliberative moments into a coherent deliberative
system, and thereby increase the legitimacy of the UN’s decision-making. It should be
the goal of any comprehensive effort for reform of the UN’s decision-making
procedures on issues of global peace and security to create an institutional
environment that enables and promotes this type of deliberative synergies.
With this in mind, the evaluation of proposals for the reform of the UN requires
answers to the following set of questions: (1) Would the suggested measures improve
the deliberative quality of the institution in question? Which of the criteria of
deliberative democracy would they improve? Are they detrimental to the fulfillment
of any of the other criteria? (2) Would the suggested measures improve the respective
institution’s capability of fulfilling its systemic function? (3) Would they promote the
occurrence and quality of deliberative synergy within the overall system?
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Ideally, the suggested measures would call for positive answers to all three of these
questions. In most cases, however, it is likely that at least one of the answers will be
negative. This entails the question of how to balance the positive and negative factors
against each other. The most important aspect is the strengthening of deliberative
synergy. The better the quality and quantity of these synergies the more participation
there is in decision-making. Enabling the GA and the NGO community at the UN to
give their input into the SC’s final decision-making allows for more voices to be
heard and indirectly entails more input from global and domestic public spheres. The
function of an institution in the deliberative system, furthermore, takes priority over
efforts to improve the general deliberative quality of said institution. As I have argued
above, in the context of global governance, it is unreasonable to expect a single
deliberative moment to satisfy all of the criteria of deliberative democracy. For this
reason, it is advisable to enable institutions to fulfill their deliberative function within
a deliberative system, rather than to attempt the perfection of a single deliberative
moment. Reflecting these priorities, the ‘Desirability Score’ of a proposal for reform
will be determined according to this procedure:
1. DELIBERATIVE MOMENT: For each of the criteria of deliberative democracy
that the measure is expected to promote, one score point is given. For each criterion it
is expected to deteriorate, one negative score point is given. The criteria that define
the systemic function of the institution do not count in this category.
2. SYSTEMIC FUNCTION: If the reform proposal is expected to improve the
institution’s capability of fulfilling its systemic function, two score points are given. If
it hinders it in fulfilling this function, two negative points are given.
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3. DELIBERATIVE SYNERGY: In the case that the measure promises to promote
the occurrence and quality of deliberative synergy within the overall system, three
points are given. If the opposite applies, three negative points are given. If the
measure has neither positive nor negative consequences concerning any of these
questions, no points will be given with regard to that question.
All these points will be added up to determine the proposal’s DESIRABILITY
SCORE. The higher the resulting score above zero, the more desirable is the proposed
reform, the further beneath zero, the less desirable the proposed reform.
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II. The Politics of UN Reform: The Feasibility Score
Introduction
Improving the legitimacy of the United Nations’ decision-making procedures on
issues of global peace and security is, of course, itself an enterprise that is dependent
upon the political conditions of the less than ideal manner in which decisions are
made at the UN. This is an inevitable factor that no treatise on UN reform can ignore,
and it is, therefore, imperative to clarify and analyze both the potential political
driving forces for institutional change as well as the obstacles such proposals may
encounter.
This chapter will discuss the political conditions that determine the feasibility of UN
reform. It will review the institutional procedures required for a revision of the UN
Charter and discuss the conditions for legally less demanding procedural reforms.
Together with empirical examples of successful and unsuccessful initiatives and an
overview of the basic fault lines among the UN membership regarding the issue, this
will provide the foundation for the elaboration of the key criteria to be taken into
account when considering the political feasibility of proposals for reform. Such a
conceptual framework is necessary for the systematic evaluation of the large number
of proposals that are to be dealt with.
UN Reform
The founders of the United Nations created stringent requirements for amending the
Charter. To them, the Charter presented a still delicate compromise, achieved in
tedious and painstaking negotiations, which had to be set in stone if it were to serve as
the foundation of a new world order. The relevant article reads “[a]mendments to the
65
present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when
they have been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General
Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by
two thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent
members of the Security Council.”99 On paper, the fact that the approval of
amendments by the permanent members is necessitated only in the process of
ratification but not in the vote for adoption in the GA seems like an insignificant
technicality. The history of UN reform demonstrates, however, that in practice, this
legal detail can make a big difference.
In an effort to appease those states that had only grudgingly acquiesced in the
inequities of the Charter, the P5 agreed on establishing an automatic review
mechanism.100 Article 109, by promising a review conference, was meant to function
as such: if after the first 10 years following the foundation of the UN, no review
conference had been held, the issue should automatically be placed on the agenda of
the GA. The conference would have required the same prerequisites for amendments
as the respective GA procedure, i.e., the approval of two thirds of the Member States
and the subsequent ratification by two thirds, including all of the P5. Yet, history
confirmed the fears of the founders that the charter presented a unique compromise, a
product of extraordinary and temporarily limited circumstances, which only a few
years later would have appeared unachievable.101 The ensuing rivalry of the
99 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter XVIII, Article 108,
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter18.shtml
100 Edward Luck, “Reforming the United Nations: Lessons from a History in Progress”, in: Jean Krasno
(ed.), The United Nations: Confronting the Challenges of a Global Society, Boulder, Co; London:
Lynne Rienner 2004, p. 362.
101 Richard Falk, “Reforming the United Nations: Global Civil Society Perspectives and Initiatives”,
Glasius, Marlies, Mary Kaldor and Helmut Anheiner (eds.), Global Civil Society Yearbook 2005/2006,
London: Sage 2005, p. 170.
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superpowers destroyed any hopes for reform and rendered article 109 inconsequential:
in the end, no review conference was held.
The stringent legal requirements for amending the Charter explain why, in its now
almost seven decades of existence, it has occurred on only three accounts, and only
one of these cases pertains to the UN’s governance of issues of global peace and
security.102 All three of these reforms were the result of the process of
decolonialization and the ensuing influx of new Member States. By 1963, the UN had
grown to 114 members, more than double its original membership. This increase in
membership changed its regional balance and thereby entailed a relative over-
representation of Europe and Latin America in the Security Council. Hence the new
supermajority of developing states in the GA pressed for increased representation, but
since all of the permanent members – except China – had announced their opposition
to such a reform, these efforts seemed destined to fail.
Nonetheless, in December 1963, the GA passed resolution 1991 which called for an
expansion of the SC from eleven to fifteen members. Of the P5, only China voted in
favor of this resolution. As more and more countries ratified the resolution, however,
the superpowers succumbed to their rivalry for influence with the developing states.
After the Soviet Union changed its mind and ratified the amendment, the P3 were
quick to follow, and in 1965, the Council was expanded. As this case demonstrates,
even if a resolution calling for amendments is initiated without the support of all of
the P5, it can ultimately succeed by building up momentum in the process of its
ratification.
102 The other two amendments modified the Economic and Social Council.
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Although there has been only one amendment to the Charter concerning the decision-
making procedures on issues of global peace and security, this does not mean that the
system has remained static in the last decades. Over the years, many lower-level
procedural modifications have notably altered the UN’s decision-making. The most
significant development in the decision-making of the Council throughout the Cold
War was its increasing recourse to negotiations behind closed doors. The first surge in
the number of the private ‘consultations of the whole’ took place in the late seventies
when the Consultation Room was built,103 and a second noticeable increase occurred
in the early nineties.104 By this time, as the Permanent Representative of France, Jean-
Bernard Mérimée, complained in 1994, this type of meeting had “become the
Council’s characteristic working method, while public meetings, originally the norm,
are increasingly rare and increasingly devoid of content: everyone knows that when
the Council goes into public meetings everything has been decided in advance […]
informal meetings are not even real Council meetings at all; they have no official
existence, and are assigned no number. Yet it is in these meetings that all the
Council’s work is carried out.”105
There is, in addition to the sheer numbers, ample evidence that today most issues are
decided in consultations of the whole: procedural votes in the Council have become
very rare, votes on the adoption of the agenda hardly occur anymore and seldom does
a draft resolution fail when put to the vote.106 The significant decrease in the use of
103 Jochen Prantl, “Informal Groups of States and the UN Security Council”, International
Organization, 59 (3), 2005, p. 572.
104 Dominik Zaum, “The Security Council, the General Assembly, and War: The Uniting for Peace
Resolution”, in: Vaughan Lowe et al. (eds.), The Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought
and Practice since 1945, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008, p. 164.
105 United Nations Security Council, “Security Council working methods and procedure”, UN Doc No.
S/PV.3483, 1994.
106 Michael Wood, “Security Council Working Methods and Procedure: Recent Developments”,
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 45 (1), 1996, p. 155.
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the veto, mostly celebrated as a symbol of the post-Cold War consensus among the P-
5, is also rooted in the increasing use of consultations of the whole. The – legally –
unofficial consultations of the whole are today listed in the UN Journal under the
section that is designated for official meetings of UN bodies.
In addition to the increased recourse to closed meetings, the expanding work load of
the SC further aggravated discontent with its decision-making procedures. The end of
the Cold War saw a tremendous jump in Council activity: in the period between
March 6, 1991 and October 13, 1993, the SC adopted 185 resolutions, compared to
only 685 resolutions in the previous 46 years. These numbers testify to the Council’s
prodigious activity in the post-Cold War years.107 This trend has continued, albeit in a
less dramatic and more incremental fashion, up to this day. More and more issues are
being tabled on the Council’s agenda and its responsibilities are expanding steadily.
This does not only severely limit the time available for the deliberation of individual
issues but it also makes it more difficult for outsiders to track developments in the
Council’s decision-making processes.
The Political Fault Lines
An evaluation of the feasibility of proposals for the reform of the UN necessitates a
clear perspective on the political fault lines and voting alignments among its
membership. In this regard, the issue of UN reform is a particularly complex matter,
as it does not fit neatly into the usual voting blocs and varies in respect to the different
aspects of reform. I will briefly analyze the fault lines regarding those aspects of
reform that are crucial in promoting a deliberative system of decision-making
107 David Malone, “Introduction”, in: David Malone (ed.), The UN Security Council: From the Cold
War to the 21st Century, Boulder; London: Lynne Rienner 2004, p. 6.
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procedures for the UN’s governance of global peace and security: the reform of (1)
the SC’s membership and voting rights, (2) the SC’s working methods, (3) the
relationship between the SC and the GA, and (4) the relationship between the SC and
Civil Society.
(1) The composition and voting procedures of the Security Council have been
controversial issues that predate the inauguration of the UN, and there has not been
one moment throughout its history in which reform has not been up for discussion.
Yet, as mentioned above, to this day the SC has only once been substantially reformed
when it was expanded in 1965. The issue of Council reform was again officially
placed on the agenda of the GA in 1979, but it was not until after the end of the Cold
War, as the SC was freed of its deadlock and its level of activity soared to new
heights, that both the interests in, as well as the perceived prospects of substantial
reform increased significantly.
On the grounds of their importance as global economic powers and financial
contributors to the UN, Germany and Japan began lobbying for permanents seats on
the Council. From their perspective, there was no stronger reason for France and the
UK to enjoy this privilege than there was for them to do so, and many Member States
could follow their logic, as did Italy, albeit with a very different idea of how to deal
with this situation. Fearing its degradation relative to the other European powers,
France, Germany and the UK, the Italian government proposed one permanent seat
for the EU as a whole.108 Since this would have required of France and the UK to give
up their seats and of Germany to give up its aspirations, the plan had no chance of
108 Dimitris Bourantonis, The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform, London; New York:
Routledge 2005, p. 35.
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success. The antagonism between Italy and Germany, however, is, to this day, one of
the keys to understanding the politics of SC reform.
When in September of 1992, a number of states from the Non-Aligned Movement
(NAM), first and foremost India, also began pressing for a reform of the SC, the P5
could no longer contain the debate. In an effort to defuse some of the mounting
pressure for substantial reform, they introduced a number of measures to fulfill
NAM’s demands for more transparency in the SC’s decision-making procedures. But
while the latter acknowledged the improvements made in subsequent years, they also
made it clear that “procedural reformulations in the working methods of the Council,
meritorious as they may be, should not be taken as palliatives for a substantial
restructuring of the Council itself.”109 So far, the continued calls for substantial
reform remain inconsequential for a different reason: while basically the entire
membership of the UN calls for a reform of the SC, opinions on what these reforms
should entail diverge widely. Much to the convenience of the P5, who are left in a
position in which they can apply a policy of divide et impera, there is fierce
opposition between the various interest groups. Efforts at overcoming these frictions,
such as the incremental Razali Plan110 in 1997 or Kofi Annan’s push for
comprehensive reform articulated in 2005 in his report In Larger Freedom,111 failed
on account of the seemingly incommensurable expectations of the Member States.
Over the years of debate on SC reform, more or less coherent groups of states with
common interests and expectations regarding the matter have formed themselves.
109 United Nations Security Council, “Security Council Working Methods and Procedure”, UN Doc. No
S/PV.3483, 1994.
110 http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/200/41310.html
111 United Nations General Assembly, “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and
Human Rights for All. Report of the Secretary-General“, UN Doc No. A/59/2005, 2005.
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Today there are basically four such groups among the membership: The Group of
Four (G4), the Uniting For Consensus group (UFC), the African Group, and the P5.
The G4 is the group of states most determined in pushing for a substantial reform of
the SC. It derives its name from the alliance of four states: Brazil, Germany, India,
and Japan. United by their common goal of acquiring a permanent seat on the
Council, these powerful states have bundled their influence on the UN membership in
order to press forward the process of reform. The main opposition to the G4 is posed
by the UFC. This is a group that is made up mainly of middle-power states who
perceive an upgrade of the status of the G4 as a relative deterioration of their own
position. Many of the UFC members are the regional rivals of the G4 states: Italy and
Spain oppose Germany, Argentina and Mexico oppose Brazil, Pakistan opposes India,
and South Korea opposes Japan, but the group also includes states such as Canada or
Turkey who are less motivated by regional dynamics. Instead of new permanent seats,
UFC demands only new non-permanent seats.
The African Group is the most complex cluster of states. On the face of it, this group
is united behind the goal of achieving greater representation of Africa through both
additional permanent seats and additional non-permanent seats. The unity
demonstrated to the outside world, however, veils only thinly the fundamental
disagreements within the group. While the African Group generally expects to acquire
two new permanent seats for the region, there is no consensus on which states should
gain these. The most prospective candidates are Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa, but
a number of other states as well claim to be suitable candidates. Then there are also
several states who officially support the position of the group, such as Algeria, but at
the same time attempt to stall the process of reform by insisting on the immediate and
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full veto-right for new permanent members of the Council – a demand perceived as so
unachievable that even the G4 have somewhat relaxed their position on it. This
insistence leaves the latter torn between their dependence on African votes on the one
hand and the need to make SC reform acceptable to the P5 on the other. The African
Group therefore holds the potential to tip the scales in favor of the G4’s reform
proposal, but the group’s internal discord is very unlikely to allow for this to unfold.
In the perspective of a number of comparatively smaller states, neither of these
alternatives is found to be attractive. Since either way their chances of Council
membership would remain very slim, they do not have a real interest in an expansion
of permanent or non-permanent seats. For this reason, some of them demand
procedural improvements rather than a reform of the membership of the SC. The P5,
finally, are mainly interested in maintaining their privileges and are therefore
comfortable with the discord among the other groups, which allows them to give
lukewarm support to the aspirations of selected countries knowing that others will
prevent them from achieving these. At times, of course, some of the P5 display more
flexibility than others, but their enthusiasm for a reform of Council membership is
generally limited. At first, it was France and the UK who were the most opposed to a
reform of the membership, later it was the US, and today Russia is the permanent
member most obvious in its reluctance to support reform.
(2) The drastic rise in Council activity in the early 1990s led also to demands for
change in its working methods. The wider UN membership increasingly voiced its
dissatisfaction with the SC’s lack of both transparency and opportunities for direct or
indirect participation of non-Council Members while others, particularly the P5, grew
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more and more concerned about its ability to keep up with the pace of developments
due to the sprawling number of items on its agenda. In response to this, France in
1994 convened an open debate in the SC on the subject of improving its working
methods.112 This debate initiated a slow and careful process of procedural changes
throughout the second half of the decade that included innovations such as briefings
to outsiders and new meeting formats. Yet these reforms did little to meet the
expectations of the wider membership. The issue was discussed further during the
Millennium summit of 2005 and was included in the outcome document as the
recommendation to “continue to adapt its working methods so as to increase the
involvement of States not members of the Council in its work, as appropriate, enhance
its accountability to the membership and increase the transparency of its work.”113
This recommendation set off two separate but related campaigns for the reform of the
Council’s working methods. On the one hand, Japan assumed the chairmanship of the
SC’s Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions
(IWGD) allowing it to push the issue from within the Council. The outcome of these
efforts was the Note of the President 507 which gives a comprehensive overview of
various issues regarding the Council’s working methods.114 After being again elected
into the SC for the years 2009-2010, Japan had itself reappointed as chair of the
IWGD and formally updated Note 507 which today still serves as the basis for all of
the open debates in the SC on working methods.
112 United Nations Security Council, “Security Council working methods and procedure”, UN Doc No.
S/PV.3483, 1994.
113 United Nations General Assembly, “2005 World Summit Outcome”, UN Doc No. A/60/L.1, 2005.
114 United Nations Security Council, “Note by the President of the Security Council”, UN Doc No.
S/2006/507, 2006.
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On the other hand, Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland
formed in 2005 the group that came to be known as the Small Five (S5) and began a
campaign to increase pressure from the outside for a reform of the Council’s working
methods. As relatively small Member States, the S5 do not have much at stake in the
debate on the expansion of the SC, and they therefore felt the need to emphasize the
issue of working methods. In 2006, they circulated in the GA a draft resolution with
the title Follow up to the Millennium Summit that included suggestions for more
opportunities for the participation of the wider membership in the Council’s
deliberations.115 Although, in the end, the S5 decided not to put the draft to a vote,
they decided to continue lobbying the Assembly on these matters.
In 2008, the S5, aided by Costa Rica’s Council membership at the time and despite
initial resistance from the P5, together with Belgium succeeded in lobbying for an
open debate in the SC on the implementation of Note 507.116 Being the first of its kind
since 1994, this debate gave new impetus to the cause, and by mobilizing much of the
membership to speak out on the issue, it increased the pressure on the SC to review its
working methods. During its presidency in 2011, Portugal held another open debate
on the implementation of Note 507.117 Portugal had assumed its membership on the
Council with the ambition of taking over Japan’s role as champion for the reform of
working methods. Because the US dreaded too much activism on the issue, however,
it lobbied the other P5 into appointing Bosnia-Herzegovina as chair of the IWGD.118
This did not deter Portugal from convening the open debate, and in 2012 it was finally
115 Security Council Report, Security Council Transparency, Legitimacy and Effectiveness: Efforts to
Reform Council Working Methods 1993-2007, New York 2007, p. 2.
116 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.5968, 2008.
117 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6672, 2011.
118 Interview at the Office of a NGO involved with the Security Council, New York, 12 June 2012.
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assigned the chair of the IWGD, a position it has used to promote various innovations
in the Council’s working methods.
Despite these efforts from within the Council, the S5 grew increasingly weary of the
SC’s sluggishness in improving its working methods and continued its campaign to
build up pressure from the outside. The main objective was still to obtain a resolution
of the GA that would call upon the SC to put comprehensive reforms in place.
Possibly encouraged by the vetoes of China and Russia against a draft resolution
condemning the actions of the Syrian government against its own population,119
which in the GA evoked widespread dissatisfaction with the Council’s inaction, the
S5 decided that the time was ripe to table a resolution that combined a number of
suggestions for the improvement of the Council’s working methods with the demand
that the P5 agree to limit the application of the veto.120
The reactions to the S5‘s draft resolution varied greatly. Somewhat surprisingly, the
G4 were very supportive of the initiative. Previously, the group had regarded the S5’s
attempts to draw attention to the issue of SC working methods as a distraction from its
own campaign for new permanent seats and it had, therefore, opposed the draft
circulated in 2006. As there had been no movement regarding the expansion of the
Council since then, the G4 now came to the conclusion that progress regarding the
working methods might bring about a new dynamic in the entire reform debate and
that a qualified majority of the GA in favor of reform might set a precedent for further
action.121 For the S5, this backflip turned out to be both a blessing and a curse: on the
119 Interview at a Permanent Representation of a UN Member State, New York, 15 June 2012.
120 The draft resolution of the S5 is available at
http://www.centerforunreform.org/system/files/S5+Reform+draft+resolution.pdf
121 Interview at a Permanent Representation of a UN Member State, New York, 6 June 2012.
76
one hand, the G4’s endorsement would have brought with it the support of many other
states if the draft had been put to the vote. On the other hand, however, the rest of the
UN membership followed the G4’s reasoning in linking the issue of working methods
with that of the expansion of the Council, and the S5’s draft, therefore, ended up in
the very same cul-de-sac that characterizes the debate on expansion.
The UFC immediately grew suspicious of the G4’s support for the draft resolution
and decided to prevent it from being passed in the GA. This became evident when the
UFC, particularly Italy, together with China strongly lobbied the President of the GA
with the intention of convincing him that the draft had to be regarded as part of the
intergovernmental negotiations on SC reform and therefore required a qualified rather
than a simple majority in order to be passed.122 As a result of these efforts, the PGA
consulted the UN’s Office of Legal Affairs on the matter and received the advice that
the draft resolution did indeed require a qualified majority. Several months later, in
November 2012, the Singaporean representative aired his frustration: “In response to
a query from the President of the General Assembly at its sixty-sixth session, the
Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) gave an interpretation that “it would be appropriate if
the General Assembly were to adopt the draft resolution with the affirmative vote of
two-thirds of the General Assembly membership”. Member States learnt of that legal
opinion, not from OLA or even from the President of the General Assembly, who had
first raised the query. Instead, it was a permanent member who faxed and emailed
OLA’s legal opinion to all Member States the morning of the formal consideration of
the draft resolution, with the admonition to all Member States to support a no-action
motion on A/66/L.42/Rev.2. How did that P-5 mission procure the OLA’s legal
122 Interview at a Permanent Representation of a UN Member State, New York, 6 June 2012.
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opinion, even before the President of the General Assembly himself had circulated it
to the United Nations membership? What does that say about the P-5’s real position
on working methods of the Security Council? Do deeds match words?”123
The P5 are generally opposed to any outside effort to change the working methods of
the SC. Since the Council’s procedures are the key to the control of much of its
decision-making, they share a common interest in maintaining a tight grip on these
matters and do not tire of emphasizing that the determination of the working methods
of the Council is its exclusive prerogative. The opposition of the P5 to the S5’s draft
resolution was amplified by its provisions regarding the application of the veto,
which, as particularly Russia made clear to the S5, was perceived as an affront to their
privileges.124 The S5 had in previous months invited each presidency of the SC to
discuss the issue of working methods in an informal setting, and when China took up
the office in May 2012, it received the same invitation. Although China formally
accepted the offer, in the discussions it quickly became clear to the S5 that it was not
willing to engage seriously.125 Instead, China went to great lengths in lobbying against
the draft in the GA, and the P3, although less rigid in their response to the S5’s
initiative, also left no doubt about their rejection of the draft.
In the end, the opposition of the P5 was not entirely unexpected, but many at the UN
were surprised at its forceful nature, and it seems that the S5 hit a sensitive nerve with
their initiative.126 Later that year, the Russian PREP stated very bluntly that “the
123 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6870, 2012.
124 Interview at a Permanent Representation of a UN Member State, New York, 8 June 2012.
125 Interview at a Permanent Representation of a UN Member State, New York, 8 June 2012.
126 Interview at the United Nations Secretariat, Department of Political Affairs, New York, 7 June
2012.
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working methods themselves and any potential possible modifications to them are the
responsibility of the Council itself. That is a very sensitive issue in the context of the
reform of the Council, and discussion on that topic should not be subjected to
populism.”127
Just as with the debate on the expansion of the SC, the internal divisions of the
African Group became the key obstacle to the adoption of the S5’s draft resolution.
Although many African states were in favor of the initiative, the opposition to the
proposal was amplified by China’s vigorous lobbying within the group.128 This
frustrated any attempt to establish a regional consensus and prevented the group from
taking a position in the debate. When on the evening before the scheduled tabling of
the draft in the GA the S5 invited the African group to a discussion, the latter declined
the offer. For the S5, this was the final blow to their initiative: for reasons of
legitimacy, the endorsement of the African group had been particularly important to
them, and although it was still unclear whether a qualified majority in the GA was out
of reach, they decided to withdraw the draft.129
Unfortunately for the S5, their initiative became deeply entangled with the debate on
the expansion of the SC, which prevented the UN membership from evaluating it on
its own merits. The failure of the draft resolution demonstrates just how entrenched
the fault lines in the debate on reform have become, and hence, how difficult it is for
any formal approach to institutional change to succeed. In the end, it is likely that the
debate on the S5’s draft resolution contributed to a further deepening of these trenches
127 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6870, 2012.
128 Interview at a Permanent Representation of a UN Member State, New York, 15 June 2012.
129 Interview at a Permanent Representation of a UN Member State, New York, 6 June 2012.
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rather than achieving any type of progress. It amplified the mutual distrust of the G4
and the UFC, it conjured a manifestation of the disunity within the African group, and
most importantly, it further alienated the P5 who perceived it as an affront against
their privileges and an assault on their status. According to some diplomats at the UN,
the hard-headed approach of the Swiss PREP in the negotiations on the draft only
served to harden the attitude of the P5.130 Moreover, there are some early signs that
the failure of the S5’s attempt to put pressure on the P5 to allow for change in the
Council’s working methods has emboldened the latter in their exclusive approach to
decision-making.131
The failure of the S5’s draft also places a question mark behind the group as such.
Singapore will not continue its work in the group, and for a small state such as
Liechtenstein, it is likely that a cost-benefit calculation of the momentary situation
might lead it to reassess its priorities in the designation of its limited resources. The
S5 do, however, attempt to continue their quest for the reform of the Council’s
working methods and will seek to broaden their base and include in their initiative
various other states that have over the years cooperated closely with them. In
conclusion, while the initiative is not dead, the S5 are currently licking their wounds
and will need to reorder their ranks before continuing their cause. In late 2012, the
Swiss PREP explained that, “[w]e […] intend to continue our engagement in the
former group of five small nations under a new configuration, and we are currently
holding promising consultations to that end.”132
130 Interview at the United Nations Secretariat, Department of Political Affairs, New York, 7 June
2012.
131 Interview at the Office of a NGO involved with the Security Council, New York, 12 June 2012.
132 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6870, 2012.
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Regardless of this setback, the issue of reforming its working methods has now
established itself firmly on the agenda of the Council. During its presidency in
November 2012, India, together with Portugal, organized a further open debate on the
subject in the SC, and the intention was expressed that such a debate will henceforth
be convened on a yearly basis.133 The increase in frequency of these meetings reflects
the steady increase of attention assigned to the topic by the UN membership and
constitutes a partial success on behalf of all those who have been lobbying for a
reform of the Council’s working methods over the past two decades.
(3) The most important factor for the involvement of the GA in issues of global peace
and security is its institutional relationship to the SC. Although the Charter guarantees
the Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of global peace and
security, the Assembly often attempts to influence the former’s decision-making and,
at times, it even takes matters in its own hands – the strongest example being its
application of the Uniting For Peace procedure. Indeed, the involvement of the GA in
issues of global peace and security, as well, has been a matter of contention since the
early days of the UN. More recently, the issue of strengthening the role of the GA has
been discussed at the UN in terms of its ‘revitalization.’ Although some Member
States have criticized the suitability of this term because, to them, the need for
revitalization implies that the GA was ‘dead’, it has become deeply embedded in the
diplomatic vocabulary at the UN.134 The Member States’ discussions on the
revitalization of the GA are driven by the question of the right balance between the
two institutions.
133 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6870, 2012.
134 See, for example, the remarks of the President of the 62nd General Assembly at the Carnegie
Council: http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/transcripts/0016.html
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The general perception in the membership is that in the early years of the UN, the GA
was much stronger than it is today. In the 1950s, after all, the Assembly had played a
determining role in the Korean War as well as in the Suez Crisis. At that point in time,
the Assembly was dominated by the US and its allies, and the latter were, therefore,
inclined to increase its stature vis-à-vis the Council, where the Soviet Union could
block any resolution with its right of veto. This changed, however, in the process of
decolonialization: the incoming Member States created a new voting bloc of countries
from the global South. NAM disassociated itself from both the Western and the
Eastern blocs, and ever since, the developing countries have dominated the Assembly
by force of overwhelming numbers.135 Together with their majority in the GA, the US
and its allies lost their interest in strengthening the Assembly, and along with its
instrumental value for either of the superpowers, the GA shed much of its impact on
global peace and security.
Yet, it was not until the end of the Cold War that there occurred a significant shift in
the balance of power between the GA and the SC. In addition to taking its weight out
of the Assembly, the US and its allies now decided to throw it in with the Council.
The end of the Cold War also brought an end to the ‘automatic’ veto of the Soviet
Union, and hence the West discovered the Council’s utility as an instrument of global
governance. In the last two decades, the SC has not only elevated its frequency of
activity but has also increasingly engaged in policy areas that 30 years ago would
have been deemed to fall exclusively within the purview of the GA.
135 It is important to distinguish between the developing countries of the global South in general and
NAM in particular as, depending on the occasion, the G77 is preferred as a platform for South-South
coordination.
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These developments shape today’s debates on reforming the relationship between the
SC and the GA. From the perspective of NAM, there is a strong imperative to reassert
the authority of the GA vis-à-vis the SC. In 2010, e.g., speaking on behalf of NAM,
the Egyptian Permanent Representative, Magded Abdelaziz, demanded that “the
Council should stop encroaching on the functions and powers of the General
Assembly and the Economic and Social Council through addressing issues which
traditionally fall within the competence of these organs.”136 On the other hand, many
of the developed states dread the automatic supermajority of the developing states in
the Assembly and do not show real interest in empowering this institution at the cost
of the SC. Since they often perceive their influence on the decision-making of the
Council to be higher than that they have on the Assembly, many developed countries
attempt to focus the debate on revitalization on reforms aiming at the GA’s internal
procedures rather than on those concerning the relationship between the two bodies.
Yet, it would be an oversimplification to argue that the fault line on the revitalization
of the GA represents a clear cut between developed and developing states. Since the
one-state-one-vote system of the GA disproportionally augments the stature of smaller
states, the attitude towards the revitalization of the GA also depends on the size of the
state.137 Some of the smaller of the developed Member States, such as Switzerland or
Liechtenstein, have traditionally been very outspoken on the need to strengthen the
role of the Assembly in respect to the Council. Indeed, augmenting the GA’s
influence on the deliberations within the SC is an essential part of the S5’s agenda on
reforming the Council’s working methods. Among the developing states, on the other
136 United Nations General Assembly, “Report of the Security Council”, UN Doc No. A/65/PV.48,
2010.
137 Joseph Schwartzberg, Revitalizing the United Nations: Reform through Weighted Voting, New
York: Institute For Global Policy, World Federalist Movement 2004.
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hand, there are some that advocate for the expansion of the Council’s mandate. The
Small Island States, e.g., are hoping for the SC to take up the issue of climate change
in order to enforce measures that would combat rising sea levels.
(4) When it comes to the question of how to involve NGOs in the UN’s decision-
making procedures, the fault lines among the membership are even more complex.
Even though the word ‘partnership’ is today often used at the UN to describe the
relationship between Member States and NGOs, it is clear that the former neither see
themselves on par with the latter, nor do they perceive such a status as desirable. The
UN is essentially an intergovernmental institution, and even governments well-
disposed to NGOs will not consider affording them the same rights and obligations as
Member States. In the eyes of the latter the question is merely: should we listen to
NGOs and if so up to what point?
Nonetheless, NGOs have been a part of the UN since its very beginning. They were
present at the negotiations on the UN Charter and successfully lobbied for a pathway
into the organization: Article 71 allows ECOSOC to “make suitable arrangements for
consultation with non-governmental organizations.”138 Eventually, these
arrangements were put into effect, and ECOSOC established a roster for NGOs with
official relations with the UN, the number of which has increased greatly over the
years. In 1948, there were 41, in 1967, already 377, and following a boost of NGO
involvement in the 1990s, their number had reached 1350 by the end of the century.139
In the last two decades, NGOs have progressively made inroads on the UN’s
intergovernmental deliberations. The large UN conferences of the 1990s, such as the
138 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter X, Article 71.
139 Chadwick Alger, “The Emerging Roles of NGOs in the UN System: From Article 71 to a People’s
Millennium Assembly”, Global Governance, 8 (1), 2002, p. 95.
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Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro or Habitat II in Istanbul, where NGO participation
soared to new levels, encouraged the NGOs to become more involved in decision-
making at Turtle Bay as well.
The issue of NGO participation came to the fore when in 1997 a debate flared up in
ECOSOC on whether the GA as well should establish a permanent official status for
NGOs. The faction in support of this measure was made up of the Group of 77,
Canada and New Zealand, while the US and the EU strongly opposed such a move.
At that time the larger part of the developing world regarded the NGOs as allies
against the developed states in their fight for more equity in the Bretton Woods
institutions, and the US and the EU appeared to share this perception. Only one year
later, the alignments changed significantly: within NAM, the states in opposition to
the strengthening of NGO involvement gained the upper hand, and the attempt to
extend the latter’s official status at the UN beyond ECOSOC lost all its prospects.
One explanatory factor for this shift within NAM was the growing number of states
who were displeased by the NGO’s incessant criticism of their human rights records.
Another factor may have been the realization that more NGO involvement in one field
of policy might automatically lead to more involvement in other fields such as
disarmament or international conflicts.140 In addition to this, 1998 saw incidents of
excessive behavior by individuals accredited by NGOs at sessions of the Commission
of Human Rights that further alienated the diplomatic community. According to
140 Peter Willets, “From ‘Consultative Arrangements’ to ‘Partnerships’: The Changing Status of NGOs
in Diplomacy at the UN”, Global Governance, 6 (2), 2000, p. 198
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James Paul, Executive Director of Global Policy Forum, “these embarrassing events
have undermined NGO support by some state officials.”141
Despite the failed attempt to gain official status with the GA at the close of the
century, NGOs continued to make progress in lobbying for more participatory rights
at the UN. In 2004, the UN Secretariat supported their cause with the publication of
the Cardoso report which strongly recommended new guidelines and practices for
NGO access and thereby rekindled the intergovernmental debate on these issues.142
Yet, a number of Member States, first and foremost the United States, were unhappy
with the content of the report, and many observers criticized its lack of concrete
suggestions for improvement.143 Opinions vary on the question of whether the
Cardoso report has resulted in any improvements for NGOs. It is clear, however, that
from the perspective of the NGOs there has been a backlash against their participation
in recent years. The physical access of NGOs to the UN Headquarters in general has
been challenged and, as a result, has become more restrictive. The SC in particular
has reduced the access of the media and has cut back on its engagement with NGOs.
At the UN today, opinions on the participation of NGOs vary greatly. As Cora Weiss,
President of Hague Appeal For Peace, points out: “the willingness to listen certainly
depends on the member state and the flexibility of thinking of the ambassador. The
limits range from 0 to 100 percent. Some of them are really grateful to get
information from [us NGOs] they can’t normally get. There are some who are
grateful that a certain point is brought to them not aggressively but with passion so
141 quoted in Alger, The Emerging Roles of NGOs in the UN System, p. 98.
142 United Nations General Assembly, “We the Peoples: Civil Society, the United Nations and Global
Governance”, UN Doc No. A/58/817, 2004.
143 Peter Willets, “The Cardoso Report on the UN and Civil Society: Functionalism, Global
Corporatism, or Global Democracy?”, Global Governance, 12 (3), 2006, pp. 305-324.
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that they turn around and say that they will look into it and sometimes we will get
feedback right away. There are other people, like the Bush administration, where you
got the cold shoulder, and then there are countries that feel threatened by civil
society.”144
Concerning the SC in particular, the most significant differentiation on this matter is
that between the Permanent Five (P5) and the Elected Ten (E10). There are several
reasons why the latter are the “more natural partners of the NGOs:”145 Frequently, the
elected members find it difficult to exert their influence in the Council and, more
often than not, the P5 present them with “precooked meals”.146 In this regard, the E10
are often inclined to see NGOs as allies against a monopolization of decision-making
by the P5. When crucial information from the field is withheld by P5 members in an
attempt to influence the decision-making of the E10, they can turn to NGOs to get a
better picture of the situation on the ground. In 1997, e.g., several NGOs testified
before the Council members that there was a refugee emergency in the Great Lakes
region of Africa. This angered the US and France, who opposed action and had told
the other members beforehand that their intelligence did not indicate such an
emergency.147 For this reason, as Michelle Brown, Senior Advocate of Refugees
International points out, it is often those states that do not have missions or
diplomatic representations in the country under discussion that are most willing to
engage with NGOs.148
144 Interview with Cora Weiss, President, Hague Appeal for Peace, New York, 9 November 2010.
145 James Paul, “Working with Nongovernmental Organizations”, in: David Malone (ed.), The UN
Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, Boulder, CO; London: Lynne Rienner 2004,
p. 379.
146 Interview at the Office of a NGO involved with the Security Council, New York, 12 November
2010.
147 Paul, Working with Nongovernmental Organizations, p. 379.
148 Interview with Michelle Brown, Senior Advocate, Refugees International, New York, 14 October
2010.
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The different P5 members, in turn, have varying perspectives on the engagement of
NGOs in SC affairs. Those who have been the most open towards the latter are France
and the UK.149 The US delegation is much more cautious in its approach to NGOs: as
mentioned above, the Bush administration was extremely critical of NGO
involvement in SC affairs, and while relations have improved since then, the NGO
community is still not happy with the US mission’s somewhat reserved attitude.
Finally, according to one NGO representative, “countries like China and Russia won’t
listen at all.”150
As mentioned above, some of the most outspoken supporters of NGOs in the UN
membership are Canada and New Zealand. There are, furthermore, a number of states
such as Bangladesh, Chile and Mexico who, depending on the permanent
representative in office, have given strong support to the NGO community at the UN
in its attempts to become more involved with the SC. It is, however, the most
vulnerable Member States from whom the NGOs receive the most wholehearted
support. The Small Island States, e.g., have literally a vital interest in working
together with NGOs in their fight for Council action against climate change. Some
sub-Saharan African Member States also tend to see the NGO community at the UN
as political allies in the pursuit of development and of a more just distribution of
global wealth. The European states most in favor of NGO participation are usually the
Nordic countries, but Austria, as well, has recently promoted them strongly. Some of
the others are more ambivalent in their attitudes - much like the US.
149 Michelle Brown, Refugees International.
150 Interview at the Office of a NGO involved with the Security Council, New York, 12 November
2010, New York, 10 November 2010.
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Finally, as Joseph Donelly from Caritas Internationalis puts it “there’s about a third of
Member States who believe that NGOs have no place here.”151 Most of these states
are ruled by autocratic governments, but there are also a number of democratic states
who are strongly opposed to meaningful NGO participation. These are mainly
developing states who are annoyed by public denunciation or who fear outside
influence more than they need assistance, i.e., usually the more powerful members of
NAM. In conclusion, it is important to recognize that the fault line on the question of
NGO involvement does not run along the North-South divide as it is often portrayed:
both developed and developing states are split on this issue.
Evaluating the Feasibility of Reform Proposals
Having discussed the historical, legal and political background of UN reform, I will
now complete the framework for the systematic evaluation of the feasibility of
proposals for change at the UN by elaborating a list of criteria that must be taken into
account in such an assessment. In order to evaluate the feasibility of a proposal, the
following issues have to be scrutinized:
1. What are the requirements for the reform proposal to be adopted into practice? The
obstacles for adoption differ depending on the specific nature of the proposal. In this
regard, the most important factor is whether it requires an amendment of the UN
Charter or not. The fact that there have been only three amendments to the Charter in
its now almost 70 years of existence illustrates the difficulty of such adjustments. It is
clear from the legal requirements for UN reform, from the history of reform, as well
as from the current political situation with regard to the subject matter that procedural
151 Interview with Joseph Donnelly, International Delegate to the UN, Caritas Internationalis, New
York, 5 November 2010.
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adjustments are much easier to achieve than a substantial reform. Especially when UN
reform becomes a question of status for the Member States, as is the case in the
debate on SC membership, it is perceived to be a matter of primary concern to all,
regarded as vital to the national interest. In this case, there is little room for anything
but subjective appraisal of the utility of proposals, and negotiation is made harder by
the unwillingness to make so much as the smallest concessions. Procedural
adjustments, on the other hand, are not necessarily perceived as a question of status by
the Member States and, therefore, draw less opposition. Since such adjustments are
usually contended less heavily than substantial reforms, their feasibility often
becomes a matter of detail, focus, and determined mobilization of support.
The second important factor depending on the type of the reform proposal is the role
of the P5. Their role is especially important should the reform require an amendment
to the Charter. As above mentioned, such amendments require the ratification of all of
the permanent members of the SC. Nonetheless, the history of UN reform suggests
that the veto power of the P5 is less absolute in practice than it is on paper. The
successful reform of the SC in 1965 on the one hand, and the fruitless attempts of
recent years on the other, demonstrate that the main obstacle to the amendment of the
UN Charter is not the requirement of ratification by the P5, but the attainment of a
supermajority in the GA. Once a proposal is approved by the GA, there is
considerable pressure on the P5 to ratify it. In other words, the lack of support from
the permanent members, per se, does not condemn a proposal to failure.
In addition to those that require an amendment of the Charter, any reform proposal
that concerns the SC usually also entails an elevated role of the P5. The simple fact
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that the latter have sat on the Council continuously for its entire existence gives them
a degree of ownership that is hard for any of the other states to contest, who, if they
are fortunate enough, are allowed to be members for only a limited length of time
every few years. Brazil and Japan, the non-permanent members with the most time on
the SC, have each sat on the Council for a total of 20 years, less than a third of the
time of the permanent members.152 The P5 have the advantage of expertise, they have
exclusive inside knowledge on long-term developments and, very importantly, they
have, in practice, a near monopoly on the ability to establish and maintain procedural
conventions. Thus they have unequaled influence on the way in which the Council
conducts its business. The elected members can attempt to establish an innovative
practice in the SC but once they finish their two year term, they are dependent upon
the P5 to continue their incentive. Alternatively, the outgoing elected members can
coordinate themselves with the incoming members in order to uphold certain
procedural innovations, but this requires a unity in purpose and method among the
elected members that is too often lacking in practice.
Furthermore, there is the question of funding: if a proposal for reform makes it
necessary to hire more administrative staff or even entails the creation of a new
agency, the approval of the main contributors to the UN’s budget, i.e., first and
foremost the US, but also Japan and the European states, becomes especially
important. In the past, the US Congress has on more than one occasion successfully
used its budgetary powers to pressure the UN to give in to its demands. This includes
unilaterally deducting funds from its contribution that were meant for specific
agencies that Congress does not approve of, late payment of its contribution, or the
152 http://www.un.org/sc/list_eng5.asp
91
outright refusal to pay any of its budgetary assessment until the UN gives in.153 At the
UN, the GA holds the budgetary powers, and the decisive negotiations on this matter
take place in the Fifth Committee where, in the past, this issue was treated like all
other ‘important matters’, i.e., decisions were made by a two-thirds majority. In the
late 1980s, however, the US used its financial power over the UN to enforce that these
decisions now have to be made by consensus, leaving the primary financial
contributors with a de facto veto on budgetary matters, increasing their leverage even
further. The important lesson of these events is that financial power can be used as
both a driving force as well as a dead end for institutional reform.
Finally, the amount of time required by a potential reform of Council practice needs
to be taken into consideration. The SC’s shortage of time to deal with the many items
on its agenda is already very worrisome and has the potential to create problems in
situations of conflict. Some diplomats at the UN feel, e.g., that the transition to
independence by South Sudan could have proceeded more peacefully had the
Council’s attention not been diverted to the revolutionary developments of the Arab
Spring.154 Time is a scarce resource in the decision-making procedures of the SC and
an essential factor both in the quality of its deliberations as well as for its
effectiveness. As Colin Keating warns, “[m]any overworked Council Ambassadors
would say that they are too busy with the day-to-day demands of the Council agenda
and that there is no time to focus on working methods reform. There is some truth in
this. Many would say that almost any reforms would involve additional costs, both for
the Secretariat and more particularly national delegations, and, given the current
153 Jeffrey Laurenti, „Financing the United Nations“, in: Jean Krasno (ed.), The United Nations:
Confronting the Challenges of a Global Society, Boulder, Co; London: Lynne Rienner 2004, pp. 281-
283.
154 Interview at a Permanent Representation of a UN Member State, New York, 6 June 2012.
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global financial crisis, there would be no appetite for such reforms at this time. This
is also true.”155
2. Once the requirements for the adoption of a reform proposal have been clarified, it
is necessary to determine the political forces that are in favor of said measure. This is
not simply a matter of numbers, but rather it is important to take into account both the
quantity as well as the quality of support. Concerning the former, the above analysis
of the fault lines among the membership on the broader aspects of UN reform may
serve as the main point of orientation for determining the groups that might be in
favor of a reform proposal. Said analysis also demonstrates, however, that, with
regard to reform, alliances are more often than not purely a matter of utility for the
individual Member States, and group loyalties do not necessarily count for much. The
difficulties of the African Group to contain their discordance, as well as the split
within the European Union leaving Germany and Italy in an unusual hard-headed
antagonism, are a case in point.156 For this reason, it is impossible to think purely in
terms of voting blocs and to automatically assume that a certain group would
harmoniously approve or disapprove of a set of proposals. Instead, each and every
suggested measure has to be thoroughly checked against the perceived interests of the
UN membership.
With regard to the quality of the support, there are two important factors that can
strongly influence the prospects of a reform proposal. Firstly, the official endorsement
of a reform proposal by a Member State may be based purely on strategic reasons and
155 Colin Keating, Reforming the Working Methods of the Security Council, Berlin; New York:
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2011, p. 5.
156 Ulrich Roos, Ulrich Franke and Gunther Hellmann, “Beyond the Deadlock: How Europe can
contribute to UN Reform”, The International Spectator, 43 (1), 2008, pp. 43-55.
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may count for nothing in practice. In the case of the expansion of the membership of
the SC, e.g., the P5, knowing that the divisions among the membership are the key
safeguard against an alteration of the status quo, apply a very subtle and successful
strategy of divide et impera rather than bluntly threatening their veto and refusing
cooperation. Each permanent member can endorse an aspirant for membership and
reject another as long as their choices do not match and at least one of them is
opposed to each candidate. In this way, endorsement is ‘cheap’ and without effect on
the status quo. Much more than this, an official endorsement of a reform proposal can
sometimes be a means to prevent reforms, as is the case with regard to the positions
on the composition of the SC taken by some members of the African Group. Official
positions on reform cannot, therefore, be taken at face-value, but must be checked
against the broader diplomatic background in which they are stated.
Secondly, history shows that institutional change at the UN, albeit not impossible,
does not come about easily – and certainly not quickly. For this reason, it is not
sufficient for a reform proposal to have lukewarm support in the membership in order
to be successful. Rather, an influential state or group of states must exist who make
the proposal their cause, who demonstrate persistence in their advocacy and who are
diplomatically skilled enough to convince the rest of the membership that the proposal
is not contrary to their interests. As substantial reforms are by definition perceived as
a matter of primary interest, this point is more important with regard to procedural
adjustment and even more so when it comes to strengthening the participation of
NGOs. As Edward Luck puts it, “[i]nitially, it is better to try to persuade a few
member states, including some of the smaller ones, to be actively committed to an
idea than to have many delegations with warm and fuzzy feelings about it. Targeting
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is essential when dealing with a scattered organization with 188 directors and no
CEO.”157 With regard to procedural reforms in the Council, Security Council Report
comes to the key conclusion that achieving “innovation in specific cases requires not
only determination and a very good understanding of the rules and working methods,
but also a strong political commitment – and sometimes political courage.“158
3. The next step in the evaluation of the feasibility of a reform proposal is an analysis
of the opposition to the suggested measure. It would be wrong to assume that all those
who do not support a reform proposal are opposed to it. As shown above, policies on
UN reform are rarely a matter of black and white, but instead involve numerous
shades of grey. As with the evaluation of the support of a reform proposal, the same
caveats concerning group loyalties, strategic positioning and degrees of determination
apply with regard to its opposition.
The resistance to a specific reform proposal is largely dependent upon the existence of
attractive alternatives, including the possibility of remaining at the status quo. As the
reform of 1965 demonstrates, not everyone necessarily needs to profit from a proposal
to make it achievable – not even the P5. All of the permanent members ratified the
amendment only because they had reached a point at which they perceived a refusal to
do so as more damaging to their interests than an enlarged SC. The platitude that
politics is often the choice between two evils applies as well to the reform of the UN.
157 Edward Luck, “Blue Ribbon Power: Independent Commissions and UN Reform”, International
Studies Perspectives, 1 (1), 2000, p. 89.
158 Security Council Report, Security Council Working Methods – A Work in Progress?, New York
2010, p. 2.
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4. Finally, as some circumstances are more conducive to the attainment of
compromise than others, the potential for movement in the negotiations on the reform
proposal has to be assessed. The possibility of compromise strongly depends on the
nature of the proposal itself: how easily can it be adapted to diverging expectations?
While some suggestions for reform are a simple matter of either-or, many others have
the potential to be modified to different degrees by alteration, expansion or reduction.
The higher the flexibility of a proposal, the wider is the space for negotiations.
Naturally, it is not only the flexibility of the proposal that matters, but also that of the
negotiators. If the parties involved are not willing to engage in a search for alternative
solutions, there will be no compromise. It must be determined, therefore, how flexible
the negotiators perceive their positions and how much they might be willing to
concede. What are the negotiating windows for the actors involved, and how much
overlap can be achieved? In how far is the proposal only a means to an end that could
be reached via alternative routes? Should there be a history of negotiations on a
proposal, this will also have an effect on the bargaining positions, as they may have
become aggravated by symbolic overload and sunk costs. If, moreover, the
negotiators at the UN are tightly bound by explicit and detailed instructions from their
capitals, this will further reduce the space for negotiation.
The chances for a proposal to be put into practice depend not only on the respective
quality and quantity of support and opposition, but also on the strength of their
bargaining positions in the negotiations. Is the approval of the opposition a sine qua
non or could there be partial progress or even full implementation without its
acquiescence? Finally, how likely is the emergence of a potential game changer in the
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near future? Is it possible to discern developments that might soon change the
priorities of the negotiators?
Conclusion: The Feasibility Score
The history of institutional reform of the UN illustrates the overwhelming inertia that
any proposal for change must face when introduced into the arena of international
politics at Turtle Bay. Yet, although it is wise to have very humble expectations, there
is also clear evidence that change is not impossible. By clarifying the legal
requirements for institutional change, reviewing the history of UN reform, analyzing
the political fault lines within the membership regarding the respective areas of
interest, and by extracting the key criteria that have to be taken into account when
considering the political feasibility of proposals for reform, I have laid the basis for a
systematic and comprehensive evaluation of the possibilities for change in the UN’s
decision-making procedures on issues of global peace and security.
In essence, the larger questions to be answered are: (1) What are the requirements in
order that the reform proposal be put into practice? (2) Is there strong support for this
proposal? (3) Is there strong opposition to the proposal? Since there are some
proposals which have not been considered by the UN membership, in these cases the
hypothetical level of support and opposition will have to be deduced from a
consideration of debates on similar issues, from the general political fault lines in the
membership and from the pronounced general interests of the Member States.
(4) How conducive to compromise are the circumstances of the negotiations on the
proposal? In order to allow for systematic comparison of the large number of
proposals to be analyzed, it is necessary to quantify the answers to these questions.
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For this reason, a ‘Feasibility Score’ for each proposal will be determined according
to this procedure:
1. REQUIREMENTS: If the requirements are very demanding, one negative point is
given; if they are somewhat demanding, no point will be given and if they are
relatively undemanding, one positive point is given.
2. SUPPORT: Should the support for a proposal be very strong, one positive point
will be given; should it be relatively strong, no point will be given and should there be
only lukewarm support, one negative point will be given.
3. OPPOSITION: If the opposition against a proposal is very strong, one negative
point will be given; if it is somewhat strong, no point will be given and if it is
relatively weak, one positive point will be given.
4. NEGOTIATIONS: Should the circumstances of the negotiations on the proposal be
obstructive to compromise, one negative point is given; should they afford some
potential for negotiation, no point will be given. Should they be clearly conducive to
the attainment of compromise, one positive point will be given.
All these points will be added up to determine the proposal’s FEASIBILITY SCORE
on a range from -4 (impossible) to +4 (very likely).
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III. Overview of Reform Proposals
This thesis will review and evaluate all those proposals for reform which concern
exclusively the UN’s decision-making procedures on issues of global peace and
security. The overview is the result of a meticulous screening of both the academic
literature as well as the relevant debates of the UN membership. The proposals for
reform will be separated into four categories: (1) those aiming at a reform of the SC’s
membership or voting procedures, (2) those targeting the SC’s working methods, (3),
those addressing the relationship between the SC and the GA, and (4) those
concerning the relationship between the SC and Civil Society. These four areas of
reform will in turn be divided into various subcategories in order to produce a
systematic overview of all the relevant proposals.
The evaluation will analyze the reform proposals individually, based on their
functional target, rather than considering reform packages. In intergovernmental
relations, issues are linked into negotiating packages for both substantive and strategic
reasons, and under certain circumstances, such package deals can be the key to
overcoming a stalemate in intergovernmental negotiations. In a situation in which no
possible resolution is beneficial to both sides of the table, an expansion of the scope of
these negotiations via issue-linkage can increase the prospects for agreement. Because
linkage enables each participant to concede “more on those issues it values less in
order to gain more on issues it deems more important,”159 it can, under the right
circumstances, create a win-win situation where before there were only win-lose
options. Issue-linkage can, however, also worsen the prospects of reaching an
159 Michael McGinnis, “Issue Linkage and the Evolution of International Cooperation“, The Journal of
Conflict Resolution, 30 (1), 1986, p. 151.
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agreement, e.g., when one party uses a veto on an issue that it would not block if it
were negotiated independently for the sole purpose of gaining additional leverage on
the negotiations of the linked issue.
Johannes Urpelainen builds on this problem and demonstrates with the help of game-
theory that in a multilateral setting in which any participant can create issue-linkages,
it is advisable to refrain from such linkages altogether. If the negotiators perceive
issue-linkages as a legitimate option, they have the incentive to lock in their favorite
policies by committing to such linkages and making cooperation dependent upon
them. Once various parties apply these ‘committal tactics’, none will back down out
of fear that the others will use issue-linkage to dominate the discussions. The result is
a proliferation of issue-linkages and a hardening of bargaining positions. Urpelainen
comes to the conclusion that “[w]hen issue linkage and delegation do not require
consent by all bargaining parties and different coalitions of states can use them to
opportunistically lock in their preferred policy, the commitment capacity that they
create paradoxically effects an endogenous Prisoner's Dilemma.”160
The negotiations on UN reform fit this context in that they lack a consensus
requirement on issue-linkages and in that all bargaining parties can use such linkages
to lock in their preferred policies. Indeed, the history of UN reform shows that issue-
linkage has been applied in this way: when in the late 50s the NAM pressed for
Security Council reform and tabled a resolution on this issue, the Soviet Union’s
refusal to consider any reform unless the government of the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) was given the Chinese seat at the UN forced them to reconsider their
160 Johannes Urpelainen, All or Nothing: Avoiding Inefficient Compromise in International
Cooperation, PhD thesis at the Department of Political Science, University of Michigan 2009, p. 120.
100
initiative. This issue-linkage by the Soviet Union blocked reform for a number of
years until finally the PRC itself dissolved the linkage by clarifying that it would
support reform independently of the question of rightful representation.161
When, following these developments, the Charter was amended for the first time in
the history of the UN, the enlargement of the SC had been discussed in conjunction
with the expansion of ECOSOC. In fact, both of these alterations had been decided in
one and the same GA resolution and, therefore, together they were the result of a
reform package.162 This issue-linkage, however, was neither made for strategic
reasons nor did it have a significant impact on the prospects for agreement. Instead,
the membership perceived the enlargement of both of these bodies as part of the same
issue, i.e., the equitable representation of the African and Asian membership in UN
decision-making procedures. In that sense it is up for debate whether this conjunction
can be qualified as a proper issue-linkage or as falling within the scope of a single
issue-area.163
Either way, the strategic impact of the conjunction was minimal: the political fault
lines with regard to both of these reforms were almost identical, as were their
‘distributional effects’, which means that it did not alter the balance of outcomes
between the negotiating parties. Although they formed part of the same resolution, the
two reforms were voted on individually. The voting patterns were identical except for
China’s affirmation of the expansion of the SC and its abstention on that of
161 Dimitris Bourantonis, The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform, London; New York:
Routledge 2005, pp. 19-25.
162 United Nations General Assembly, “Question of Equitable Representation on the Security Council
and the Economic and Social Council”, UN Doc No. A/RES/1991, 1963.
163 David Lebroon, “Linkages”, American Journal of International Law, 96 (1), 2002, p. 8.
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ECOSOC.164 None of the other permanent members voted affirmative on either
reform. The third amendment of the charter in the history of the UN, i.e., the second
enlargement of ECOSOC in 1973, was negotiated as a single issue.
The next significant push for charter amendment occurred in the aftermath of the Cold
War and culminated in the Razali Plan of 1997. In an effort to broker an agreement by
taking into account all of the wide-ranging interests of the Member States, Razali
Ismael of Malaysia, then President of the GA, proposed an incremental reform
package that linked the expansion of the Security Council with procedural reforms
and the removal of the enemy clause in the charter. Despite extensive consultations
with the entire membership, the plan was ultimately unsuccessful.165 In 2005, after
building up much public pressure for reform on the UN membership, Kofi Annan
proposed a wide range of suggestions listed in his report In Larger Freedom.
According to Annan, the reforms could only be realized in their entirety, as a
comprehensive package. But, as Luck demonstrates, rather than promoting reform, the
UN membership felt alienated by his take-it-or-leave-it approach, and the very limited
reform that eventually took place was the result of meticulous cherry-picking on their
behalf.166 In conclusion, the history of UN reform demonstrates that issue-linkages
have not facilitated the amendment of the charter; instead they have complicated
agreement on individual reforms at least on some accounts.
164 Edward Luck, “Reforming the United Nations: Lessons from a History in Progress”, in: Jean Krasno
(ed.), The United Nations: Confronting the Challenges of a Global Society, Boulder, Co; London:
Lynne Rienner 2004, p. 366.
165 Edward Luck, UN Security Council: Practice and Promise, London; New York: Routledge 2006, p.
116.
166 Edward Luck, “The UN Security Council: Reform or Enlarge?” in: Paul Heinbecker & Patricia Goff
(eds.), Irrelevant or Indispensable? The United Nations in the 21st Century, Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfried
Laurier University Press 2005, p. 151.
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There is no reason to assume that at present the prospects for issue-linkages across
different areas of reform in order to facilitate agreement are any better than in the
past. First of all, when it comes to Council membership and voting powers, i.e. those
issues that would require an amendment of the charter, there is, for the majority of the
UN Member States, nothing that could counterbalance an outcome unfavorable to
them. Secondly, in most cases the status quo powers are the same and, therefore, they
cannot be bought off by another reform proposal. If anything, these status quo powers
would be more likely to agree on one reform if in exchange they acquired a promise
for no further reforms in other areas. Thirdly, with regard to the involvement of civil
society, it is unlikely that any Member State, even those most favorable to NGOs,
would accept an increase of civil society participation as a counterbalance for
concessions with regard to the reform of the SC.
For this reason, the proposals for reform will be evaluated individually, defined by
their functional target. Although working on the assumption that issue-linkage is
detrimental to the prospects for reform, this individual approach does not preclude a
subsequent consideration of options for reform packages. The possibility of linking
proposals will, therefore, be revisited and reassessed once the evaluation has been
concluded.167
At the end of each discussion about a subcategory of proposals, there will be a chart
with an overview of the quantitative results of the evaluation in this section. It will
indicate scores for the improvement of the respective institution’s qualities as a
deliberative moment (DELIB MOM), for the enhancement of an institution’s systemic
167 See chapter “Conclusion”.
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function (SYST FUNC), for the promotion of deliberative synergy (DELIB SYN), for
the level of demand of the requirements for putting the proposal into practice (REQ),
for the level of support (SUP) and of opposition (OPP), for the extent of negotiating
space (NEG), as well as for the overall results for the Desirability Score (DS) and the
Feasibility Score (FS). At the very end of the evaluation, these charts will be
assembled into one complete overview of the results of the analysis. This overview







IV. Security Council Membership and Voting
Introduction
The question of Security Council (SC) membership is arguably the most prominent
issue with regard to United Nations reform. For the Member States, a seat on the
Council is the ultimate prize at the UN, granting them more influence, prestige and
often even economic profits.168 For many observers, moreover, the composition of the
Council is the key to its representativeness and hence to its legitimacy. The current
debate on a reform of the Council’s composition has been ongoing for more than 20
years and although significant progress remains elusive, it is likely to stay high on the
agenda for many more years to come.
168 Axel Dreher, Jan-Egbert Sturm and James Vreeland, “Global Horse Trading: IMF Loans for Votes
in the UN Security Council”, European Economic Review, 53 (7), 2009, pp. 742-757; Daniel Lim and
James Vreeland, Regional Organizations and International Politics: Japanese Influence over the Asian
Development Bank and the UN Security Council, World Politics, 65 (1), 2013, pp 34-72.
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Traditionally, the voting arrangements of the SC also receive tremendous attention.
As the preeminent symbol of the prerogatives of the permanent members, the veto has
never been wholeheartedly accepted by much of the UN membership, and every time
a situation arises when one or two permanent members apply the veto in order to
block a clear majority in favor of Council action, the dispute heats up anew. Russia’s
veto on intervention in Kosovo in 1999, e.g., kicked off a vigorous debate on SC
reform, and the S5’s attempt to push forward its proposals on the veto right in 2012 is
said to have been encouraged by the vetoes of China and Russia on a resolution
against the government of Syria.169
Evaluation
SC Membership & Voting – Membership – Expansion
The most straightforward reform of the composition of the SC would be an expansion
of its membership. As the Council reform of the 1960s has set a precedent for such an
expansion, technically, this would clearly be possible. A large majority of the UN
membership is in favor of additional seats, it is deeply split, however, on the specifics
of the reform. In essence, there are two broadly defined positions competing with
each other: On the one hand, there are those who support the proposal to create new
permanent seats as well as new elected seats, and on the other hand, there are those
who want only new elected seats.
The Group of Four (G4) proposed that the Council should be expanded to 25
members, adding 6 permanent seats and 4 elected seats with one-time elections for the
169 For more details, see the chapter ‘The Politics of UN Reform’.
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new permanent members to be held in the General Assembly.170 Unsurprisingly, the
most promising candidates would be the proposers themselves: Brazil, Germany,
India and Japan. Two of the new permanent seats would be reserved for African states
for which Egypt, Nigeria and South-Africa would be the main contenders. The four
new elected seats would be filled by one member each from the African states, the
Asian states, the Eastern European states as well as the Latin American and Caribbean
states. In reaction to this proposal, the group known as Uniting For Consensus (UFC)
made its own suggestions for the expansion of the Council. The UFC proposal
provides for 10 new seats, all of which should be electable rather than permanent,
while also calling for an abolition of the rule which prohibits an immediate reelection
for membership.171
Both of these proposals face tremendous obstacles in terms of their feasibility. Not
only would they require an amendment of the Charter, but in addition to this, the GA
decided in 1998, “not to adopt any resolution or decision on the question of equitable
representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related
matters, without the affirmative vote of at least two thirds of the Members of the
General Assembly,”172 even if the resolution were not to affect the Charter (REQ –1).
The G4’s proposal for new permanent seats is backed by a determined core group of
powerful states and has at times, according to some diplomats, enjoyed the support of
close to two-thirds of the Assembly.173 While the support for the UFC proposal to add
only new elected seats is somewhat weaker in numbers, it is based on an influential
group of states fiercely fighting for the cause (SUP +1). Both proposals face strong
170 United Nations General Assembly, “Security Council Reform”, UN Doc No. A/60/L.46, 2006.
171 United Nations General Assembly, “Reform of the Security Council”, UN Doc No. A/59/L.68, 2005.
172 United Nations General Assembly, “Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the
Membership of the Security Council and Related Matters”, UN Doc No. A/RES/53/30, 1998.
173 Interview at a Permanent Representation of a UN Member State, New York, 15 June 2012.
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opposition not only from the supporters of the competing proposal, but also from
those who are skeptical towards an expansion of the Council in general, particularly
the P5. China and the US have in the past coordinated their opposition and actively
lobbied against the stronger of the two proposals, i.e., that of the G4.174 Russia
generally does its best to stall any progress on the reform of the Council’s
composition and while France and the UK officially display an open mind to such
considerations, they take a more cautious approach in practice (OPP –1).
There have been numerous efforts to find compromise solutions acceptable to both,
those who demand additional permanent seats and those who call solely for new
elected seats. In 2007, e.g., Panama presented an innovative proposal that would
initially add six new members to the Council, each elected for a term of 5 years. If
any state were to be reelected in four consecutive terms, it would automatically
become a permanent member.175 That same year, the five facilitators on SC reform
issued a report in which they compiled a list of various solutions for an intermediary
arrangement involving ‘extended seats’.176 Despite such efforts towards compromise,
agreement remains elusive: the G4 will not accept any proposal that does not ensure
new permanent seats and the UFC are reluctant to endorse any suggestions that allude
to the possibility of additional such seats.177 For many of the Member States, the issue
of new permanent seats appears to be a question of all or nothing. (NEG –1)
174 Jonas von Freiesleben, “Reform of the Security Council”, in: Managing Change at the United
Nations, New York: Center For UN Reform Education 2008, p. 7.
175 von Freiesleben, Reform of the Security Council, p. 9.
176 United Nations General Assembly, “Report of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of
Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and other Matters
related to the Security Council”, UN Doc No. A/61/47, 2007.
177 The politics on the expansion of the SC are elaborated in more detail in the chapter ‘The Politics of
UN Reform’.
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Is an expansion of the membership of the SC desirable? The main argument in favor
is that it would make the Council more representative. Former Secretary-General Kofi
Annan, e.g., claimed in 2005 that “a change in the Council’s composition is needed to
make it more broadly representative of the international community as a whole, as
well as of the geopolitical realities of today and thereby more legitimate in the eyes of
the world.”178 In an aggregative sense, logically the addition of new members would
increase the representativeness of the Council. Together, the G4, e.g., represent more
than 1,6 billion people, i.e., about 22 per cent of the world population.
However, the arguments for increased representation through expansion usually go
beyond the assumption that individual states represent their own population and claim
that they could better represent on the Council the perspectives of their respective
region, of the developing world in general or even of a particular religion or culture.
These claims of discursive representation assume that these types of entities usually
share common perspectives on issues of global peace and security. If this were true,
then it has to be said that all of those regions and other entities normally invoked in
these arguments are already represented on the SC by at least one state. The important
question regarding equity is then a matter of voting power, primarily of who yields
the veto right, rather than of expansion. However, in the vast majority of cases
debated in the SC, there will be multiple and conflicting perspectives within these
groups, and it is therefore impossible for one state to claim that its opinion is
representative of any of these entities. As the debate on the expansion of the SC
demonstrates, the fault lines are often intra-regional rather than inter-regional, and as
178 United Nations General Assembly, “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and
Human Rights for All”, UN Doc No. A/59/2005, 2005, p. 42.
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long as there are no systems of accountability, individual states will act in their own
best interest.
Should there be additional permanent members, moreover, it would not be surprising
to see these develop a common identity with the P5, forming a new exclusive elite on
the Council rather than representing any outsiders.179 For this reason, the South Centre
is worried that such an expansion “could also weaken the position of the South, by
detaching important countries from the rest of the group.”180 No matter whether the
Council has 15 or 25 members, it will remain highly exclusive and will remain closed
to at least 168 states. Instead of mitigating this exclusion, the slight increase in
representativeness that expansion might entail brings with it the danger of
complacency on the part of the SC regarding its outreach to those who are left out.181
Muchkund Dubey reckons that an expansion’s effect “will be not only to marginalize
the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council in the UN system but
also the overwhelming majority of the members of the United Nations.”182
James Paul and Céline Nahory point out another issue regarding expansion, i.e., the
formation of executive committees. Already today, many of the Council’s core
decisions are made by the P5 who then present the other members with faits
accomplis. An expansion would propel this dynamic: “when committees get too large,
they give rise to executive committees that do all the serious work, or else (worse still)
179 Spencer Zifcak, United Nations Reform: Heading North or South?, London; New York: Routledge
2009, p. 34.
180 South Centre, For a Strong and Democratic United Nations: A South Perspective on UN Reform,
Geneva: Imprimerie Ideale 1996, p. 147.
181 Bart Szewczyk, “Variable Multipolarity and UN Security Council Reform”, Harvard International
Law Journal, 53 (2), 2012, p. 59.
182 Muchkund Dubey, “Comments on the Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges,
and Change”, in: Reforming the United Nations for Peace and Security, New Haven: The Yale Center
for the Study of Globalization 2005, p. 58.
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the original body becomes dysfunctional and irrelevant. At the UN, an enlarged
ECOSOC stands as a clear example of how greater size detracts from effectiveness.
An enlarged Security Council would only reinforce the power of the P-5 (or P-11) as
an executive committee, leaving the elected members (however numerous) more
powerless and frustrated than ever.”183 All in all, there is reason to believe that an
expansion of the SC would hinder the deliberative synergies within the UN and
thereby decrease the representativeness of its sources of input for decision-making
(SYN -3).
A further issue concerning the expansion of the Council is that it would render
decision-making more cumbersome and therefore decrease its effectiveness. Due to
the need of each member to consult with its capital, the different time zones and the
multiple languages, the deliberations of the SC are very time-consuming, and
additional members would aggravate this problem. As David Bosco puts it, “[a]t
fifteen members, the Council is already close to its maximum effective capacity.”184
The G4 argue that an inclusion on the Council of states that have the capability to
contribute to the maintenance of global peace and security would increase the
effectiveness. However, it is not clear why any state would make its contributions to a
UN operation dependent upon its membership on the Council rather than on the
interests that are at stake in that particular situation. Presently, most of the blue
helmets are provided by states other than the P5. It does not, therefore, seem that non-
Council membership deters states from making such contributions. From a financial
perspective, the contributions of Germany and Japan are used as a justification for
183 James Paul and Céline Nahory, Towards a Democratic Reform of the UN Security Council, New
York: Global Policy Forum 2005.
184 David Bosco, Five to Rule them All: The UN Security Council and the Making of the Modern World,
Oxford; Toronto: Oxford University Press 2009, p. 256.
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their candidacy; they are not a result of membership. Whereas these states, ceteris
paribus, might find themselves in the position in which they need to emphasize their
status by financial means, those that already are permanent members need not resort
to such measures and, as is the case with the US, might actually seek a reduction of
their contributions (FUNC -2).
In the case of additional permanent seats, the UFC argue that the creation of new
centers of power would violate the principle of sovereign equality. In the same vain,
James Sutterlin argues that “the introduction of a new class of members (e.g.,
permanent seats without the veto, M.N.)[…] could brand the Council for operating on
a class basis with an ‘underclass’ at the bottom comprising the large majority of
members.”185 In fact, new permanent seats would validate the existing inequality
within the Council and risk accentuating its hierarchical structures, thereby promoting
an atmosphere of disrespect towards ‘lesser members’ (MOM -1).
Anne-Marie Slaughter makes a very different proposal for an expansion of the SC:
“One possibility would be to provide for the appointment of an ad hoc member of the
Security Council for the duration of a particular regional crisis. The member in
question would be chosen to ensure that specific regional concerns were aired at the
Council level.”186 Slaughter does not go into any details on her proposal, which leaves
many questions unanswered. How would ad hoc members be selected? By whom?
When does a regional crisis begin and, more importantly, when does it end? It is hard
185 James Sutterlin, “Some Thoughts - Mostly Cautionary - on the Recommendations of the High-level
Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change”, in: Reforming the United Nations for Peace and Security,
New Haven: The Yale Center for the Study of Globalization 2005, p. 179.
186 Anne-Marie Slaughter, “The Liberal Agenda for Peace: International Relations Theory and the
Future of the United Nations”, in: Saul Mendlovitz and Burns Weston (eds.), Preferred Futures for the
United Nations, Ardsely, NY: Transnational Publishers 1995, p. 106.
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to imagine a selection procedure that would not be driven by the political interests of
the Council members, which would lead to the selection of states that represent views
acceptable to them, rather than views representative of the region. Once a state has
become an ad hoc member, the SC might find itself in a situation in which it cannot
terminate the membership either because the crisis cannot be declared resolved or
because some members prefer to keep that state aboard for reasons of political
expedience. As certain crises can remain on the agenda of the SC for decades, it is
easily imaginable that the same could happen to ad hoc members. In addition to the
necessity for Charter amendment, the challenges for putting this proposal into practice
are very high (REQ -1). There is at the moment no active support in the UN
membership for this proposal, and it is reasonable to expect at least moderate
opposition should it ever gain momentum (SUP -1/OPP 0). As many questions are
unanswered, there is some space for negotiation on the specifics of ad hoc
membership (NEG 0).
The task of adding ad hoc members in crisis situations would in all likelihood involve
a process of decision-making which might evolve into a political challenge in itself.
Considering both the generally overburdened agenda of the SC as well as the potential
necessity to respond as quickly as possible to emerging crises, the concept of ad hoc
members bears considerable risks. As there are less formal alternatives for including
particular non-members in the Council’s deliberations, little would be gained by an







SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Addition of
permanent members -1 -2 -3 -6 -1 +1 -1 -1 -2
Addition of elected
members 0 -2 -3 -5 -1 +1 -1 -1 -2
Ad hoc addition of
members 0 -2 0 -2 -1 -1 0 0 -2
SC Membership & Voting – Membership – Modification
In addition to those proposals aiming at an expansion of the SC, there are those that
suggest modifications to the existing membership. The most straightforward proposal
is to abolish permanent membership altogether. According to those who strive for
such a 'democratization' of the Council, "the fact that five specially privileged
members occupy permanent seats and enjoy the power of the veto is now widely – and
reasonably – perceived as an unfair and anachronistic legacy of World War II."187
Yet, it is questionable whether permanent seats are really anachronistic. In 1945, the
main justification for creating these seats was to ensure that the militarily most
powerful states would be included in the Council's decision-making in order both to
guarantee its effectiveness as well as to lessen the probability of war between them.
Although the relative military power of France and the UK has declined significantly
and their continued membership on the SC might, therefore, reasonably be considered
as somewhat anachronistic, it is not clear why the initial purpose of permanent seats is
any less important today than it was in 1945.
The continued relevance of this function can be observed in the civil war in Syria.
Permanent membership of China, Russia and the US, but arguably also of France and
the UK, ensures that these states are forced to take into consideration each other’s
187 Joseph Schwartzberg, Revitalizing the United Nations: Reform through Weighted Voting, New
York; The Hague: Institute For Global Policy/World Federalist Movement 2004, p. 36.
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conflicting perspectives and acts as a buffer against unmediated activism. Having to
confront their differences before an intervention is carried out rather than afterwards,
ensures that these states do not spiral into a military confrontation with each other.
Although a proxy war is already taking place in Syria, so far none of the P5 are
directly involved in the conflict, which is partly due to the SC. The permanent
presence of the militarily most powerful members on the Council increases the
likelihood that its decisions take effect on the ground and, still today, lessens the
probability of war between the great powers. As the Australian representative argued,
“[i]n terms of Council effectiveness, a review of its composition which called into
question the status of the current permanent members would […] be counter-
productive”188 (FUNC -2).
The example of the Syrian crisis demonstrates, furthermore, that permanent
membership forces those who are most capable of action to justify their positions
publicly. When, e.g., after many months of deliberations behind closed doors, some
members came to the conclusion that agreement on Council action was out of sight,
they decided to call a vote, thereby placing the SC in the public limelight and forcing
those who blocked action to justify their stance. This accountability mechanism would
not have worked if the most relevant actors had not been members of the Council
(MOM -1). On the other hand, the division of the SC into privileged permanent
members and temporary elected members obviously creates hierarchic class structures
188 United Nations General Assembly, “Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the
Membership of the Security Council and Related Matters”, UN Doc No. A/48/264, 1993.
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and promotes an atmosphere of disrespect towards the 'tourists', as the latter are often
called by the P5189 (MOM +1).
Since they know that their positions are only temporary and that they will therefore
soon depend on their predecessors, elected members are usually much more open to
input from non-members and NGOs and pass on information more willingly.190 In this
regard, the abolition of permanent membership would in all likelihood increase the
transparency and openness of the SC. However, if states such as China and the US
were not members of the Council, it is reasonable to expect that the real decision-
making would take place somewhere else, which would not only radically diminish its
decisiveness but would also significantly limit the informative content of the
deliberations and, thence, the gains in transparency and openness would ultimately
fail to take effect (SYN 0).
As the abolition of permanent membership would necessitate extensive amendments
to the Charter, the requirements for this proposal to be put into practice are high (REQ
-1). Although a significant portion of the membership is in favor of abolition, there is
currently no momentum for this proposal191 (SUP 0). The P5 are, without a doubt,
strongly opposed to this proposal, and many other states, mainly those from the
developed world, share their concerns (OPP -1). The abolition of permanent
membership is a question that can only be answered with yes or no and therefore does
not leave any room for negotiations with the entrenched opposition (NEG -1).
189 Bosco, Five to Rule them All, p. 239; Kishore Mahbubani, “The Permanent and Elected Council
Members”, in: David Malone (ed.), The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century,
Boulder; London: Lynne Rienner 2004, p. 259.
190 This point was made in many of my interviews with staff from the UN, the Member States'
permanent missions and NGOs.
191 The South Centre, a think tank affiliated with NAM, recommends the abolition of permanent
membership: South Centre, For a Strong and Democratic United Nations, p. 148.
118
Alternatively, some proposals suggest the replacement of the permanent seats with
elected long term seats. Peter Wallensteen, e.g., advocates the introduction of
‘senatorial seats’ with six-year mandates instead of permanent membership.192 Such
proposals, however, share the same defaults and challenges regarding their
desirability and feasibility as those that call for the simple abolition of permanent
membership, while also maintaining the division of the Council into two classes of
members (MOM -1).
One important but somewhat neglected part of the UFC’s proposal for SC reform is
the suggestion to make those states that are about to conclude their terms on the
Council immediately re-electable for membership.193 As it usually takes new
members some time to learn about the Council’s procedures, to become up-dated on
its agenda, to restructure their permanent missions and to coordinate their policies in
order to adapt to the work on the SC, the possibility of re-election would lessen these
disruptions and enhance effectiveness through additional continuity and
professionalism194 (FUNC +2). On the one hand, the possibility of re-election might
work as a mechanism of accountability that gives the elected members an additional
incentive to create transparency and openness for the electorate. On the other hand, it
would lessen rotation in the membership and thereby decrease the chances for less
powerful states to serve on the Council (SYN 0).
Re-electable membership would necessitate an amendment of the Charter and,
therefore, the requirements are demanding (REQ -1). The proposal is backed by a
192 Peter Wallensteen, “Representing the World: A Security Council for the 21st Century”, Security
Dialogue, 25 (1), 1994, pp. 68-69.
193 United Nations General Assembly, “Reform of the Security Council”, UN Doc No. A/59/L.68, 2005.
194 Interview at the United Nations Secretariat, Department of Political Affairs, New York, 7 June
2012.
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strong and determined faction of states, the UFC, but it also faces significant
opposition. In the eyes of the G4, re-electable membership is part of the UFC’s efforts
to derail their campaign for permanent seats (SUP +1/OPP -1). However, if the idea
of re-electable membership were detached from the UFC’s proposal for SC reform, it
might be possible that the G4 perceive it as a steppingstone to further reform rather
than as a substitute for permanent membership. Very similar considerations inspired
the G4’s recent backflip with regard to the S5’s efforts for the reform of the Council’s
working methods. This demonstrates that such a reconception of others’ efforts for
reform is indeed possible and there is, therefore, some room for negotiation (NEG 0).
Richard Falk makes a very different suggestion for the modification of the Council’s
membership. According to him, a seat should be reserved for a ‘moral superpower’ to
be selected by a panel of Nobel Peace Prize winners.195 It may be imaginable that
under auspicious circumstances it might be possible for the panel to identify a state
that would not by default let its perceived national interest override what it deems to
be in the interest of humanity as a whole and thereby increase the likelihood of a
genuine consideration of the common good in the SC (MOM +1). The presence of a
‘moral superpower’ would, however, also implicitly signify the moral inferiority of
the rest of the membership, which could very well create tensions among the members
and promote an atmosphere of disrespect (MOM -1).
The requirements for putting this proposal into practice are extremely demanding. Not
only would it necessitate an amendment of the Charter, but it would also be dependent
upon an elaborate and justifiable selection procedure as well as requiring a
195 Vicenç Fisas, Blue Geopolitics: The United Nations and the Future of the Blue Helmets, London;
East Haven, CT: Pluto Press 1995, p. 23.
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clarification of what could turn out to be a very tricky mandate for the chosen state.
What responsibilities would this position bring with it? Would the chosen state be
required to neglect its duty of national representation (REQ -1)? There is currently no
support in the UN membership for this proposal, and the opposition to a ‘morally
superior’ state on the SC would in all likelihood be very strong (SUP -1/OPP -1).
Moreover, this proposal does not leave much room for negotiation: either there should
be a seat for a moral superpower or there should not (NEG -1).
Others suggest a specification of conditions for eligibility to stand in the elections for
Council membership. Article 23 of the Charter determines that the GA shall elect the
members with “due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the
contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international
peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to
equitable geographical distribution.”196 In practice, the requirement for equitable
distribution dominates the concerns of the Member States, while the proviso that
attention should be paid to the contribution of the candidates is virtually ignored.
In the opinion of Vicenç Fisas, e.g., more emphasis should be placed on the quality of
the candidates. He suggests laying down conditions for membership and specifies that
candidates should “be fully paid up with the UN, accept the International Court of
Justice, take part in the United Nations Peace Forces, fulfill the Council’s
resolutions, [and] sign agreements on disarmament and human rights.”197 The High-
level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, on the other hand, calls on the
Member States “to elect Security Council members by giving preference for
196 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter V, Article 23,
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter5.shtml
197 Fisas, Blue Geopolitics, p. 30
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permanent or longer-term seats to those States that are among the top three financial
contributors in their relevant regional area to the regular budget, or the top three
voluntary contributors from their regional area, or the top three troop contributors
from their regional area to United Nations peacekeeping missions.”198
Specifying conditions for membership would probably keep those states that are more
skeptical of the UN as such, and that are more prone to engage in obstructive policies
in multilateral settings, off the Council, hence ensuring a more homogenous
composition which would increase the probability of consensus and thereby promote
its effectiveness (FUNC +2). It would, however, not only further diminish the chances
of less powerful states to serve on the Council but, by establishing two categories of
states, those who are eligible for membership and those who are not, also create a
pretext for the absolute exclusion of the latter in any type of decision-making
regarding global peace and security. Why should anyone listen to these states if it is
well-established that they are unfit for SC decision-making (SYN -3)?
A specification of conditions for SC membership could either be achieved through the
amendment of the Charter or through a practical consensus in the GA, similar to the
arrangements regarding the geographical distribution of the elected seats. Either way,
the requirements are considerably demanding (REQ -1). Although this proposal is not
currently discussed in the UN membership, the US does not tire of emphasizing the
requirement that potential Council members be able and willing to contribute to the
198 This proposal is made in the context of Council expansion, but it nonetheless demonstrates the range
of possibilities regarding conditions for SC membership: United Nations General Assembly, “A More
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility”, UN Doc No. A/59/565, 2004, p. 86.
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maintenance of global peace and security.199 France and the UK share this concern.
Hence, the proposal would have reasonable chances of receiving support from some
of the most significant Member States with regard to Council reform (SUP 0). On the
other hand, a large number of states would fear the possibility of losing their
eligibility for a seat on the SC and would, therefore, be heavily opposed to this
proposal (OPP -1). Since the specification of conditions for membership could take
shape in many forms considering the choice of criteria and the rigidity with which it is






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Abolish permanent
membership 0 -2 0 -2 -1 0 -1 -1 -3
Senatorial seats -1 -2 0 -3 -1 0 -1 -1 -3
Re-electable
membership 0 +2 0 +2 -1 +1 -1 0 -1
Moral superpower
seat 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -4
Conditions for
membership 0 +2 -3 -1 -1 0 -1 +1 -1
SC Membership & Voting – Membership – Regional Representation
There are many proposals that suggest some type of regional representation as the
basis for the future composition of the SC. Joseph Schwartzberg, e.g., proposes a
Council that is based entirely on regional arrangements.200 As argued above, regional
representation without well-established mechanisms of accountability is highly
problematic. Instead, as Jakob Lund points out, “regional representation only makes
sense when countries in a region have agreed in advance to pool their sovereignty
and share seats or make some similar arrangements, which will ensure that regional
199 United Nations General Assembly, “Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the
Membership of the Security Council and Related Matters”, UN Doc No. A/66/PV.51, 2011.
200 Schwartzberg, Revitalizing the United Nations, pp. 39-47.
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representatives will in fact represent a whole region and not just their own
countries.”201 For this reason, the proposals for a common seat for the EU, as the
arguably most integrated regional organization, will serve as the showcase for the
evaluation of regional seats.
The idea of a single seat for the European Community first gained political currency
in 1990, when the Italian Foreign Minister, Gianni de Michelis, suggested the idea as
an alternative to an additional permanent seat for Germany.202 The common seat was
supposed to address both Germany’s ambitions for more influence on the SC as well
as the growing criticism regarding the ‘anachronistic’ permanent membership of
France and the UK, which would have to give up their special privileges for the
benefit of the EU as a whole. Although a common seat for the EU would formally
entail one less veto-yielding member, in practice, it would amount to the addition of
25 new veto-powers. As Bardo Fassbender explains, “[b]ecause the EU foreign policy
is still guided by the unanimity principle, it is also very questionable whether the
responsibilities inherent in such a seat could be carried out effectively, or whether in
contrast the EU would be forced to a policy of permanent abstention.”203 Even if the
unanimity principle were to be replaced by the requirement for a two-thirds majority
or some similar arrangement, the EU’s intricate policy making could still severely
hamper the effectiveness of the SC (FUNC -2). This need for coordination, however,
would also increase the input from those EU member states which otherwise would
not be represented on the SC and would add transparency to the Council’s decision-
201 Jakob Lund, “Pros and Cons of Security Council Reform”, Centre for UN Reform Education, 2010:
http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/414
202 Dimitris Bourantonis, The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform, London; New York:
Routledge 2005, p. 35.
203 Bardo Fassbender, “The European Union in the United Nations and the Issue of UN Reform”, in:
Reforming the United Nations for Peace and Security, New Haven: The Yale Center for the Study of
Globalization 2005, p. 85.
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making procedures by making it somewhat harder for the permanent members to
strike backdoor deals (SYN +3).
An EU seat on the SC would require far-reaching amendments to the Charter. Not
only would the articles concerning the composition of the Council have to be
modified, but fundamental provisions such as article 4, which allows UN membership
for sovereign states only, would have to be reconsidered204 (REQ -1). Although Italy
heavily advocated this proposal in the early nineties, it has since changed its strategy
and now concentrates fully on the UFC’s plans for additional elected members. Other
European states such as Spain and Poland are also in favor of an EU seat205, but over
the years, the proposal has lost momentum (SUP 0). France, Germany and the UK are
fiercely opposed to the idea of one common EU seat. Referring to France and the UK,
Richard Holbrooke accurately pointed out in 2002, that “for those two, Security
Council membership is the definition of their global role […] they are not going to
give it up in a hurry.”206 Germany, on the other hand, is not ready to drop its
aspiration for permanent membership in favor of a seat for the EU207 (OPP -1). The
required amendment of article 4 is a very fundamental question which does not leave
much room for compromise (NEG -1).
204 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter II, Article 4,
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter2.shtml
205 Jan Wouters and Tom Ruys, “Security Council Reform: A New Veto for a New Century?”, Working
Paper No 78, K.U. Leuven, Institute for International Law 2005, p. 27.
206 Quoted in Christopher Hill, “The European Powers in the Security Council: Differing Interests,
Differing Agendas”, in: Katie Laatikainen and Karen Smith (eds.), The European Union at the United
Nations: Intersecting Multilateralisms, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2006, p. 58.
207 Bourantonis, The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform, p. 38.
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The African Group has proposed adding permanent seats which would rotate among
the members of the region.208 It is not clear, however, why those countries that were
to be selected for these new permanent seats should be any more representative than
those that assume mandates for the regular elected seats. It seems that the real
difference would be made by the prospects of an adaption of the selection procedures
and the creation of a mechanism of accountability within the region. This could be
achieved just as well without a reform of the SC (SYN 0). More than anything, the
proposal of regional rotation is the result of the African Group’s inability to find a
consensus on the candidates for the two permanent seats that an expansion of the
Council might entail.
This proposal would necessitate an amendment of the Charter and, therefore, the
requirements for putting it into practice are demanding (REQ -1). On the one hand,
the African Group supports regional rotation, on the other hand, the US has made it
sufficiently clear that it will not accept new permanent seats as long as it is not
definite who will assume them209 (SUP +1/OPP -1). There might be a chance of
making the proposal more acceptable to the US by narrowing down the circle of
candidates to three or four states who would circulate the seat among themselves or







SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Regional seats (e.g.
EU) 0 -2 +3 +1 -1 0 -1 -1 -3
Regional rotation 0 0 0 0 -1 +1 -1 0 -1
208 African Economic Community, “Declaration and Decisions adopted by the Thirty-fourth Ordinary
Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government”, AEC Doc No. AHG/Dec.129 (XXIV),
1998.
209 United Nations General Assembly, “Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the
Membership of the Security Council and Related Matters”, UN Doc No. A/66/PV.51, 2011.
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SC Membership & Voting – Voting – Abolition of Veto
The veto power of the permanent members has been a bone of contention since the
very first days of the UN210, and today many Member States concur with the opinion
of the Indonesian representative “that the right of veto has no place in a world that is
becoming more democratic.”211 The abolition of the veto would significantly reduce
the structural inequality among the Council members and thereby promote an
atmosphere of mutual respect (MOM +1). Yet, such a reform would, in all likelihood,
also immensely decrease the effectiveness of the Council. Should the P5 lose their
veto rights, it is very likely that they would lose interest in the Council and outsource
their deliberations and decision-making to other fora. The root of the problem is, of
course, that the SC, and indeed the UN as a whole, is not only legally dependent upon
the P5, but that its effectiveness hinges as well on the practical cooperation of these
states.
In 1945, the main justification for bestowing the veto on the five great powers was
that, by nature of their military capabilities, these were the states that were to bear the
brunt of any enforcement measures. But today, many would agree with Fassbender
who argues that “[i]t has become doubtful that the five states who were chosen, or
established themselves, as permanent members of the Security Council in 1945 still
represent that group of states whose action alone can maintain world peace.”212 It is
definitely true that the geopolitical realities of today are different to those of 60 years
ago, but the crucial question is: to what effect have they changed? In the Stockholm
210 Ian Hurd, After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council, Princeton:
Princeton University Press 2007, pp. 83-110.
211 United Nations General Assembly, “Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the
Membership of the Security Council and Related Matters”, UN Doc No. A/66/PV.51, 2011.
212 Bardo Fassbender, UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto: A Constitutional Perspective,
The Hague; London; Boston: Kluwer Law International 1998, p. 171.
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International Peace Research Institute’s ranking of military expenditure, the P5 still
occupy today the five top spots.213
The US, of course, plays the outstanding role of being the only state in the world
whose military has truly global reach. Without a question, this group of states remains
essential to the maintenance of global peace and security. David Malone goes as far as
to argue that “[a] Council that is not an instrument of U.S. foreign policy would
probably be as ineffective as the League of Nations”214 It is somewhat excessive to
suggest that the SC necessarily needs to be an ‘instrument’ of the US, but Malone’s
comparison with the League of Nations does seem warranted. The history of the UN’s
predecessor is a clear warning of what a withdrawal or the non-cooperation of the
world’s greatest powers could entail for the viability of the organization.
Now, as it has 60 years ago, the veto ensures that the UN as an organization does not
fall victim to a substantial clash of interest between the world’s greatest military
powers. As the representative of the UK argued in 1996, “[t]he role of the United
Nations may have been diminished during the Cold War but a consequence of the veto
in those years was that the United Nations survived, and that the organization has
become the forum for genuine cooperation between the members of the same blocs
since the end of the Cold War. While we see no likelihood of a return of international
bloc politics, the fact that the veto served in those years to protect the neutrality of the
United Nations and its unique position as the single global forum accepted by all is
213 http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/resultoutput/milex_15/the-15-countries-with-the-
highest-military-expenditure-in-2011-table/view
214 David Malone, “Conclusion”, in: David Malone (ed.), The UN Security Council: From the Cold
War to the 21st Century, Boulder; London: Lynne Rienner 2004, p. 637.
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still relevant”215 By keeping the UN out of the conflicts between the great powers, the
veto upholds the organization’s universality. Moreover, it often cautions the
permanent members from becoming directly involved on opposite sides of a conflict,
as is presently the case with regard to Syria (FUNC -2).
Although the abolition of the veto right would probably make the Council more
transparent and accountable, these improvements would no longer have any effect on
the actual decision-making regarding global peace and security (SYN 0). This reform
would require an amendment of the Charter (REQ -1). A majority of the membership,
including the African Group216 and the Caribbean Community217, is, in principle, in
support of this proposal, although the short-term strategy of most of these states is to
call for a limitation of the veto right rather than its abolition (SUP +1). The P5, on the
other hand, are adamantly opposed to the abolition of the veto218 and the proposal
itself does not leave any room for compromise (OPP -1/NEG -1).
It has been suggested that rather than entirely abolishing the veto right, it should be
restricted to only two or three SC members.219 Many Member States and observers
feel that the present military and political role of France and the UK no longer
justifies their right to veto decisions in the SC. Yet, even though fewer veto members
would lessen the probability of SC action being blocked, it is not clear whether a
removal of the French and British veto right would increase the effectiveness of the
215 Quoted in Bourantonis, The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform, p. 72.
216 African Union Executive Council, “The Ezulwini Consensus”, AU Doc No. Ext/EX.CL/2 (VII),
2005.
217 United Nations General Assembly, “Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the
Membership of the Security Council and Related Matters”, UN Doc No. A/66/PV.51, 2011.
218 Bourantonis, The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform, p. 72.
219 Hannah Newcombe, “Third-Generation World Organizations”, in: Eric Fawcett and Hannah
Newcombe, (eds), United Nations Reform: Looking Ahead after 50 Years, Toronto: Dundurn Press
1995, p. 88.
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Council. Although it is true that the relative power of these countries has declined
significantly, both still play an important role in many of the African crises. Given
that by far the great majority of the items on the agenda of the SC directly concern the
African continent, this is a significant factor. Furthermore, both states have
accumulated extensive professional experience in the SC’s procedural matters, and by
taking on a very large proportion of the drafting of resolutions, they add considerable
drive to the Council’s work.220 Indeed, diplomats at the UN point out that, given the
Foreign and Commonwealth office’s traditional expertise in legal matters, even the
US often prefers the UK to draft resolutions. Finally, the last time France and the UK
have made use of their veto right was in 1989.221 Although a mere threat of a veto can
sometimes prevent a vote from being called – the so-called ‘hidden veto’ – and can,
therefore, take effect without being cast, more than 20 years of non-application speaks
a clear language (FUNC 0).
Fewer veto members would not limit the threat of an ‘executive committee’ on the
Council and would in no way increase its transparency or openness. In this regard, it
is also important to note that, being well aware of the disputes regarding their
continued privileges, France and the UK have, in the last two decades, sought to
increase their perceived legitimacy by adding transparency to the work of the SC
(SYN 0). This proposal would require an amendment of the Charter, and it can be
expected that NAM would be in favor of a removal of the veto privileges of two
developed states222 (REQ -1/SUP +1). The latter two are adamantly opposed to any
such reform, and should there be no European substitute for the lost veto rights, could
220 Interview at a Permanent Representation of a UN Member State, New York, 15 June 2012.
221 http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/tables-and-charts-on-the-security-council-0-82.html
222 Helen Leigh-Phippard, “Remaking the Security Council: the Options”, in: Paul Taylor, Sam Daws
and Ute Adamcziek-Certeis (eds.), Documents on the Reform of the United Nations, Brookfield, VT:
Dartmouth 1996, p. 427.
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also count on the support of the EU as a whole (OPP -1). The proposal to remove the






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Abolition of veto +1 -2 0 -1 -1 +1 -1 -1 -2
Fewer veto members 0 0 0 0 -1 +1 -1 -1 -2
SC Membership & Voting – Voting – Limitation of Veto
Many proposals suggest a qualitative limitation of the veto to defined issue areas,
which is often seen as a prelude to “phasing out of the veto”.223 In 2010, e.g., the
PREP of Egypt suggested restricting “the Veto rights of current and new permanent
members to exclude, as a first stage, cases of genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes
against humanity, grave violations to international law, cessation of hostilities
between belligerent parties and the election of the Secretary General.”224 An
alternative option forwarded, e.g., by NAM in 1993, would be to limit the veto right
to decisions that are made according to chapter VII of the Charter.225 Others have
suggested that a permanent member should refrain from using the veto in cases in
which “it has a personal interest.”226
By lessening the danger of decisions being blocked by a single member, a qualitative
limitation of the veto would make SC action in cases of emergency more probable.
223 Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood: The Report of the Commission on
Global Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995, p. 345.
224 United Nations General Assembly, “Report of the Security Council”, UN Doc No. A/65/PV.48,
2010.
225 United Nations General Assembly, “Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the
Membership of the Security Council and Related Matters”, UN Doc No. A/48/264,1993.
226 United Nations General Assembly, “Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the
Membership of the Security Council and Related Matters”, UN Doc No. A/48/264,1993. Article 27 of
the UN charter which states that “in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52,
a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting” is not applied in practice: Wouters and Ruys, Security
Council Reform, p. 8.
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However, two factors regarding the effectiveness of the Council have to be taken into
account: Firstly, SC authorization against the will of one or possibly even all of the
permanent members risks remaining without effect on the ground or, in a potentially
much worse scenario, might encourage a military operation that, for lack of support,
has only little chance of success. The veto “is a safety valve that prevents the UN from
undertaking commitments that it lacks the power to fulfill.”227 Secondly, there is a
danger that the Council might remain caught up in procedural questions instead of
addressing the emergency swiftly. Since there exist different opinions as to what
constitutes a chapter VII emergency, genocide, ethnic cleansing, personal interest,
etc., in principle, as well as considerable interpretative variation in individual cases,228
depending on the particular interests involved, the SC would potentially lose much
time before taking action by first having to find a consensus on the legal evaluation of
the situation at hand (FUNC 0).
A clean and legally indisputable limitation of the veto would require an amendment of
the Charter. An alternative would be an informal agreement between the P5 to abstain
from using the veto in certain situations. The High-level Panel suggests to “ask the
permanent members […] to pledge themselves to refrain from the use of the veto in
cases of genocide and large-scale human rights abuses.”229 But even in the case of
such an agreement, the requirements are very demanding. Not only would agreement
have to be found between five states who, at best, show no interest in this proposal,
but more importantly, such an agreement would, without any legal guarantees, stand
227 Fassbender, UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto, p. 272.
228 A recent example for conflicting interpretations as to what counts as a chapter VII situation are the
deliberations on a resolution regarding the crisis in Northern Mali: What’s in Blue: Insights on the
Work of the Security Council, “Draft Resolution on Mali”, 3 July 2012,
http://whatsinblue.org/2012/07/draft-resolution-on-mali.php
229 United Nations General Assembly, “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility”, UN Doc
No. A/59/565, 2004, p. 68.
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and fall with the first cases of possible application, and it does not seem at all clear
that there is enough trust between the P5 to entice one state to sacrifice its vital
interests in the belief that the others would act in the same manner should tables turn.
NATO’s intervention in Libya is a case in point: from the perspective of China and
Russia, the P3 misused their abstention on a resolution that addressed humanitarian
concerns230 in order to enforce a regime change in their self-interest (REQ -1).
China and Russia, therefore, are strongly opposed to a qualitative limitation of the
veto right, as are, for slightly different reasons, the UK and the US231 (OPP -1). A
majority of the UN membership is in favor of such a limitation: in May 2012, the S5
withdrew a draft resolution that asked the P5 to refrain “from using a veto to block
Council action aimed at preventing or ending genocide, war crimes and crimes
against humanity”232 only because it was likely to fail in achieving a two-thirds
majority, and a few months later, somewhat surprisingly, even France declared its
support of the proposal: “France supports the permanent members of the Council
voluntarily and jointly foregoing the use of the veto in situations under the Council’s
consideration in which mass atrocities are being committed and, more generally,
which pertain to the responsibility to protect”233 (SUP +1). As these limitations could
be defined either very narrowly or very broadly, the proposal leaves some room for
negotiation (NEG 0).
230 United Nations Security Council, “The Situation in Libya”, UN Doc No. S/Res/1973, 2011.
231 Thomas Weiss and Karen Young, “Compromise and Credibility: Security Council Reform?”,
Security Dialogue, 36 (2), 2005, p. 135.
232 The draft resolution of the S5 is available at
http://www.centerforunreform.org/system/files/S5+Reform+draft+resolution.pdf
233 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6870, 2012.
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A variation of this proposal is the idea of imposing quantitative rather than qualitative
limitations on the veto. The suggestion is to establish “a quota of only so many vetoes
per year permitted to any veto-possessing member.”234 In addition to some of the
normative considerations that apply to a qualitative limitation of the veto right, a
quantitative limitation would produce a dangerous incentive to provoke certain
Council members into applying their veto. The resulting probability of antagonizing
debates with the sole aim of achieving procedural advantages would hinder a genuine
consideration of the common good and bog down the Council in unpractical debates
(MOM -1/FUNC -2). In terms of requirements, the considerations are the same as
with a qualitative limitation of the veto (REQ -1). Although many Member States will
generally show support for any proposal that dilutes the veto, the focus lies on the
cause for qualitative rather than quantitative limitations (SUP 0). The P5 would be
strongly opposed to this proposal (OPP -1). As the quota could be fixed in a way that
limits the veto right either very significantly or purely theoretically, or anything in
between, the proposal leaves room for negotiation (NEG 0).
Some academics propose qualifying the veto by changing the minimum requirements
for passing a resolution. Brian Lepard suggest that “one intermediate reform moving
closer to this ideal would be to amend the Charter to require at least two vetoes for a
resolution to be defeated.”235 Others propose “requiring a qualified majority (e.g.,
three-quarters of the Security Council) to overcome the veto.”236 Such qualifications
of the veto would, on the one hand, make SC action more likely, but on the other
hand, they would also risk alienating the most powerful members of the UN (FUNC
234 Newcombe, Third-Generation World Organizations, p. 88.
235 Brian Lepard, “Jurying Humanitarian Intervention and the Ethical Principal of Open-Minded
Consultation”, in: Terry Nardin and Melissa Williams (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention, New York:
New York University Press 2006, p. 237.
236 Newcombe, Third-Generation World Organizations, p. 88.
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0). Changing the minimum requirements for passing the adoption of resolutions
would definitely necessitate an amendment of the Charter (REQ -1). As is the case
with the proposal for a quantitative limitation of the veto, there is no momentum in
support, and strong opposition from the P5 is guaranteed (SUP 0/OPP -1). Since a
qualified veto could be based on either very demanding or less demanding minimum
requirements, the proposal leaves room for negotiation (NEG 0).
Another option would be a provision for the GA to become involved in the case of a
veto. In this regard, some have suggested the establishment of “a bicameral
agreement with the General Assembly: e.g., a four-fifths majority in the General
Assembly could override a Security Council veto.”237 Such a referral of decision-
making to the GA would immensely expand the sources of input into the
deliberations, and the sheer existence of this option would give the Council members
a strong incentive to pre-emptively consider the perspectives of the Assembly, thereby
increasing the deliberative synergy between the bodies (SYN +3).
Concerning the effectiveness of the SC, it is likely that the specter of losing its
prerogatives in decision-making would entice the Council members to work towards a
compromise that would allow them to keep control of the agenda item. On the other
hand, such a mechanism could very well have the opposite effect if some Council
members can be sure of a majority in the GA and therefore insist on their maximum
demands in order to provoke a veto. Obviously, a referral to the GA would also entail
a much more cumbersome and time-consuming process of decision-making, and the
number of cases in which a decision is vetoed in the SC, but for which a four-fifths
237 Newcombe, Third-Generation World Organizations, p. 88.
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majority can be found in the GA would probably be very limited. It could be argued
that since this procedure would be initiated only in the case of a veto, the Assembly
would become involved at a point when the Council is already ineffective. A veto,
however, does not equal a breakdown of negotiations, and in such an event, it might
still be easier to find a viable compromise in the SC rather than having the issue taken
out of the hands of the Council by an automatic referral to the GA which could then
entail protracted debates and the imposition of a decision by majority vote. What
happens once the Assembly has adopted a resolution? Will the responsibility for the
issue remain with the GA or be referred back to the SC? All in all, it is very hard to
predict the effects such a mechanism would have on the effectiveness of the SC.
(FUNC 0).
The proposal of a bicameral arrangement requires very significant amendment of the
Charter. Not only would the voting mechanisms of the SC have to be modified, but a
referral of decision-making to the GA also touches upon the question of whether it
can make the same type of decisions as the Council, i.e., legally-binding decisions and
authorization of force (REQ -1). Although NAM is in favor of such a mechanism, and
some states such as the Ukraine and Colombia have in the past forwarded this
proposal in the GA,238 at the moment the focus of its efforts lies on the strengthening
of the more realistic Uniting For Peace procedure (SUP 0). The P5 and other, mostly
developed states, firmly reject this proposal239 (OPP -1). Since there are various
possibilities regarding the voting thresholds, the proposal does leave some room for
negotiation (NEG 0).
238 Bardo Fassbender, UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto, p. 269; Very recently, Cuba
has suggested the consideration of this proposal: United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of
the Note by the President of the Security Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6870 (Resumption 1), 2012.
239 For more details, compare the stance of the P5 on the UFP procedure in the chapter ‘Relations
between Security Council and General Assembly.’
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In 2012, the S5 suggested that the GA ask the P5 to consider “[e]xplaining the
reasons when resorting to a veto or declaring its intention to do so, in particular with
regard to its consistency with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations and applicable international law. A copy of the explanation should be
circulated as a separate Security Council document to all Members of the
Organisation.”240 Such an obligation to explain the reasons behind a veto would
promote the justification of assertions and validity claims and would not only add
transparency to the Council’s deliberations, but also emphasize its accountability to
the GA. As Jan Wouters and Tom Ruys state, explanations of veto to the GA as “an
accountability mechanism is the minimal concession that permanent members should
make if they wish to endow the Security Council with the legitimacy and support it
requires”241 (MOM +1/SYN +3).
Presumably, this obligation would be based on some type of convention or practical
agreement and would, therefore, not necessarily require an amendment of the Charter.
Since an explanation would not change the validity of the veto, such an agreement
would not entail the same problems as, e.g., an agreement on a qualitative limitation.
As the PREP of Switzerland explained, “to explain the reasons for resorting to a veto
is nothing fundamentally new since it is already practiced to some extent by the
permanent members of the Security Council”242 (REQ 0). A large majority of the
membership, including various developed states such as Spain and New Zealand,243 is
in favor of the proposal of the S5, while the P5 are very reluctant to acquiesce in an
240 http://www.centerforunreform.org/system/files/S5+Reform+draft+resolution.pdf
241 Wouters and Ruys, Security Council Reform, p. 30.
242This statement is available at:
http://www.centerforunreform.org/system/files/S5+Presentation+of+draft+resolution+04.04.2012.pdf
243 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6672 (Resumption 1), 2011.
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obligation to bow down and justify themselves to the GA (SUP +1/OPP -1). Since
there are numerous possibilities as to the requirements in content and procedure of the
explanation of the veto, and since the opposing positions are not hopelessly






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Qualitative limitation
of veto 0 0 0 0 -1 +1 -1 0 -1
Quantitative
limitation of veto -1 -2 0 -3 -1 0 -1 0 -2
Qualified veto 0 0 0 0 -1 0 -1 0 -2
Refer vetos to the
GA 0 -2 +3 +1 -1 0 -1 0 -2
Explain vetos to the
GA +1 0 +3 +4 0 +1 -1 +1 +1
SC Membership & Voting – Voting – Alternative Procedures
In its draft resolution of 2012, the S5 also proposed an interesting innovation in the
voting procedures of the Council. The draft suggested “[e]stablishing a practice, in
appropriate cases, of declaring, when casting a negative vote on a draft resolution
before the Council, that such a negative vote shall not constitute a veto in the sense of
Article 27, paragraph 3 of the Charter.”244 As the representative of Liechtenstein
explains, this “additional tool would enable any permanent member to take a clear
position on the substance of a text, while making it clear that it does not intend to
block the adoption of a proposal.”245 Indeed, it is likely that in some rare cases this
option would make it easier for the Council to take action despite disagreement
(FUNC +2). In addition, the possibility of casting a negative vote without a veto
244 http://www.centerforunreform.org/system/files/S5+Reform+draft+resolution.pdf
245 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6672, 2011.
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would be a small step in the direction of its abolition, but would, nonetheless, leave
the P5 in full control of the process, thereby avoiding their alienation.
With regard to the draft resolution, the PREP of Switzerland maintained that “[t]he
Charter is left completely untouched”246, and the representative of Liechtenstein
argued that “given the Council’s practice of considering that an abstention does not
constitute a non-concurring vote, meaning a veto, a new practice could be established
that would allow a permanent member to cast a negative vote without giving it the
effect of a veto.”247 Yet, in the negotiations on the S5 draft, the Russian representative
made it clear that, in his perspective, the proposal for a negative vote without a veto
would require an amendment of the Charter.
When comparing the circumstances in which the practice that an abstention does not
constitute a non-concurring vote was adopted with those regarding the proposal of the
S5, it does, indeed, seem that the former cannot be used as a precedent for the latter.
In the case of the former, the Charter was still a very young legal document that had
to prove its viability in practice. In this situation, the P5 gave expression to a common
interpretation of the Charter through their uniform practice of not counting an
abstention as a non-concurring vote. Today there already exists an established
interpretation of the Charter’s provisions regarding the veto that has been consistently
expressed in more than 70 years of Council practice. The proposal for a negative vote
without a veto would, therefore, require an amendment of the Charter in order to be
put into practice.
246 United Nations Department of Public Information, “Switzerland withdraws Draft Resolution in
General Assembly aimed at Improving Security Council’s Working Methods to avoid ‘Politically
Complex’ wrangling”, UN Doc No. GA/11234, 2012.
247 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6672, 2011.
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In the end, given the objections voiced, the S5 decided to delete this proposal from the
draft resolution (REQ -1). The S5 has much support in the membership for its
proposal, but the P5, especially Russia, strongly opposed it248 (SUP +1/ OPP -1). The
P5 have, however, promised the S5 to look into their proposals, and given that the
negative vote without a veto is not necessarily contrary to the interests of the P5 –
indeed, future scenarios might convince them that it is very much in their interest –
there might be some room for negotiations even in the short term (NEG 0).
In 2004, the High-level Panel proposed “the introduction of a system of ‘indicative
voting’, whereby members of the Security Council could call for a public indication of
positions on a proposed action. Under this indicative vote, ‘no’ votes would not have
a veto effect, nor would the final tally of the vote have any legal force. The second
formal vote on any resolution would take place under the current procedures of the
Council. This would, we believe, increase the accountability of the veto function.”249
The main objective of this process would be to expose the positions of the Council
members and thereby put public pressure on those states that stall SC action well
before the actual vote is taken.
James Fearon argues that “by raising the political costs of veto threats, this reform
might enable action in cases that under the current system would be stalled for
narrow, idiosyncratic reasons.”250 It is, however, doubtful whether the process of
indicative voting would really make a difference. Kemal Dervis demurs that “[i]f an
248 Interview at a Permanent Representation of a UN Member State, New York, 8 June 2012.
249 United Nations General Assembly, “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility”, UN Doc
No. A/59/565, 2004, p. 68.
250 James Fearon, “Comments on the Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and
Change”, in: Reforming the United Nations for Peace and Security, New Haven: The Yale Center for
the Study of Globalization 2005, p. 102.
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existing member is not shamed by a situation where there is a 14 to 1 vote in favor of
a resolution but the resolution is blocked by the one vote of this member with veto
power, I do not see why this member would be more shamed by an indicative 14 to 1
vote preceding the formal vote.”251 It could be argued that the time between the voting
would enable the mobilization of public pressure. Yet, the problem remains that even
if a permanent member decided to change its position due to the public pressure an
indicative vote might evoke, the resolution would have to be changed in some way or
another in order to give this state a means of saving face. Thus, in most cases, there
would be voting on two different resolutions rather than on one. Since regular votes
could be taken on both, this would make the mechanism of indicative voting
redundant (FUNC 0).
This proposal would require an amendment of the Charter (REQ -1). The idea of
indicative voting did receive considerable attention at the 2005 World Summit, but
especially China and Russia were opposed to it. Firstly, these states are not interested
in increasing public pressure and secondly, they fear that this procedure could be
misused. A comment by Erik Voeten demonstrates that this is a reasonable concern:
“From the perspective of a coalition of willing states, a qualified majority in an
indicative vote — even if the vote carries no legal force — may confer a sufficient
degree of international legitimacy on a proposed intervention. On balance, the use of
indicative voting in this manner would be a positive development. Most importantly, it
251 Kemal Dervis, “Thoughts on the Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and
Change”, in: Reforming the United Nations for Peace and Security, New Haven: The Yale Center for
the Study of Globalization 2005, p. 50.
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would take some force away from obstructive veto threats”252 (SUP +1/OPP -1). The
proposal for indicative voting does not leave any room for compromise (NEG -1).
A more radical reform proposal is that of introducing a system of weighted voting.
Schwartzberg, Dervis, and others suggest that the vote of each Member State should
be assessed according to a formula that takes into account primarily the size of its
population and its financial contributions to the UN, but possibly also some additional
factors. The right to veto would be abolished.253 Since such a reform would assign
each state a rank, it would lead to very pronounced hierarchical structures and thereby
promote an atmosphere of disrespect among the membership (MOM -1). In terms of
effectiveness, it would have the same effects as those discussed concerning the
abolition of the veto (FUNC -2).
Obviously, this proposal would not only require very significant amendment of the
Charter, but it also puts in question a very fundamental principle of the UN, i.e., the
sovereign equality of all states (REQ -1). There is currently no support for this
proposal in the membership, and since the great majority of states would incur a
relative loss in voting power should it be put into practice, the opposition is very
strong254 (SUP -1/OPP -1). As there are many different possibilities for deriving
quotas for voting power, there is some space for negotiation (NEG 0).
252 Erik Voeten, “Some Comments on UN Charter Reform”, in: Reforming the United Nations for
Peace and Security, New Haven: The Yale Center for the Study of Globalization 2005, p. 195.
253 Schwartzberg, Revitalizing the United Nations; Dervis, Thoughts on the Report of the High-level
Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, pp. 48-54.








SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Negative vote
without veto 0 +2 0 +2 -1 +1 -1 0 -1
Indicative voting 0 0 0 0 -1 +1 -1 -1 -2
Weighted voting -1 -2 0 -3 -1 -1 -1 0 -3
Conclusion
As a result of the protracted debate on SC reform, the academic literature is full of
suggestions for the reform of the membership of the SC, and various groups of
Member States continue to push vigorously for reform. Yet, as the evaluation
demonstrates, the likelihood that the composition of the Council will be changed in
the near future remains very small. This is primarily the result of persistent political
obstacles, but, on the other hand, this evaluation also highlights clearly that, despite
all the efforts on behalf of various commentators for designing more or less creative
suggestions for a reform of the membership, none come even close to being
normatively desirable. Certain Member States would, of course, dispute this
observation, but it seems clear that the status quo in formal membership is upheld not
only by a political stalemate but also by the fact that none of the forwarded proposals
for reform emanate the normative force that would make them irresistible. As Ian
Hurd points out, there is reason to believe that the stalemate in the negotiations may
“originate in incompatible notions about how legitimation works.”255 The evaluation
supports the argument that a reform of the membership of the SC is just as much a
normative dilemma as it is a political one.
255 Ian Hurd, “Myths of Membership: The Politics of Legitimation in UN Security Council Reform”,
Global Governance, 14 (2), 2008, p. 213.
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The normative evaluation of the proposals also gives support to Luck’s argument that,
regarding the political limits and challenges it faces, the SC’s basic structure is still
appropriate.256 Those who would like to see a radical overhaul of the Council’s
structure fail to recognize that the injustices and inefficiencies they wish to cure
cannot be dealt with simply by redesigning international institutions when, indeed,
this task would require fundamental socio-political change. While this thesis argues
that international institutions should always push their limits in support of a
democratization of international politics, it is self-defeating to go beyond these limits,
to lose touch with the socio-political realities of the day and, therefore, to descend into
irrelevance.
As it promises to improve the Council’s effectiveness, one reform that clearly would
be desirable is to make the elected members eligible for consecutive terms on the SC.
Although at the moment the chances for this proposal are still limited, it is not
unthinkable that the G4 may reconsider their stance on the issue and thereby clear the
path for it to be put into practice. If detached from some of the other issues in the
debate on reform, the G4 might very well find re-electable membership to be in their
best interest. Similar considerations apply to the proposal to introduce a negative vote
without the veto for the permanent members. On the one hand, this might improve the
effectiveness of the Council, on the other hand, at least some of the permanent
members are opposed to such a reform. Yet, again, it is not unimaginable that these
states might soon change their perspective and that a second, more collaborative,
attempt at introducing a negative vote without the veto could eventually be successful.
256 Edward Luck, “The UN Security Council: Reform or Enlarge?” in: Paul Heinbecker & Patricia Goff
(eds.), Irrelevant or Indispensable? The United Nations in the 21st Century, Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfried
Laurier University Press 2005, pp. 145-147.
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One proposal that certainly should be put into practice is that of requiring the P5 to
justify the application of their vetoes to the GA. This would increase the
accountability of the SC, and it also seems relatively easy to implement. Although the
P5 will not readily acquiesce to such a demand, there is not much at stake for them
either, which suggests that they might give in if put under sufficient pressure or if
given the right incentives. The great advantage of this proposal is that it would not
necessarily require an amendment to the Charter. A referral of vetoes to the GA, on
the other hand, would need such an amendment and while it would be desirable in
theory, in practice it is impossible to implement. With regard to a reform of the
composition of the Council, the idea of regional membership could be a future path to
improvement. In the short term, however, it is impossible to implement: not only
would it require fundamental changes to the Charter, but there is also strong
opposition and only moderate support. The key to progress in this matter is increasing
integration in the regions themselves. If the regions were actually to speak with one
voice, this would both strengthen support and decrease the opposition to such a
reform.
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V. Security Council Working Methods
Introduction
This chapter analyzes those reform proposals targeting the UN’s decision-making
procedures on global peace and security which are not directly related to the SC’s
membership or voting arrangements, its relationship with the GA, or its relationship
with civil society. One of the key characteristics of this area of SC reform – the debate
on ‘working methods’ – is that the respective arrangements are not regulated by the
UN Charter, but are determined by the Council itself. These are mostly very technical
matters concerning the SC’s everyday conduct and as such they gain less public and
academic attention than the more grandiose issues involving the reform of the
Charter. At the same time, the SC working methods also represents the area of reform
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in which change is the most likely and, indeed, the area in which reform does actually
take place.
Constant but low key developments in the Council’s working methods modify the
way it conducts its business. In this regard, change is sometimes brought about by an
individual actor who decides to do things another way, by situationally driven
precedence, by experiments, or by ritualistic repetition and insistence. Although
unspectacular, the reform of its working methods is one of the key factors in the SC’s
continued relevance in global politics. As Edward Luck points out: “Even an
awkwardly large Council would not be representative unless new working methods to
assure greater transparency, accountability and inclusiveness were also
introduced”257
Evaluation
SC Working Methods – Meetings – Open Meetings
The most prominent issue with regard to the working methods of the SC is the format
of its meetings. There are, essentially, two categories of Council meetings: Open
meetings in which the deliberations are subject to public broadcasting, and closed
meetings, which limit the audience to specific authorized actors. The Provisional
Rules of Procedure (PRP) designate open meetings as the default option for the
Council’s deliberations: “Unless it decides otherwise, the Security Council shall meet
in public.”258 During the first 30 years of its existence, most Council meetings were
257 Edward Luck, UN Security Council: Practice and Promise, London; New York: Routledge 2006, p.
122.
258 United Nations Security Council, “Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council”, UN Doc
No. S/96/Rev.7, 1983, rule 48.
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indeed held in public, but, as was discussed elsewhere,259 the last decades have been
characterized by the growing importance of closed meetings. Today, it is an
undisputed fact that “most of the actual work of the Council now takes place […]
behind closed doors”260 This development has been accompanied by recurring
demands for a reversal to open meetings as the standard format of SC deliberations. In
1994, instigated by France, the Council held an open debate on working methods that
resulted in a presidential statement which specified that it is “the intention of the
Council […] that there should be an increased recourse to open meetings.”261 Despite
constant efforts to promote open meetings, there are today at most a handful of such
meetings every month, and the important decisions are usually made behind closed
doors.
There are basically two different but non-exclusive approaches to the promotion of
open meetings. The first of these aims at re-establishing them as the default format for
Council deliberations. As the Permanent Representative (PREP) of Brazil stated in
2011, “the Council should strengthen the trend of meeting more often in public. In
fact, it should meet in public as a general rule, without prejudice to the usefulness of
consultations of the whole in preparing Council decisions. Private meetings should be
reserved for exceptional circumstances. Even some traditionally private meetings
could be turned into public sessions.”262 The second approach aims at creating and
establishing new types of open meetings, i.e. public briefings, orientation debates,
259 See chapter “The Politics of UN Reform.”
260 Nico Krisch, “The Security Council and the Great Powers”, in: Vaughan Lowe et al. (eds.), The
Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945, Oxford: Oxford
University Press 2008, p. 137.
261 United Nations Security Council, "Security Council working methods and procedure", UN Doc No.
S/PRST/1994/81, 1994.
262 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6672, 2011.
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wrap-up sessions, and horizon-scanning sessions, which can be perceived as
complementing the closed meetings instead of competing with them.
Ian Johnstone makes a concrete proposal for an increase in the Council’s general
recourse to open meetings. According to him, “at least one open session of the
Security Council should be held before a draft resolution has been introduced, and a
second once a draft is on the table but well before the vote.”263 In 2012, the Council
adopted on average five resolutions per month264 which means that this proposal
would require at least ten additional open meetings every month. This calculation
does not include those drafts that are discussed but not adopted. In practice, therefore,
Johnstone’s proposal would lead to a replacement of most of the closed meetings.
Would such an extensive replacement of closed meetings with open meetings be
desirable? There are several reasons why it would be advisable to maintain the
practice of holding frequent closed meetings. Having interviewed a range of SC
practitioners, Loie Feuerle comes to the conclusion that informal consultations are
essential to consensus decision-making in the Council: “the less oppositional
practices [in the SC today] can be attributed to the emergence of informal
consultation.”265 The privacy of the meetings makes it easier for the delegates to
modify their positions without losing face in front of the global public and, more
specifically, their domestic constituencies. The former PREP of France, Jean-Marc de
la Sablière, recalls that public meetings “crystallized the differences […]. You give
263 Ian Johnstone, “The Security Council as Legislature”, in: Bruce Cronin and Ian Hurd (eds.), The UN
Security Council and the Politics of International Authority, London; New York: Routledge 2008, p.
100.
264 http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions11.htm
265 Loie Feuerle, “Informal Consultation: A Mechanism in Security Council Decision-Making”, New
York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 18 (1), 1985, pp. 291-292.
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your position – you do not try to compromise. It’s not negotiation. If you want to
negotiate, you better negotiate out of the room.”266 There is broad agreement among
practitioners that informal consultations promote “real exchanges of view”267 rather
than sequences of isolated statements. The former PREP of Pakistan, Jamsheed
Marker, e.g., underlines that the “confidentiality of exchanges is essential for the
decision-making process, including the achievement of consensus.”268 Thus, closed
meetings promote the systemic function of the SC (FUNC +2).
Furthermore, closed meetings seem to augment respect among the PREPs. The
conduct of meetings away from the glare of publicity decreases the incentive for the
members to engage in polemics rather than in a more flexible exchange of views.
Feuerle observes that “[m]ost of those interviewed praised informal consultations for
encouraging Council members to talk to, rather than at, each other.”269 Since the
informality of the meetings enables the interlocutors to concentrate on each other
rather than on a public audience and thereby allows them to take statements into
consideration with less bias, it increases the level of respect in the deliberations. One
official of the Secretariat, furthermore, claims to have observed that the more relaxed
atmosphere of informal consultations has given the delegates “the opportunity to
learn about each other and to work together, resulting in a greater spirit of
cooperation and collegiality in the Council than in earlier years.”270 Finally,
according to both, state representatives and UN staff, the use of informal meetings is
conducive to a more candid communication among the delegates. Being shielded from
266 David Bosco, Five to Rule them All: The UN Security Council and the Making of the Modern World,
Oxford; Toronto: Oxford University Press 2009, p. 235.
267 Feuerle, Informal Consultation, p. 291.
268 United Nations Security Council, “Security Council working methods and procedure”, UN Doc No.
S/PV.3483, 1994.
269 Feuerle, Informal Consultation, p. 291.
270 Feuerle, Informal Consultation, p. 292.
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outside observers while also knowing that there are no official records which their
interlocutors could consult in order to pin them down on the odds and ends of their
statements gives them the feeling that they can speak more freely about their
standpoints271 (MOM -2).
On the other hand, there are arguments that speak against the resort to closed
meetings. The lack of public scrutiny makes it easier for the delegates to avoid
justifying their demands, and especially the P5 are in a position in which they can
stand their ground simply by threatening the use of their veto. As one diplomat points
out, the delegates are less reluctant to use openly strategic maneuvers such as “raising
irrelevant points, making package deals and oppressive bargains, and quarrel[ing]
about commas.”272 Members can, moreover, use the informal consultations to avoid
taking action on an issue. If they decide not to have an official meeting on an issue,
they do not have to justify their inaction in front of the global public. Because of the
lack of publicity and the moral judgment associated with it, the Council members are
also less compelled to take into consideration the common good in their deliberations
behind closed doors (MOM +2).
The fact that most of the Council’s work today is done behind closed doors hinders
the free circulation of information and makes it much harder for non-members and the
wider public to scrutinize both the reasoning behind decisions and the individual
positions of its members. According to the former PREP of France, Jean-Bernard
Mérimée, “[t]he result of this situation is strong frustration and a lack of information.
271 Feuerle, Informal Consultation, p. 291.
272 Feuerle, Informal Consultation, p. 297.
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There is frustration among nonmembers of the Council.”273 As some UN officials
readily confirm, a further detrimental result of informal meetings is a “lack of outside
input.”274 This is of course highly problematic with regard to deliberative synergy
within the UN system. Yet, it is doubtful whether the substitution of closed meetings
with open meetings would promote such deliberative synergy. The problem is that a
replacement of the closed meetings would not place the key decision-making in the
open meetings but in all likelihood would drive Council members to further outsource
the crucial deliberations into even less official fora. The growing importance of expert
meetings is, in light of the formalization of the consultations of the whole, a case in
point.275 Hence, a significant replacement of closed meetings with open meetings
carries the risk of making the Council’s decision-making even more obscure and
informal (SYN 0).
The requirements for the proposal to substitute most of the closed meetings with open
meetings are only somewhat demanding. Although the monthly Programme of Work
is usually agreed upon in a consensual manner, officially, the final say on the format
of the meeting is with the President of the Council. The challenge for putting the
proposal into practice is that it requires consistent effort and considerable political
will on behalf of a significant majority of Council members who can push through
their presidencies’ Programmes (REQ 0). Costa Rica set a precedent when it
scheduled almost only open meetings during its presidency in 2008. The P5, however,
did not react favorably to this initiative and made it clear that they were unwilling to
273 United Nations Security Council, “Security Council working methods and procedure”, UN Doc No.
S/PV.3483, 1994.
274 Feuerle, Informal Consultation, p. 294.
275 Security Council Report, Security Council Working Methods – A Work in Progress?, New York
2010, p. 9.
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cooperate on this matter276 (OPP -1). On the other hand, a majority of the UN
membership is clearly in favor of reestablishing open meetings as the default format
for the Council’s deliberations, although the focus of criticism has recently shifted
from the quantity to the quality of open meetings277 (SUP +1). One of the most
significant conditions for the feasibility of this proposal is that the P5 hold a powerful
bargaining chip: on the basis of their ability to outsource the crucial deliberations to
other fora, they can threaten to make any official or semi-official meeting of the
Council meaningless. Obviously, this would make the replacement of closed meetings
a Pyrrhic victory for those in support of the proposal (NEG -1).
In 1994, France made an early effort to restore “the balance between official meetings
and informal consultations”278 and proposed ‘orientation debates’ as a new type of
open meeting designed to complement the closed sessions instead of replacing them.
The basic idea of these debates is for the Council to gather the perspectives of the
wider membership by establishing the practice of holding an open debate on issues or
situations before they are first put on the agenda of the Council. Following some
lobbying on behalf of France, several such debates were indeed held, but since 1996
no further use has been made of this format and it seems as though it has been
discarded altogether.279
276 Security Council Report, Security Council Working Methods – A Work in Progress?, p. 8.
277 See, e.g., the statement of Egypt on behalf of NAM in the 2011 open debate on SC working
methods: United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the
Security Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6672, 2011.
278 United Nations Security Council, “Aide-mémoire concerning the working methods of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/1994/1279, 1994.
279 Security Council Report, Security Council Transparency, Legitimacy and Effectiveness: Efforts to
Reform Council Working Methods 1993-2007, New York 2007, p. 8.
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Would it be desirable to reinvigorate orientation debates? On the one hand, such a
practice would probably clog the agenda of the SC and delay its decision-making
procedures, thereby inhibiting it from fulfilling its systemic function (FUNC -2). On
the other hand, orientation debates offer the opportunity for the wider membership to
give its input at a very early stage of the SC decision-making procedures, thereby
providing it with the possibility to shape the very fundament for further deliberations
(SYN +3). Hence, further orientation debates would be desirable. As with the
scheduling of open meetings in general, the main obstacle to the establishment of
orientation debates in Council practice is consistency, which requires great
determination in the negotiation of many individual cases (REQ 0/NEG 0). Although
it is very likely that a majority of Member States would be in favor of such debates in
principle, in practice there is currently no momentum of support (SUP 0). The P5 is
split on the issue: both France and the UK held orientation debates during their
presidencies, while the other three permanent members are at best unsupportive of
such meetings (OPP 0). Although normatively desirable, at the moment the idea of
orientation debates does not seem to be of interest to the UN membership.
The introduction of ‘wrap-up sessions’ was a further attempt to increase the Council’s
transparency. In 2001, the PREP of Bangladesh presided over the first such meeting
“of the Security Council being held in public to take into account an assessment and
evaluation of its work during the preceding month.”280 Several wrap-up sessions were
held up until 2005 when Brazil convened the last of them at the end of its Council
presidency. Subsequently, the idea of holding such meetings lay dormant for six years
until, in February 2011, Brazil again convened a wrap-up session at the end of its
280 United Nations Security Council, “Wrap-up discussion on the work of the Security Council for the
month of June 2001”, UN Doc No. S/PV.4343, 2001.
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presidency. Portugal followed suit in November of that year and in January 2013,
Pakistan also scheduled such a meeting.281 Interestingly though, unlike the first
generation of wrap-up sessions, the current sessions have not been convened as
official meetings of the Security Council, but as informal meetings. Although they are
mentioned in the UN Journal, no official record is held of these meetings.
Wrap-up sessions are intended both to give the wider membership an account of the
Council’s work in that month and to provide the former with the opportunity to give
feedback on the performance of the Council in general and of the presidency in
particular. The first point promotes accountability and transparency between the SC
and the GA, thereby fostering deliberative synergy within the UN system (SYN +3).
The second point puts the outgoing presidency, but also the rest of the Council
members, in a position in which they are compelled to justify their performance
(MOM +1). Since these sessions are held only once per month and at a time when the
respective presidency has already accomplished most of its responsibilities, they do
not clog the agenda or hinder the effective work of the Council (FUNC 0). It would be
desirable, therefore, to institutionalize wrap-up sessions in Council practice.
In terms of requirements, the decision to turn the wrap-up sessions into informal
meetings has greatly lowered the bar for the establishment of this format. The support
of the P5 is no longer necessary, and it is up to the respective presidency to engage in
what the PREP of Guatemala calls “a voluntary exercise in accountability”282 Brazil
is a strong driving force and has shown unusual determination in promoting wrap-up
281 What’s in Blue: Insights on the Work of the Security Council, “The Council’s January Programme of
Work”, 3 January 2013, http://www.whatsinblue.org/2013/01/the-councils-january-programme-of-
work.php
282 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6672, 2011.
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sessions over the course of time. Although NAM is officially in support of this
innovation, other members such as India have not replicated the example of Brazil in
the following months. For many delegations, holding the presidency of the SC is a
formidable challenge, and by the end of the month the mission staff is overworked
and in no mood to take on additional tasks283 (REQ +1/SUP +1).
The P5 have no interest in further exposing themselves to the judgment of the UN
membership and are opposed to wrap-up sessions, be they official or informal. None
of them have ever convened such a meeting. In December 2012, however, they
acquiesced in as far as they approved the convention of such meetings by other SC
members. Presidential note 922 reads: “Members of the Security Council encourage
the holding by Council Presidents of informal briefing sessions with the wider
membership on the work of the Council at the end of their respective presidencies, as
appropriate. Formal wrap-up sessions may also continue to be organized when
appropriate and with the consent of all members of the Security Council”284 (OPP 0).
In terms of feasibility, it all boils down to the question of whether a sufficient number
of Member States will decide to take on the additional workload of holding such
voluntary exercises in accountability in order to establish the practice in the next few
years (NEG 0).
Up until 1998, briefings by members of the Secretariat to the SC were always held
behind closed doors. But in that year, a note by the President of the Security Council
proclaimed that the members of the Security Council “have agreed that the Secretary-
General is to be encouraged to make statements to the Council, when he deems it
283 Interview at a Permanent Representation of a UN Member State, New York, 8 June 2012.
284 United Nations Security Council, “Note by the President of the Security Council”, UN Doc No.
S/2012/922, 2012.
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appropriate, in public meetings of the Council.“ 285 Since then, briefings by UN staff
to the SC have often been held in public. This development was a precursor for a very
recent innovation regarding Council formats: the so-called ‘horizon-scanning
sessions’. As a result of a British initiative in 2011, the SC has invited the Department
of Political Affairs of the UN Secretariat to hold monthly open briefings in order to
give Council members an overview of current developments and to draw attention to
the most pressing issues regarding global peace and security. These public briefings
are usually given by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, which, up until
July 2012, was B. Lynn Pascoe.
By helping the Council to focus its deliberations and by providing somewhat more
objective direction from the outside, horizon-scanning sessions promise to enhance its
systemic function. As the Portuguese representative explained, “[p]revention is a key
aspect of the Council in performing its role under the United Nations Charter.
Horizon-scanning meetings […] can be very useful in helping the Council to enhance
awareness of situations with potential to develop into conflicts. […] They can indeed
be important opportunities for Council members to exchange views with the
Secretariat on new developments in different situations and regions of the world with
deterrence potential and to help settle conflicts at an early stage”286 (FUNC +2).
Although some complications arose early on, this initiative was set for a good start:
for several months in a row, horizon-scanning sessions were included on the agenda.
In April 2012, however, the US broke this cycle during its presidency and in the
285 United Nations Security Council, “Note by the President of the Security Council“, UN Doc No.
S/1998/1016, 1998.
286 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6870, 2012.
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following months Azerbaijan and China followed suit. These Member States had been
skeptical from the start and never became comfortable with horizon-scanning for two
reasons: Firstly, since Pascoe would inform them on the topics to be discussed only
slightly in advance, the delegations would lack the time necessary to run their
statements through the extended bureaucratic mechanisms of government approval
that states such as the US and China require. Secondly, from their perspective,
horizon-scanning posed the danger of functioning as a Trojan horse for introducing
discussions on issues they would prefer to keep off the official agenda. Pascoe had,
for instance, once reported on the conflict in Sri Lanka, which angered those Council
members who were determined to keep this situation off of the agenda.287
The recent backlash against horizon-scanning ended in a compromise with its
supporters, i.e., first and foremost the European SC members: in future, these sessions
will not be scheduled automatically, but only when a Council member requests such a
briefing on topics that are agreed upon in advance.288 Accordingly, the Colombian
presidency of July 2012 did not schedule a horizon-scanning session in the
Programme of Work, but unlike the presidencies of the US, Azerbaijan and China in
the months before, it included a footnote with the provision that the President of the
SC could convene such a briefing at his discretion.289 These limitations take much of
the edge off horizon-scanning, and since Pascoe, who was one of the driving forces
behind them has now left office, the future of these sessions is uncertain. But the
compromise did not hold for long, and during its presidency in August 2012, France
again scheduled a proper horizon-scanning session in which the new Under-Secretary-
287 Interview at a Permanent Representation of a UN Member State, New York, 6 June 2012.
288 Interview at the Office of a NGO involved with the Security Council, New York, 12 June 2012.
289 What’s in Blue: Insights on the Work of the Security Council, “The July Programme of Work”, 3
July 2012, http://whatsinblue.org/2012/07/the-july-programme-of-work.php#
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General for Political Affairs, Jeffrey Feltman, briefed the SC for the first time.290
Clearly, the supporters of the format are far from giving in and are determined to
establish horizon-scanning more firmly in Council practice. In November 2012, the
German PREP proclaimed: “we call on all Council members to consider conducting
one such horizon-scanning during their respective presidencies”291 (REQ 0/SUP
+1/OPP -1/NEG +1).
Following the debate on procedural issues sparked by France in 1994, the UK started
a tradition of briefing the wider membership on the content of Council deliberations
immediately after the end of consultations of the whole. The convocation of these
briefings was left to the respective President of the SC. Although at the time these
briefings quickly established themselves, presently they have become more and more
infrequent.292 There is no established practice regarding these briefings, and non-
Council members are essentially dependent on the good will of the members. This has
caused much frustration for those waiting for information from the consultations on
subjects of special interest to them. A good example for this occurred in 2012 when a
small Member State had agreed to send experts with the advance team of the observer
mission to Syria. During the closed meeting on the establishment of this mission, the
delegates of said Member State waited for hours outside of the Council in order to get
the respective information, but when the doors finally opened they were told that
these had really only been negotiations and not consultations of the whole and
therefore a detailed briefing was not required.293
290 What’s in Blue: Insights on the Work of the Security Council, “The August Programme of Work”, 2
August 2012, http://whatsinblue.org/2012/08/the-august-programme-of-work.php
291 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6870, 2012.
292 Security Council Report, Security Council Working Methods – A Work in Progress?, p. 14.
293 Interview at a Permanent Representation of a UN Member State, New York, 6 June 2012.
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Hence it is not surprising that, on the part of the wider UN membership, the general
interest in these briefings is declining. In 2008, the representative of the US
complained that he “had hoped that the briefings by the Council’s President would
provide first-hand information to Member States, but attendance at those briefings
has been sparse.”294 The representative of Costa Rica confirmed in the same debate
that “[w]e often witness a lack of interest of many members of the Organization in the
work of the Council, a lack of attention to the information that is available and the
sparse use made of the opportunities offered.”295 There is the danger of a vicious
circle leading from what are perceived by the wider membership to be ‘bland’
briefings296 providing only superficial information to lower attendance and, in
consequence, to even less effort on the part of the briefers.
Another type of SC briefings are those given by the incoming presidency to the UN
membership at the beginning of the month. These briefings were designed to give the
Member States information on the provisional Programme of Work for the month and
to provide them with an opportunity to discuss the Council’s agenda. Although these
briefings as well have been somewhat irregular and are still subject to the debates on
working methods, they have more or less established themselves as customary
practice.
These types of briefings of the wider membership have the potential to increase the
transparency of the Council’s deliberations and thereby promote deliberative synergy
within the UN system. The extent of this beneficial effect, however, very much
294 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.5968, 2008.
295 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.5968, 2008.
296 Security Council Report, Security Council Transparency, Legitimacy and Effectiveness, p. 4.
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depends on the quality of the briefing, which will fluctuate depending on the
respective presidency (SYN +3). Since these briefings are very flexible, there is in
principle not much resistance to them, and the concept as such enjoys widespread
support (SUP +1/OPP +1). The main obstacle for the firm establishment of the
briefings is the question of whether it will be possible to routinely fill them with
content meaningful to their audience. In case these briefings continue to be perceived
as bland litanies of obvious information, they will soon be forgotten. This caveat
applies especially to the briefings on the consultations of the whole but to a certain
degree also to those for the introduction of the monthly Programme of Work (REQ -
1/REQ 0). Briefings are both very flexible in their application as well as in their
format and substance (NEG +1). The regional groupings have all set up mechanisms







SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Replace consultation
with open meetings 0 -2 0 -2 0 +1 -1 -1 -1
Orientations debates 0 -2 +3 +1 0 0 0 0 0
Wrap-up sessions +1 0 +3 +4 +1 +1 0 0 +2
Horizon-scanning
sessions 0 +2 0 +2 0 +1 -1 +1 +1
Briefings on
Consultations 0 0 +3 +3 -1 +1 +1 +1 +2
Briefings on
Programme of Work 0 0 +3 +3 0 +1 +1 +1 +3
SC Working Methods – Meetings – Closed Meetings
A further reaction to the increasing importance of closed meetings are proposals that
aim to create possibilities for the wider membership to participate in these meetings
297 Interview at a Permanent Representation of a UN Member State, New York, 15 June 2012.
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instead of attempting to promote more public deliberations. There are essentially two
categories of closed meetings: Firstly, there are official closed meetings of the SC,
termed ‘private meetings’ and secondly, there are informal meetings of the members
of the Council, such as the consultations of the whole, which is currently the standard
format for Council deliberations.298
As the UN peacekeeping missions became both more numerous and more challenging
in the early nineties, those countries that provided the troops for these operations
demanded, in accordance with Article 44 of the UN Charter,299 to be more involved in
the decision-making procedures that determined the fate of the personnel they had
made available to the UN.300 As Ian Hurd explains, “[a]n ‘accountability gap’ had
emerged around peacekeeping contributions due to the fact that the framers of the
Charter envisioned the permanent five being the principal providers to security
operations, while most such operations have in fact been undertaken through the
unanticipated device of ‘peacekeeping’ with material contributions drawn mainly
from the ranks of the medium and small states.”301
In response to this, the Council began to hold informal meetings with troop-
contributing countries (TCCs)302 before decisions on particular peacekeeping
operations had to be taken. In 2001, moreover, the TCCs effectuated that in case “the
Secretary-General has identified potential troop-contributing countries for a new or
298 For further detail see Sydney Bailey and Sam Daws, The Procedure of the UN Security Council,
Oxford: Clarendon Press 1998, pp. 21-22.
299 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, Article 44,
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml
300 United Nations Security Council, “An agenda for peace: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and
peace-keeping”, UN Doc No. S/PRST/1994/22, 1994.
301 Ian Hurd, “Security Council Reform: Informal Membership and Practice”, in: Bruce Russett (ed.),
The Once and Future Security Council, New York: St. Martin’s Press 1997, p. 146.
302 Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations:
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2012/Dec12_2.pdf
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ongoing peacekeeping operation, when considering a change in, or renewal or
completion of a peacekeeping mandate, or when there is a rapid deterioration in the
situation on the ground, including when it threatens the safety and security of United
Nations peacekeepers“303 the SC may convene formal private meetings with the
respective TCCs rather than holding informal consultations.
In practice, however, the Council routinely failed to schedule its sessions with TCCs
early enough for them to have any impact on its decision-making. As a result, they
often end up as nothing more than ritualistic pro forma meetings.304 Further lobbying
on the part of the TCCs pushed the SC in 2009 to commit to „[e]arlier and more
meaningful engagement with troop and police contributing countries before the
renewal or modification of the mandate of a peacekeeping operation.“305 Although
the implementation of this commitment proceeded only slowly, as of 2012 the TCC
meetings are consistently scheduled at least one week in advance.306
Yet, the quality of the TCC meetings remains problematic. The Council members
often send only low-level staff, and the participation of the TCCs themselves is
frequently underwhelming: in a recent TCC meeting on the UN Supervision Mission
in Syria, e.g., only four TCC representatives asked a question. In other meetings not a
single question is asked. One of the reasons for the lack of truly interactive
deliberation in these meetings is that the Member States’ delegations are made up
mostly of political and legal advisors whereas only a few representatives have the
303 United Nations Security Council, “Strengthening cooperation with troop-contributing countries”,
UN Doc No. S/RES/1353, 2001.
304 Interview at the Office of a NGO involved with the Security Council, New York, 12 June 2012.
305 United Nations Security Council, “United Nations peacekeeping operations”, UN Doc No.
S/PRST/2009/24, 2009.
306 Colin Keating, Reforming the Working Methods of the Security Council, Berlin; New York:
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2011, p. 5.
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military expertise to freely engage in the technical details of the operations in
question.307 Another reason is the mutually reinforcing correlation between the low
quality of information and the low level of participation which has been discussed
above in relation to Council briefings.
Meaningful TCC sessions would involve a wider range of Member States in the
decision-making procedures of the SC and would thereby enhance the deliberative
synergy in the system (SYN +3). While the enlarged circle of participants in the
deliberations might complicate the attainment of a consensus and hence lessen the
decisiveness of the Council, at the same time it has much to gain from the cooperation
of the TCCs in that regard. Much of the clout of the SC depends on its ability to
muster sufficient numbers of troops for the operations it mandates (FUNC +2).
Although there are some structural problems with TCCs meetings, there have been
some meaningful sessions in the past, as, e.g., during the crisis in the Democratic
Republic of Congo in 2008,308 which demonstrate that these obstacles can be
overcome if the circumstances are favorable (REQ 0).
The TCCs, obviously, are strongly in favor of meaningful involvement in the
Council’s decision-making procedures, but there is much support for their cause in the
wider membership as well. Jordan in particular has been pushing the issue, and even
some of the P5 at least display some good will.309 While in 2011 the Russian
Federation aimed solely to “maintain” TCC meetings, some of the other P5 claimed to
be more progressive in this regard: “On the initiative of France and the United
307 Interview at a Permanent Representation of a UN Member State, New York, 15 June 2012.
308 Security Council Report, Security Council Working Methods – A Work in Progress?, p. 6.
309 Interview at the United Nations Secretariat, Department of Political Affairs, New York, 7 June
2012.
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Kingdom, a regular dialogue has been established with troop contributors to
peacekeeping operations. With the agreement of all delegations concerned, we should
now make that dialogue more substantial.“310 In 2009, the President of the US,
Barack Obama, highlighted the issue by convening a meeting with TCCs during his
first visit to the UN (SUP +1/OPP +1). Improving the quality of TCC meetings, and
thereby their future viability, is dependent both on the P5 who can freely choose when
to accord significance to these meetings, and when not to do so, as well as on the
dedication of the TCCs themselves (NEG 0).
A further format for informal gatherings of the members of the Council are the Arria-
formula meetings named after the former PREP of Venezuela, Diego Arria, who
created the prototype of these sessions in 1992. The UN Secretariat describes Arria-
formula meetings as “very informal, confidential gatherings which enable Security
Council members to have a frank and private exchange of views, within a flexible
procedural framework, with persons whom the inviting member or members of the
Council (who also act as the facilitators or conveners) believe it would be beneficial
to hear.“311 Arria-formula meetings are not held in the Council chambers, but today
are usually convened in one of the UN’s conference rooms.
Originally, this format was invented as a way to enable direct input from members of
civil society, but its revival in recent years is partly due to the fact that it has been
discovered to also be “an adequate tool for engaging in a more informal dialogue
310 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6672, 2011.
311 Security Council Report, Security Council Transparency, Legitimacy and Effectiveness, p. 11.
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with the United Nations membership.“312 In addition to their use as a platform to
engage with civil society and the wider membership, Portugal has begun to convene
Arria-formula meetings with staff from UN missions. In May 2012, Council members
met with Gender advisers from the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, the UN
Stabilization Mission in Haiti and the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire in order to
obtain input directly from the ground and to thereby gain additional perspectives on
the achievements and challenges in implementing the women, peace and security
agenda in peacekeeping missions. A similar meeting was held with the heads of the
human rights components in UN missions in February 2012.313
In 2009, the SC as well began to hold ‘informal interactive dialogues’. This new
format is essentially an Arria-formula meeting limited to Member States and
intergovernmental organizations that emphasizes dialogue among the participants.314
One of the main objectives of this format is to allow the Council “to better exchange
views with Members of the United Nations on situations that concern them
directly.”315 The informal interactive dialogues have been used both to enable
deliberations with non-Council members specially affected by a particular situation
and as a platform for the discussion of issues that are not officially on the agenda of
the SC.
Since Arria-formula meetings provide an opportunity for various types of actors, be
they other Member States, regional organizations, NGOs, UN staff, or even individual
312 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6672, 2011.
313 What’s in Blue: Insights on the Work of the Security Council, “Arria Meeting with Gender
Advisers”, 17 May 2012, http://whatsinblue.org/2012/05/arria-meeting-with-gender-advisers.php
314 Security Council Report, Security Council Working Methods – A Work in Progress?, p. 10.
315 Statement by France in: United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the
President of the Security Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6672, 2011.
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experts, to give their input into the Council’s deliberations, more frequent use of this
format is definitely desirable. The same applies to the somewhat more limited
informal interactive dialogues (SYN +3). Due to their highly flexible and informal
nature, the requirements for holding Arria-formula meetings and interactive informal
dialogues are low. After all, these formats originated when one PREP invited his
colleagues to the Delegates’ Lounge to hear a Bosnian priest give an eye-witness
account of the crisis in his country (REQ +1).
There is generally much support for more frequent use of these formats, but while
many of the European states emphasize the utility of Arria-formula meetings as a
gateway for members of civil society, NAM mainly perceives them as a means for
increasing opportunities for the wider membership to give its input to the Council’s
deliberations, i.e., much like the informal interactive dialogues. The opposition to
both formats is moderate: while some of the P5 have their reservations about an
increased use of such meetings, France and the UK both convened such sessions with
NGO representatives in 2012 (SUP +1/OPP 0). It is very much up to the individual
SC members whether they follow the invitations to such meetings and if they do,
whether they send representatives of adequate rank to turn these sessions into
meaningful sources for the Council’s decision-making (NEG 0).
In 2007, furthermore, the Council invented a format called the ‘Kosovo model’. This
format is an official private meeting of the SC that allows non-Council members to
attend deliberations upon invitation.316 As is standard practice for private meetings, no
official records are kept, but affected states gain additional insight from attending, and
316 Security Council Report, Security Council Working Methods – A Work in Progress?, p. 10.
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hence, the Kosovo model does increase the transparency of the Council (SYN +3).
The requirements for the further application of the Kosovo model are low (REQ +1).
Whereas traditionally private meetings were not open to non-members, the Council
can now decide to invite affected countries to these sessions.317 Since the Council
members can still decide upon invitations case by case, there is no significant






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
More TCC meetings 0 +2 +3 +5 0 +1 +1 0 +2
Arria-formula and
interactive dialogues 0 0 +3 +3 +1 +1 0 0 +2
Kosovo model 0 0 +3 +3 +1 +1 +1 0 +3
SC Working Methods – Outside Input – Increased Input
New meeting formats, such as the informal interactive dialogues or the Kosovo model
are in part a response to recent complaints from the UN membership that those states
that are affected by the conflict under consideration are often not included in the
respective deliberations of the SC. The PRP declare that such a state may be invited
“to participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the
Security Council when the Security Council considers that the interests of that
member are specially affected.”318 Discontented with the provision that it is solely up
to the discretion of the Council itself whether it considers a state as ‘specially
affected’ and therefore needing to be included it in its discussions, the Philippines, in
2008, proposed an amendment of this rule: “the Philippines recommends that rule 37
317 Bailey and Daws, The Procedure of the UN Security Council, p. 22.; United Nations Security
Council, “Note by the President of the Security Council”, UN Doc No. S/2010/507, 2010, paragraph 36
(b).
318 United Nations Security Council, “Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council”, UN Doc
No. S/96/Rev.7, 1983, rule 37.
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be amended such that a United Nations Member State which is not a member of the
Security Council but which is under its scrutiny has the right to be present and to be
heard during all proceedings in regard to such scrutiny and in any subsequent
incident which may arise therefrom.”319
The participation of affected states in the discussions of the SC obviously improves
the legitimacy of its deliberations and hence, in theory, creating a right to such
participation would be desirable. The problem is that the requirements for putting this
proposal into practice are very difficult. Not only would the amendment of the PRP
require a consensus among the Council members, but it is also unclear how it could be
determined whether a state is ‘specially affected’ by the respective situation under
consideration. Who if not the SC can make this decision? If this were left to each
Member State itself, the attribute ‘specially affected’ would in all likelihood be
applied very loosely, which would result in overcrowded meetings driving the
Council members to outsource their deliberations to other fora. This would defeat the
purpose of including those who are the most affected in the Council’s deliberations
(REQ -1). Most of the states in favor of increasing the participation of affected states
focus on promoting Arria-formula meetings, interactive informal dialogues, and the
Kosovo model, rather than an amendment of the PRP (SUP 0). The P5, moreover, are
not ready to give up their authority on the question of who counts as specially affected
and there is absolutely no room for negotiation (OPP -1/NEG -1).
One prominent method of influencing the deliberations of the SC from the outside are
the so-called ‘Groups of Friends of the Secretary-General’. These groups are self-
319 United Nations Security Council, “Intervention by the Philippines”, UN Doc No. S/2008/589, 2008.
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selected networks of Member States with a special interest in a particular issue on the
agenda of the SC. They have evolved mainly as mechanisms for the cooperation
between members and non-members of the Council by which the former profit from
the latter’s influence on a particular conflict while the latter stand to gain from the
formers’ influence on the SC’s decision-making. In the last 20 years, these groups
have gained much prominence, and today SC resolutions are frequently based on
drafts produced by these entities.320
Jochen Prantl advocates the increased usage of Groups of Friends. According to him,
they developed as a practical and informal response to the structural deficiencies of
the SC in the 1990s, i.e., its perceived lack of representativeness and effectiveness.321
By expanding the deliberations on specific issues to the states concerned, this
mechanism had not only improved the Council’s representativeness, but since it
induced the consulted states to cooperate, also enhanced its effectiveness. It is
generally undisputed that Groups of Friends often aid the Council’s decision-making
procedures and help to give it clout in situations of conflict (FUNC +2). It is less
clear, however, whether these entities do indeed add to the representativeness of the
SC’s decision-making procedures. Since they are self-selected, groups of friends often
turn out to be more similar to ‘coalitions of the willing’ than representative and
diverse samples of the UN membership.
In 2008, the PREP of South Africa complained that “[t]ypically, these small groups
are dominated by or entirely comprised of developed countries. They usually operate
320 Jochen Prantl, “Informal Groups of States and the UN Security Council“, International
Organization, 59 (3), 2005, p. 573.
321 Jochen Prantl, “Legitimacy and Accountability of the United Nations”, in: Sumihiro Kuyama and
Michael Fowler (eds), Envisioning Reform: Enhancing UN Accountability in the Twenty-First Century,
Tokyo; New York; Paris: United Nations University Press 2009, p. 108.
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in secrecy and seek to impose their views on the rest of the membership of the Security
Council by drafting resolutions that the Council is then expected to endorse without
any further discussion. For South Africa, given our desire for transparency and
political inclusiveness, the small group phenomenon presents a significant
problem.”322 Interestingly, this complaint was made by a representative from a state
that is in the lead of one of the most established and influential groups, i.e. the Core
Group on Timor-Leste.323 As early as 1999, the complaints that the Groups of Friends
reduced the majority of the Council members to the task of rubber-stamping pre-
established decisions led to a Note by the President cautioning these entities that “the
drafting of resolutions and statements by the President of the Council should be
carried out in a manner that will allow adequate participation of all members of the
Council.”324
On the other hand, in some instances these groups have also functioned as
counterweights to the predominance of unilateral interests in the SC. The Friends of
the Secretary-General on El Salvador, who in 1992 were so crucial to ending the civil
war, e.g., were first convened by the Secretariat in order to balance the influence of
the US.325 Teresa Whitfield comes to the conclusion that “the composition of the
Group is all-important.”326 With this in mind, there have been some efforts to
formalize these groups and assure that they “remained open to all members,”327 but in
322 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.5968, 2008.
323 What’s in Blue: Insights on the Work of the Security Council, “Timor-Leste Debate and Adoption”,
22 February 2012, http://whatsinblue.org/2012/02/timor-leste-debate-and-adoption.php
324 United Nations Security Council, “Note by the President of the Security Council”, UN Doc No.
S/1999/165, 1999.
325 Teresa Whitfield, “Groups of Friends”, in: David Malone (ed), The UN Security Council: From the
Cold War to the 21st Century, Boulder, CO; London: Lynne Rienner 2004, p. 316.
326 Whitfield, Groups of Friends, p. 322.
327 United Nations Security Council, “Recommendations from the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict
Prevention and Resolution in Africa”, UN Doc No. S/2002/979, 2002.
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practice, the Groups of Friends persist as highly informal and exclusive entities – a
quality that ensures their popularity with some Council members. The fact that
Groups of Friends are often conducive to the exclusion of the ‘weaker’ Council
members in the deliberations of the SC means that they cannot be considered as
generally desirable (SYN -3). However, much depends on the specific circumstances
and the composition of the group in question.
Due to their highly informal and flexible nature, the requirements for Groups of
Friends are low (REQ +1). This mechanism enjoys support among many of the more
powerful states in the UN, especially those that are part of the ‘Western Europe and
others’ group. In the 2011 Council debate on working methods, the US openly
expressed its support for Groups of Friends328 (SUP +1). Others, such as the Russian
Federation, have a more reserved attitude towards these groups.329 Although there are
a number of states who have expressed principled opposition to this mechanism, the
force of that opposition often depends on the specific role of these groups in the
substantial politics of the day (OPP 0/NEG +1). Much of the membership has
accepted Groups of Friends as a “fact of life.”330 Whitfield identifies the possibility of
compromise: “Groups of Friends have been most effective when they avoid the
impression of presenting the Council with faits accompli, ensure that Council
members are adequately consulted and briefed on the issues at hand, and allow
sufficient time for the decisionmaking process to run its course.”331
328 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6672, 2011.
329 United Nations Security Council, “Workshop for Newly Elected and Present Security Council
Members”, UN Doc No. S/2008/195, 2008.
330 United Nations Security Council, “Workshop for Newly Elected and Present Security Council
Members”, UN Doc No. S/2008/195, 2008.
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The role of regional organizations with regard to SC decision-making has recently
gained much attention and at the UN today, much hope for future reform is placed in
the strengthening of regional integration.332 Basically, regional organizations could
potentially - and partially already do - assume two important functions in increasing
and enhancing the input the Council receives from the outside. Firstly, they could
function as conveyor belts for the perspectives of its members into the SC, and
secondly, they could serve as the Council’s main points of contact on issues
concerning regional conflicts. James Paul and Céline Nahory list possible ways in
which these organizations could improve their function as conveyor belts: they could
make the elected states in their region more responsive to regional policies, they could
set up regional secretariats that would coordinate policies, strengthen its members on
the Council by pooling resources, as well as provide an institutional memory
regarding the SC, and finally, the elected members could include diplomats from
some of their regional neighbors in their delegations.333
Some regional organizations are closer to this ideal than others. The European Union,
e.g., has a well-equipped regional representation at the UN that coordinates and hosts
frequent meetings of its members.334 But even for the relatively well-integrated EU, it
is often impossible to find common positions that take into account all of its
members’ perspectives on the issues facing the SC. One need only mention the idea of
‘old Europe and new Europe’ to illustrate this point.335 The issue of UN reform itself
332 This sentiment was expressed in several of the interview conducted for this thesis.
333 Paul, James, and Céline Nahory, Towards a Democratic Reform of the UN Security Council, New
York: Global Policy Forum 2005.
334 Mary Farell, “EU Representation and Coordination within the United Nations”, in: Katie Verlin
Laatikainen and Karen Smith (eds.), The European Union at the United Nations: Intersecting
Multilateralisms, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2006, pp. 27-46.
335 Christopher Hill, “The European Powers in the Security Council: Differing Interests, Differing
Arenas”, in: Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen Smith (eds.), The European Union at the United
Nations: Intersecting Multilateralisms, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2006, pp. 49-69.
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shows that the divisions within other regional organizations are even more deep and
permanent,336 and hence, the requirements for enhancing the role of regional
organizations as conveyor belts for the perspectives of its members are formidable.
This caveat is amplified in those improvements that involve questions of funding
(REQ -1). While there is no considerable opposition, there is in general much support
for the improvement of this function of regional organizations in the UN membership
(SUP +1/OPP +1). In this sense, the EU could be seen as a cumbersome but
progressive avant-garde that inspires many of the other Member States to slowly raise
their expectations concerning their regional organizations. The strengthening of these
organizations as conveyor belts is largely in the hands of the respective regions
themselves and it can take shape in various forms (NEG +1).
Currently, the more prominent issue is the role of international organizations as
contact points regarding regional conflicts. Over the years, the cooperation between
the Security Council and regional organizations has increased both in quantity and in
quality.337 The initially very technical relationship between these entities, which
focused largely on operational issues and SC authorization, is slowly evolving into a
more political, general inclusion of regional organizations into the Council’s
deliberations. The fact that the SC began in 2003 to invite representatives from
regional organizations to some of its thematic debates is symbolic for this
development.338 Three years later, the SC agreed to expand the consultation and
cooperation by more frequent participation of such representatives in its open
336 See chapter ‘The Politics of UN Reform’
337 Shepard Forman and Andrew Grene, “Collaborating with Regional Organizations”, in: David
Malone (ed), The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, Boulder, CO; London:
Lynne Rienner 2004, pp. 295-309.
338 Security Council Report, Security Council Working Methods – A Work in Progress?, p. 13.
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meetings and in drafting procedures in general.339 Since the majority of the conflicts
on the Council’s agenda take place in Africa, the relationship with the AU has
become especially important. Today, the SC frequently meets with the AU Peace and
Security Council, alternating between New York and Addis Ababa.
Tensions surfaced, however, when in 2009 some members of the AU attempted to
highlight these meetings by turning them into official consultations between the two
bodies. A number of SC members forcefully rejected this and insisted that these were
merely informal consultations between members of the two councils.340 These
objections are largely motivated by concerns about creating legal obligations and
maintaining the hierarchy between these bodies.341 Also, in May 2012, in Abidjan,
Côte d’Ivoire, Security Council members held for the first time ever a high-level
meeting with the Economic Community of West African States in order to discuss the
situations in Guinea-Bissau and Mali. Since the Organization plays a pivotal role
regarding conflict resolution in the region, it is likely that there will be further such
meetings in the future.342
The obstacles for promoting regional organizations as the main contact points
regarding regional conflicts are mostly of practical nature. Meetings, such as those
between the members of the two councils, are time-consuming and require the
members to send their representatives abroad. This obviously places a limit on the
339 United Nations Security Council, “Note by the President of the Security Council”, UN Doc No.
S/2006/507, 2006.
340 Security Council Report, Security Council Working Methods – A Work in Progress?, p. 13.
341 What’s in Blue: Insights on the Work of the Security Council, “UN-AU Partnership Debate and
Resolution”, 11 January 2012, http://whatsinblue.org/2012/01/un-au-debate-and-resolution.php
342 What’s in Blue: Insights on the Work of the Security Council, “Council Visiting Mission: High-
Level ECOWAS Meeting”, 21 May 2012, http://whatsinblue.org/2012/05/council-visiting-mission-
high-level-ecowas-meeting.php#
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frequency of such meetings (REQ 0). There is generally much support for this cause
in the UN membership. In 2010, China initiated an open debate on this issue with
representatives from all of the major regional organizations343 and in 2012, South
Africa made the cooperation between the UN and regional organizations in
maintaining international peace and security the focus of its Council presidency344
(SUP +1). While there is no principled opposition to such promotion of regional
organizations, the dispute concerning the nature of the meetings between the members
of the two councils also demonstrates that there are limits to what will be accepted by
the SC (OPP 0). There is much flexibility in the Member States’ positions and this
function of regional organizations can be implemented in various ways (NEG +1).
The promotion of regional organizations as both conveyor belts for the perspectives of
its members into the SC and main points of contact on issues concerning regional
conflicts is certainly desirable. By increasing outside participation in the Council’s
deliberations, by enabling input from those states that are likely to be the most
affected by a conflict in their region, and by providing the SC with regional expertise,
such a promotion of regional organizations promises to enhance the deliberative






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Amendment of rule
37 of the PRP 0 0 0 0 -1 0 -1 -1 -3
More Groups of
Friends 0 +2 -3 -1 +1 +1 0 +1 +3
Regional Orgs. as
‘conveyor belts’ 0 0 +3 +3 -1 +1 +1 +1 +2
Regional Orgs. as
points of contact 0 0 +3 +3 0 +1 0 +1 +2
343 United Nations Security Council, “Cooperation between the UN and regional and subregional
organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6257, 2010.
344 United Nations Security Council, “Cooperation between the UN and regional and subregional
organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6702, 2012.
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SC Working Methods – Outside Input – Enhanced Input
In customary practice, Council members always speak before any of those invited to
its open meetings. Some Member States have complained that this results in a
situation in which some of the Council members ignore whatever is said once the
other members have spoken. Indeed, it is not unusual to see a PREP leave the Council
chamber before the non-members have had the chance to voice their contributions.
For this reason, the PREP of Mexico demanded in 2011 that “during open debates the
order of the speakers’ list should be reversed, so that Council members would deliver
their statements at the end. That would allow them to truly listen to the membership
and to include its contributions in the outcomes of such meetings, particularly when a
presidential statement is adopted.“345
Such a reversal of the speakers’ list, or alternatively a disregard of membership status
in the order of speakers, would probably make it harder for Council members to
ignore the contributions of the non-members and thereby improve deliberative
synergy in the UN (SYN +3). Moreover, by de-emphasizing the differences in status
and minimizing the opportunities for dismissive gestures, such a procedural reform
would be conducive to an atmosphere of respect in the open meetings of the SC
(MOM +1). Since such a reform would need to be based on a consensus in the SC, the
requirements are somewhat demanding (REQ 0). When during its presidency in 2011,
Portugal took the initiative and attempted to have the non-members speak first during
an open debate, it was not allowed to do so by the other Council members.346 There is
much support for such a reform in the wider membership – NAM would welcome it –
345 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6672 (Resumption 1), 2011.
346 See the statement of Mexico in: United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by
the President of the Security Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6672 (Resumption 1), 2011.
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but as the Portuguese presidency discovered, the opposition is also strong. In 2008,
e.g., France expressed “very serious reservations”347 against having a representative
of a regional organization take the floor before the Council members have done so
(SUP +1/OPP -1).
Although the P5 will in all likelihood not allow a reversal of the speakers list as a
general rule, they have, under special circumstances, shown some flexibility in letting
non-members speak before the Council members. In December 2012, they agreed that
exceptions may be made. Hence, presidential note 922 reads: “The members of the
Security Council may agree, by consensus on a case-by case basis and when they
consider it appropriate for certain open debates, to invite non-members to alternate
their interventions with those of Council members. In such situations, those Council
members who wish to do so will give up their slot on the speakers’ list to non-
members.”348 In this regard, there is some space for negotiation, and much will
depend on the number of such exceptions made in the next years (NEG 0).
A further issue with regard to the participation of non-members in the SC’s open
debates is that the decisions are routinely made well before the meeting itself. This is
evident in the frequent adoption of the respective resolutions and presidential
statements immediately after the last speaker is heard, without taking the time
necessary to incorporate in it the contributions made during the debate. In fact, on one
occasion a presidential statement was already adopted at the very beginning of the
debate.349 In 2011, the PREP of Colombia accordingly pointed out that “[i]t may seem
347 United Nations Security Council, “The situation in Somalia”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6095, 2008.
348 United Nations Security Council, “Note by the President of the Security Council”, UN Doc No.
S/2012/922, 2012.
349 Security Council Report, Security Council Working Methods – A Work in Progress?, p. 15
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contradictory for open debates to be held in which presidential statements or
resolutions that had been previously negotiated among Council members are adopted.
A reasonable break should be allowed between an open debate and the negotiation
and adoption of such documents to allow Council members to incorporate points of
view that emerged in the debate.”350
The requirements for this proposal to be put into practice are only somewhat
demanding. It essentially boils down to the question of whether the Council members
are willing to postpone their decisions and whether the President of the SC schedules
the correlated meetings favorably. Considering the fact that these open debates are
mostly topical and therefore do not demand immediate action on behalf of the SC,
there is no pressure on them to make decisions in a timely fashion (REQ 0). Many
Member States have voiced the desire to see their input reflected more adequately in
the outcome of these debates, and hence this proposal enjoys much support (SUP +1).
The fact that this practice has persisted to this day indicates the P5’s unwillingness to
reconsider their approach, and accordingly, the only achievable consensus on the
matter so far has been the vague statement made in presidential note 922 that
“[w]here appropriate for certain open debates, the adoption of an outcome might
occur at a date subsequent to that of the open debate in order to allow it to more fully
reflect, if the Security Council considers it appropriate, matters raised during the
debate”351 (OPP -1). As with the issue of the speakers’ list, much depends on the
number of cases in which such exceptions will be made in the next years (NEG 0).
350 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6672, 2011.
351 United Nations Security Council, “Note by the President of the Security Council”, UN Doc No.
S/2012/922, 2012.
179
Allowing more time for the incorporation of the non-members’ contributions into the
outcome of Council debates would definitely improve the deliberative synergy within
the UN system (SYN +3). By minimizing the disregard of the non-members’
contributions to the debates, this would, furthermore, promote an atmosphere of






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Reversal of speaker’s
list in open debates +1 0 +3 +4 0 +1 -1 0 0
More time for
outcomes of debates +1 0 +3 +4 0 +1 -1 0 0
SC Working Methods – Information – Outreach
A recurring issue with regard to SC working methods has been the timely circulation
of draft resolutions. Unless the wider membership receives this information well
before the respective decisions are made, these states’ delegates can neither consult
their capitals nor prepare and communicate their input on the matter. According to the
presidential note on working methods of 2006, “[t]he members of the Security Council
agree to consider making draft resolutions and presidential statements as well as
other draft documents available as appropriate to non-members of the Council as
soon as such documents are introduced within informal consultations of the whole, or
earlier, if so authorized by the authors of the draft document.”352 Despite this
agreement, in the Council’s debate on the implementation of this note in 2008, many
speakers felt the need to reiterate this point. The PREP of Tonga, e.g., complained
about the prevalent method of circulating drafts: “They are often trimmed and edited
before reaching informal consultations. Such a practice makes it hard for non-
352 United Nations Security Council, “Note by the President of the Security Council”, UN Doc No.
S/2006/507, 2006.
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members to be readily informed of the work of the Council. It also makes it difficult
for nonmembers to provide meaningful input into the process, even in rare
opportunities such as open debates.”353
In an effort to improve this situation, the PREP of Spain in 2011 suggested
establishing the practice of circulating drafts before rather than as soon as they are
introduced in consultations: “We encourage the distribution of those initial drafts, to
the extent possible, before they are passed on to informal consultations of the whole. I
know that is an ambitious proposal, but if it were put into even partial practice it
would certainly enhance the transparency of the Council’s work.”354 More
demanding proposals are made by NGO representatives such as Peter Padbury who as
early as 1995 pointed out the importance of circulating drafts: “The preparation of
negotiating documents should be a much more open process. The Secretariat should
distribute widely an outline paper and then successive drafts, inviting analysis,
examples and creative solution-oriented input. This would allow government
departments and others to use the process in more constructive ways. It would allow
major groups who cannot afford to come to these meetings to have a say. It would
make it much easier for writers to focus their contribution, and for the Secretariat to
incorporate contributions. This is a very simple, but important innovation that could
significantly increase ownership and participation.”355
353 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.5968 (Resumption 1), 2008.
354 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6672 (Resumption 1), 2011.
355 Peter Padbury, “UNCED and the Globalization of Civil Society”, in: Eric Fawcett and Hanna
Newcombe (eds), United Nations Reform: Looking Ahead after 50 Years, Toronto: Dundurn Press
1995, p. 217
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Since the timely circulation of SC drafts improves the transparency of the Council and
increases the quantity and quality of outside input, it is generally desirable to promote
such practice (SYN +3). The point in time at which a draft is circulated depends
exclusively on the authors of the respective draft: some Council members have a more
proactive attitude towards transparency than do others, and all will interpret the
provision to make ‘documents available as appropriate’ as they see fit (REQ 0). There
is much support in the wider membership for the practice of distributing drafts in a
timely manner, but the P5 have a reserved attitude towards this matter. They have
agreed that such a practice is desirable in principle, but in practice, they will continue
to make the timing of the distribution dependent upon the case at hand (SUP +1/OPP -
1). Those who strive to promote this practice can proceed to set examples, but given
the disproportional involvement of the P5 in drafting resolutions, much depends on
whether these will consistently circulate information in a timely manner (NEG 0).
In 2008, the PREP of Australia put forward the idea that the SC should collect and
issues statistics on its working procedures. The expectation is that if it were possible
to compare, e.g., the number of changes made to draft resolutions in one year
compared to the next, it would be possible to track the implementation of the efforts
to increase outside input.356 Therefore, according to Australia, “[t]he Council should
keep those sorts of statistics and issue them periodically — say, every two years — so
that we can know if we are making progress or not.“357 Since the compilation and
distribution of such statistics would increase the transparency of the SC’s decision-
making and would also aid in holding it accountable, such an innovation would be
desirable (SYN +3).
356 Security Council Report, Security Council Working Methods – A Work in Progress?, p. 7.
357 United Nations Security Council, “Workshop for Newly Elected and Present Security Council
Members”, UN Doc No. S/2008/195, 2008.
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The question is whether the collection of insightful data is feasible. Presumably, the
task of collecting this data would fall to the UN Secretariat. In that case, the SC would
have to mandate it to do so and the Secretariat would then require additional resources
in order to comply (REQ 0). The Department of Political Affairs has indeed increased
its activities with regard to the collection and publication of data on the work of the
SC, but quickly runs up against its limits. E.g., the P5 would not allow it to publish
any data on the Arria-formula meetings in its statistics on 2011.358 Although many
states might be in favor of the Australian proposal, there is currently no momentum of
support (SUP 0). As their reluctance concerning the data on Arria-formula meetings
demonstrates, it is unlikely that the P5 would agree to the collection of any sensitive
procedural data that could publically expose them to criticism (OPP -1). Compromise
solutions in which various limits might apply to the type of data that is collected and
distributed are easily imaginable, but then it is questionable whether these would yield
any insightful results. As the PREP of Australia himself pointed out, an alternative
solution could be to mandate outside actors such as the NGO Security Council Report
with this task359 (NEG +1).
The timely integration of the incoming Council members is a further issue for the
effective functioning of the SC. Due to the Council’s lack of transparency, in the past
the new members often assumed their seats on the SC with imperfect skills regarding
its working methods and with little knowledge of the minutiae of its agenda.360 To
ensure a smooth transition from one year to the next, the incoming members are now
358 Interview at the United Nations Secretariat, Department of Political Affairs, New York, 7 June
2012.
359 The role of Security Council Report will be discussed in chapter “Relations between Security
Council and Civil Society”.
360 Interview at the United Nations Secretariat, Department of Political Affairs, New York, 7 June
2012.
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invited to attend the Council’s meetings as observers in the months between their
election and the start of their term. In addition, Finland began in 2003 to host annual
‘Workshops for Newly Elected and Present Security Council Members’ to bring
together the Council members in their new composition and to prepare the incoming
representatives for their task.361 Currently, Security Council Report as well is
significantly expanding its efforts to provide customized preparation for incoming
members.362
Innovations such as these that enable a more smooth transition between the outgoing
and incoming members are desirable for two reasons: firstly, these measures are likely
to increase the effectiveness of the SC by lessening the disruption caused by the
integration of the new members and secondly, they help to reassure the incoming
members of their role in the Council and are thereby conducive to an atmosphere of
mutual respect in its deliberations (FUNC +2/MOM +1). Since all sides stand to
benefit from these innovations, they are generally popular. With regard to the pre-
term attendance of incoming Council members, e.g., the debate evolved much more
around the details of this arrangement, i.e., the time frame and the particular types of
meetings they were allowed to attend, rather than its desirability as such (SUP
+1/OPP+1). There is a range of measures individual Member States can take in order
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361 United Nations Security Council, “Workshop for newly elected and current Security Council
members”, UN Doc No. S/2004/135, 2004.
362 For more detail see chapter “Relations between Security Council and Civil Society”.
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SC Working Methods – Information – UN Journal
The most significant issue concerning the UN Journal is the announcement of SC
meetings. Which meetings should be announced and when? There have been many
complaints from within the UN membership that the late announcement of meetings,
or the lack of any such announcement, greatly impedes their ability to follow the
developments within the Council and to prepare contributions to its work. Concerning
the first question, it has been proposed that the Journal consistently announce
meetings of the Council’s subsidiary bodies as well as all expert meetings. In 2008,
e.g., the PREP of Switzerland called for the “announcement in the Journal of the
United Nations of all meetings of the Security Council and its subsidiary bodies,
including expert-level meetings.”363
On the face of it, the announcement of these meetings in the UN Journal should
ensure an increase in the transparency of the Council and promote input from non-
members. There is a danger, however, that a further formalization of these meetings
would entice the P5 to outsource decision-making even further from the SC. Security
Council Report demonstrates that the monthly publication of the provisional
Programme of Work resulted in the over-formalization of consultations of the whole
with the consequence that decision-making was outsourced from consultations of the
whole to expert meetings. Hence, the provisional Programme of Work has actually
diminished the transparency of the Council’s decision-making instead of increasing
it.364 It is very likely that the expert meetings would suffer the same fate were they to
be announced in the UN Journal (SYN 0).
363 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.5968, 2008.
364 Security Council Report, Security Council Working Methods – A Work in Progress?, pp. 3-4.
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Permission for the announcement of expert meetings and of those of subsidiary bodies
requires an informal consensus in the Council (REQ 0). Although many Member
States are in favor of such announcements, the P5 are very reluctant to agree to this
(SUP +1/OPP -1). So far all they were willing to concede is the agreement to
“encourage Chairs of the subsidiary bodies of the Council to make the schedules of
meetings of subsidiary bodies available to the public, when appropriate, through their
websites and the Journal of the United Nations.”365 This, of course, leaves a lot of
leeway to a case-by-case interpretation of the necessity to announce such meetings,
but since the Chairs are often elected members, such announcements may well
establish themselves (NEG +1). Since expert meetings are less formal than those of
the subsidiary bodies, the P5 have more control over their procedures and it is
therefore less likely that expert meetings will be announced regularly (NEG 0).
Regarding the timely announcement of SC meetings, the PREP of Singapore in 2008
proposed a deadline for decisions on the format and the announcement thereof:
“Perhaps one suggestion would be to establish an agreed time frame for concluding
negotiations on the format — ideally, 48 hours before the debate — in order to give
involved States the opportunity to prepare.”366 As such a deadline would allow both
Council members and non-members to better prepare themselves and improve the
quality of their participation, it would be desirable (SYN +3). The biggest challenge
with this proposal are the negotiations on the format themselves which, depending on
the subject at hand, might need to accommodate very differing opinions (REQ 0). The
P5 are not keen on putting additional pressure on these negotiations and would favor
365 United Nations Security Council, “Note by the President of the Security Council”, UN Doc No.
S/2006/507, 2006, paragraph 47.
366 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.5968 (Resumption 1), 2008.
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temporal flexibility in deciding the format of meetings (OPP 0). On the other hand,
the S5 are proactively in support of such a deadline and many others have demanded
the timely announcement of meeting formats (SUP +1).
A surprisingly persistent issue has been the designation of appropriate titles for items
on the agenda of the SC. According to traditional Council practice, these items are
given their titles based on the document requesting discussion in the SC.367 For this
reason, about a fifth of the item titles on the Council agenda are based on one and the
same format giving absolutely no cue of the subject matter: ‘Letter dated […] from
the Permanent Representative of […] to the President of the Security Council.’ At the
open debate on SC working methods in 2008, which is officially titled
‘Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security Council’, the PREP of
the UK pointed out that “we can look at further ways of keeping the Security Council
agenda up to date and selfexplanatory. The title of today’s debate is a classic example
of using bureaucratic language rather than something that can be readily understood
by all.”368
Although seemingly an insignificant technicality, inaccessible agenda titles can
greatly diminish the transparency of the SC. The titles of agenda items direct the
attention of the audience and function as the primary cognitive access points for
anyone who is not yet part of the respective debates. It would therefore be very
desirable to have self-explanatory titles for the items on the agenda of the SC (SYN
+3). The greatest challenges for putting this proposal into practice are the necessary
367 Interview at the Office of a NGO involved with the Security Council, New York, 12 June 2012.
368 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6672, 2011.
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bureaucratic rearrangements, on the one hand, and the requirement of finding a new
method for titling agenda items, on the other (REQ 0).
This method could be based on either a new automatism, which might again lead to
formulistic titles, or a case by case consensus of the SC. There is strong support for
such a rearrangement, and a transitional solution in which old agenda items keep their
obscure names but new issues are assigned self-explanatory titles, is easily
imaginable. As early as 2006, the members of the Council agreed to “the desirability,
whenever possible, of using descriptive formulations of agenda items at the time of
their initial adoption“369 (SUP +1/NEG +1). One issue is that the Council members
often prefer to deliberately hide issues behind obscure agenda titles in order to avoid
acknowledgment that these topics do indeed pose a problem.370 The discussion on the
SC working methods is a case in point. Hence, China, Russia and the US prefer to
keep the option of using obscure agenda titles and will only adapt descriptive titles
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369 United Nations Security Council, “Note by the President of the Security Council”, UN Doc No.
S/2006/507, 2006, paragraph 2.
370 Interview at a Permanent Representation of a UN Member State, New York, 8 June 2012.
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SC Working Methods – Formalization
It has been a long-standing demand of a large number of Member States to formalize
the Council’s Provisional Rules of Procedure. Although detailing the rules for voting
and decision-making, the UN Charter left it to the discretion of its main bodies to
determine their own rules of procedure. Of these bodies, today only the SC retains
merely provisional arrangements. Speaking on behalf of the African Group, the PREP
of Sierra Leone stated in 2010 that “we continue to stress for more increased
inclusivity, transparency, and legitimacy of its proceedings, and here we would like to
emphasize that the Rules of Procedure, which still remain provisional after 60 years
of the Council’s existence is a cause for concern.”371 The NAM and many other states
share this sentiment and determinately reiterate this demand whenever possible (SUP
+1). Yet formalizing the rules of procedure requires a consensus of all Council
members, and the P5 strongly resist such a modification (REQ -1/OPP -1). Since the
removal of the word ‘provisional’ is an either-or issue, there does not appear to be
much room for compromise (NEG -1).
From the perspective of the P5, formalizing the rules of procedure would lessen the
SC’s ability to react to unforeseen developments and prevent it from adapting to the
challenges of the day. Edward Luck supports this position with the argument that it
was the Council’s ability to evolve “its tools and working methods as conditions
[change] in unpredictable ways”372 which has saved it from irrelevance throughout
the years. This flexibility is seen as essential to the SC’s decisiveness. It is doubtful,
however, whether the formalization of these rules would indeed prevent the Council
371 United Nations General Assembly, “Report of the Security Council”, UN Doc No. A/65/PV.48,
2010.
372 Edward Luck, “A Council for All Seasons: The Creation of the Security Council and Its Relevance
Today” in: Vaughan Lowe et al. (eds.), The Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and
Practice since 1945, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008, p. 83.
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from adapting. In fact, in the almost seven decades of their existence, the PRP have
been revised only six times.373 The current version dates from 1983, which indicates
that during the last 30 years – a period in which the SC has faced the constant
necessity to adapt to highly volatile circumstances and has, therefore, undergone
striking changes in its working methods – no changes to the PRP have been made.
The argument concerning the decisiveness could, moreover, be inversed. The
Austrian Initiative on the Security Council and the Rule of Law, led by the renowned
legal scholar Simon Chesterman, comes to the conclusion that “[a]cknowledging that
the Council’s powers derive from and are implemented through law will ensure
greater respect for Council decisions. As part of a commitment to the rule of law, the
Council should adopt formal rules of procedure rather than continuing to rely on
provisional rules.“374 No matter whether this causality holds in the real world, this
argument demonstrates that the relationship between the formalization of the PRP and
the Council’s decisiveness is both very contestable and much contested. Instead of
necessarily decreasing the SC’s decisiveness, a formalization of the PRP would
increase its transparency. Such a modification would constitute a commitment to
international law and would create legal obligations which is, in all likelihood, the
real reason why the P5 oppose this reform. Even if formalized, the rules of procedure
would not be set in stone and could be adapted to the requirements of future scenarios
while improving the transparency of the Council through predictability and legal
guarantees (SYN +3).
373 United Nations Security Council, “Intervention by the Philippines”, UN Doc No. S/2008/589, 2008.
374 United Nations General Assembly, “The United Nations Security Council and the Rule of Law”,
UN Doc No. A/63/69, 2008.
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A further proposal towards the establishment and clarification of obligations is put
forward by Kishore Mahbubani, former PREP of Singapore, who suggests a more
specific codification of the Council members’ responsibilities. He argues that “the
lack of clear assignments of responsibilities to either the P-5 or the E-10 members has
created a structural weakness in the Council.”375 As Mahbubani explains, this would
not only make the SC more transparent and accountable, but the creation of
responsibilities and objectives would increase the pressure on its members to consider
the common good rather than only their national interests and thereby improve its
deliberations (MOM +1/SYN +3). In terms of feasibility, however, this proposal faces
the same challenges as the formalization of the PRP, and hence, it is unlikely to be put
in place.
Another suggestion presented by Muhbabani would be to keep official records of the
consultations of the whole. “As the Council often works by referring to precedents,
the elected members are at an obvious disadvantage when they have either no
knowledge of or background on the precedents.”376 The creation of a formal
institutional memory would benefit the elected members who often assumed
membership without adequate knowledge of the longer term developments of Council
debates. The issue with this proposal is that if official records of consultations of the
whole were to be kept, these would essentially turn into private meetings. Instead of
demanding official records for consultations of the whole, it might, therefore, be more
practical to advocate the increased use of these private meetings. Indeed, the trend
seems to point in the opposite direction: instead of a further formalization of the
375 Kishore Mahbubani, “The Permanent and Elected Council Members”, in: David Malone (ed.), The
UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, Boulder; London: Lynne Rienner 2004,
p. 262.
376 Mahbubani, The Permanent and Elected Council Members, p. 260.
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consultations, in June 2012, Portugal and the UK initiated a presidential note that calls
for less formality in order to promote more interactive and vivid discussions.377
In the opinion of James Paul and Céline Nahory the rotating presidency of the SC
impairs its smooth functioning: “The Council’s influential presidency changes
constantly in a monthly rotation, producing an organized confusion.”378 In addition to
the monthly transfer of business, it is problematic that many of the elected members
lack experience in leading the procedures of the Council, and the one-month term of
presidency leaves the representatives very little time to grow into the job. Thus, Paul
and Nahory propose a more institutionalized presidency for the SC. This could consist
of increasing the support of the Secretariat by providing a strong staff force for the
office of the president – much like it has recently been done with the presidency of the
GA. Moreover, the office of a speaker of the SC could be created whose task it would
be to brief the wider membership and the media on behalf of the President.
Since the monthly rotating presidency does, in fact, cause some disruptions in the
business of the SC, it would be desirable to ensure more smooth transitions between
them by institutionalizing the presidency in the ways suggested above379 (FUNC +2).
Yet, such a reform would require not only a consensus in the Council but also
additional staff and resources for the Secretariat (REQ -1). The P5, furthermore, are
very cautious about giving up too much procedural control of the SC to the Secretariat
and therefore oppose this initiative (OPP -1). There is no strong momentum in support
377 United Nations Security Council, “Note by the President of the Security Council“, UN Doc No.
S/2012/402, 2012.
378 Paul, James, and Céline Nahory, Towards a Democratic Reform of the UN Security Council, New
York: Global Policy Forum 2005.
379 Interview at the United Nations Secretariat, Department of Political Affairs, New York, 7 June
2012.
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of this proposal in the wider membership. Although, on the one hand, many see this as
a chance to put some limits on the procedural dominance of the P5, on the other hand,
some are reluctant to give the UN Secretariat too much influence as they perceive it to
be too susceptible to the influence of the US (SUP 0). But since it is not beyond
imagination that the P5 and a number of other Member States might at some point
come to the conclusion that the institutionalization of the presidency does indeed
increase the effectiveness of the SC and that this will serve their interest better than
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SC Working Methods – Agenda
This section will evaluate those reform proposals that concern the agenda of SC
meetings. The main problem these proposals aim to alleviate is that, as the Council’s
activities have increased over the years, its agenda has become overloaded as well.380
The weight of the agenda severely limits the time the SC can dedicate to the
discussion of single issues and thus entails the deterioration of their deliberative
quality (MOM +1). Moreover, since shortage of time restrains the possibility of
reaching consensus through rational deliberation, the cramped agenda is also an
obstacle to the fulfillment of the Council’s systemic function (FUNC +2). Finally, this
380 Jürgen Dedring, The United Nations Security Council in the 1990s: Resurgence and Renewal,
Albany: State University of New York Press 2008, pp. 3-5.
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situation leaves less space for consultation with external actors and consideration of
outside input, and hence, it inhibits deliberative synergy within the system (SYN +3).
Every month, the Secretariat publishes and distributes the ‘seizure list’: This
document lists all the items declared to be on the Council’s agenda. As this list has
been growing longer and longer over the years, there has recently been increased
interest in improving the mechanisms for delisting items. In 2006, the Council
decided that at the beginning of each calendar year every item on the agenda that had
not actively been considered in the last five years should automatically be deleted
unless any of the Member States objected to the removal of the item. Two years later,
it was decided to reduce the time limit for inactivity to three years. Following the
implementation of this measure, the number of items on the list decreased from 106 in
2009 to 84 in 2010.381 By 2012, the number of items on the list had again increased to
87.382
The prospect of an automatic removal of dormant agenda items had evoked
widespread protests from the UN membership, but when the caveat that an item can
only be removed if no objections are raised was added to the proposal, this guaranteed
the acceptability of this mechanism, and since the P5 especially had an interest in
shortening the agenda, it was successfully put into practice.383 There are currently no
signs of discomfort with this reform and it will very likely establish itself. Although
this is a purely formal measure, the fact that this innovation helps to ensure that the
381 Security Council Report, Security Council Working Methods – A Work in Progress?, New York
2010, p. 17.
382 United Nations Security Council, “Summary statement of matters of which the Security Council is
seized”, UN Doc No. S/2012/10, 2012.
383 For more details on the importance of the seizure list and the debate on the mechanism, see Ian
Hurd, “Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council”, Global Governance, 8
(1), 2002, pp. 39-41.
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agenda de jure properly reflects the agenda de facto makes it not only more
transparent but might also improve the focus of the Council’s deliberations. As the
UK PREP put it in 2012: “How can we properly be accountable to our members if we
cannot even be frank about what is on our agenda?”384 (REQ 0/SUP +1/OPP +1/NEG
+1).
A more practice-oriented proposal for shortening the agenda is the idea that the SC
should devolve more work to its subsidiary bodies and expert panels.385 Over the
years, the Council has established 20 subsidiary bodies specializing on a wide range
of topics from individual sanction regimes to the future of peacekeeping. These
bodies include all of the SC members and operate on the basis of consensus decision-
making. Expert panels are more informal groups of junior staff members with a
speciality in the topic at hand. As a result of the cramped agenda of the SC, the
importance of both the subsidiary bodies and the expert panels has in fact steadily
increased in recent years. Today, much of the nitty-gritty of the Council’s work takes
place in these fora.386
Is this a development that should be encouraged further? Devolving work to
subsidiary bodies and expert panels definitely lightens the Council’s work load and
thereby helps to alleviate the associated negative effects on the quality of its
deliberations. On the other hand, an expansion of this practice would greatly diminish
the prospects for deliberative synergy between the SC and other parts of the system.
As Edward Luck points out, the work of the subsidiary bodies “tends to be more
384 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6870, 2012.
385 See, e.g., Paul and Nahory, Towards a Democratic Reform of the UN Security Council.
386 Security Council Report, Security Council Transparency, Legitimacy and Effectiveness: Efforts to
Reform Council Working Methods 1993-2007, New York 2007, p. 12.
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opaque and far less known than that of the parent body.”387 These meetings are
always held behind closed doors, and other UN members receive only sparse
information on the proceedings. Security Council Report concludes therefore that
moving decision-making to expert panels and subsidiary bodies has a “negative
impact on the overall dynamics between the Council and its wider constituency”388
(SYN -3). By enabling more thorough and focused work on selected issues, these
measures promote the systemic function of the SC and provide more time for the
exchange of justifications of assertions and validity claims in internal deliberations,
but this does not improve the consideration of outside input if its external connections
are diminished in the first place (MOM +1/FUNC +2).
The political opposition to devolving work to subsidiary bodies is different from that
of devolving it to expert panels. Concerning the subsidiary bodies, much of the wider
UN membership has come to terms with the fact that their increasing importance is an
inevitable result of the Council’s workload, which is why they now concentrate on
demanding that these bodies be more transparent instead of arguing against the
practice of devolving work to them389 (OPP 0). Because expert panels are often held
outside of the UN premises and are generally much more informal, the wider
membership perceives the prospects of gaining at least some control over these
meetings as much less promising. Hence, the opposition to devolving work to expert
panels is greater than the opposition to devolving it to subsidiary bodies (OPP -1). In
the end, however, the bargaining chips are largely in the hands of the P5 who can
387 Edward Luck, “Rediscovering the Security Council: The High-level Panel and Beyond”,  in:
Reforming the United Nations for Peace and Security, New Haven: The Yale Center for the Study of
Globalization 2005, p. 146.
388 Security Council Report, Security Council Transparency, Legitimacy and Effectiveness, p. 12.
389 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6672, 2011.
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effectively decide to use expert panels as much as they see fit (REQ +1/NEG +1).
Since these panels are becoming more expedient to the P5, they are also becoming
more important to the work of the SC in general (SUP +1).
Another idea for alleviating the problem of the agenda was put forward by the
Permanent Representative of Liechtenstein in the open debate on SC working
methods in 2008: “We appreciate the heavy workload and the time constraints under
which the Council is conducting its work. We acknowledge the improvements that
have been made. Further measures to improve efficiency are necessary to enable the
Council successfully to carry out all its tasks. Discussing issues in specific
configurations, such as in the Peacebuilding Commission, could be an interesting
format in the future.”390
The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) is itself a fairly recent institutional innovation
that grew out of the reform efforts of the 2005 World Summit.391 It was created with
the goal of overcoming the problem of institutional overlap within the UN system
regarding the complex task of rebuilding war-torn countries. The PBC’s
Organizational Committee is made up of 31 states selected by both the SC and the GA
as well as ECOSOC. Its Country-Specific Configurations are composed on the basis
of the all-affected principle.392 Obviously, its focus on peacebuilding would very
much limit the number of issues discussion of which the SC could possibly devolve to
the PBC, but the nature of the PBC would make such a mechanism desirable. The
390 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.5968 (Resumption 1), 2008.
391 Ejeviome Eloho Otobo, “The New Peacebuilding Architecture: An Institutional Innovation of the
United Nations”, in: Peter Danchin and Horst Fischer (eds.), United Nations Reform and the New
Collective Security, Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press 2010, pp. 212-234.
392 United Nations General Assembly, “The Peacebuilding Commission”, UN Doc No. A/RES/60/180,
2005.
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latter combines the input of the UN’s main institutions in its deliberations and it is
equally accountable to all of them (SYN +3). Furthermore, its Country-Specific
Configurations would supposedly have the advantage of expertise and comprehensive
overview on the issues devolved to them (FUNC +2). A mechanism that would enable
the SC to devolve deliberation on certain issues to the PBC which would then report
back to the Council would certainly be desirable.
But is such a mechanism politically feasible? Since the PBC is a subsidiary body to
the SC, the GA, and ECOSOC, the requirements for this proposal to be put into
practice are somewhat complex. A special arrangement between the SC and the PBC
would also entail questions of how to uphold equal accountability to its parent
institutions (REQ 0). This is why the P5 are not well disposed to such an arrangement:
For them, moving deliberations to the PBC would mean a loss of control. Not only is
the PBC accountable to other institutions, but it directly involves a much larger
number of states in its deliberations than does the SC and it does not accord a special
status to the P5393 (OPP -1). Theoretically, such a mechanism might be in the interest
of significant parts of the wider UN membership, but so far the idea has not gained
much momentum (SUP 0). The SC, however, has recently included the chairs of the
PBC in some of its deliberations.394 If this practice establishes itself, further
cooperation between the two bodies could follow “in the future” (NEG 0). Indeed,
the careful phrasing of the Permanent Representative of Liechtenstein indicates that
the proposer himself does not consider the time to be ripe for such an initiative.
393 Apart from the fact that they are guaranteed a seat on the Organizational Committee.
394 This innovation is discussed further below.
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Council members have recently turned their attention to a problem regarding the
annual schedule of the SC. Portugal and the UK are pushing the resolution of the so-
called ‘periodicity problem’: most of the operational Council mandates are renewed in
either December or June of each year, thereby clogging the agenda of the respective
months.395 Although the majority of these renewals are more or less a matter of
routine, others often entail protracted political debates on the revisions of the
mandates. Spreading the renewal of mandates more evenly throughout the year would
enable the SC to function more efficiently and allow for a more individualized
consideration of each renewal (MOM +1/FUNC +2). Resolving the periodicity
problem is an incremental task that will take some years to be fully implemented. In
essence, it depends on the willingness of the Council members to renew individual
mandates earlier than scheduled. In some cases one or the other member will have
political reasons for protracting renewals and potential revisions to the mandate as
long as possible (REQ 0/OPP 0). But since there are no objections to the general
intention of resolving the periodicity problem and since not only Portugal, but also the
UK have made this issue their cause, it can be expected that it will be pursued
consistently (SUP +1/NEG +1).
The UK and Portugal are also promoting technological innovations, such as the use
of video teleconferencing. In June 2012, they pushed through a presidential note
which stated that “[t]he members of the Security Council intend to resort more often
to the use of video teleconferencing for briefing the Council, where appropriate, while
preserving a balanced approach between video teleconferencing and briefings in
395 What’s in Blue: Insights on the Work of the Security Council, “Council’s March Programme of
Work”, 2 March 2012, http://whatsinblue.org/2012/03/councils-march-programme-of-work.php
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person, including during open meetings in the open chamber.”396 Video conferencing
allows for ad hoc briefings from the field and provides the SC with more timely
information on existing and emerging conflicts, while at the same time saving time
and money by reducing the need for the costly presence of briefers. As the US
representative explained, this “enabl[es] the Council to maintain its vital role in early
warning and conflict prevention” (FUNC +2).
In November 2012, the South African representative suggested extending the use of
video teleconferencing to interinstitutional communications: “As a means of
concretely fostering cooperation, South Africa encourages the President of the
Council to interact regularly with the Chairperson of the Peace and Security Council
on issues on the agendas of both Councils. The two Councils could further benefit
from more interaction and substantive discussion on a regular basis. In that regard,
the use of video technology could successfully be deployed to regularize such
interaction between the two Councils.”397 As discussed in the context of increasing
the input of regional organizations, an improvement in institutional interaction with
the AU would promote deliberative synergy in the UN’s decision-making. Moreover,
video conferencing may very well contribute to the general improvement of
interinstitutional relations within the UN system (SYN +3). The introduction of video
teleconferencing has been very popular, and the Council is now increasingly making
use of it (SUP +1/OPP +1). Since the individual application of this innovation leaves
much room for negotiation, and since there are only few practical requirements, the
396 United Nations Security Council, “Note by the President of the Security Council“, UN Doc No.
S/2012/402, 2012.
397 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6870, 2012.
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prospects for a more extensive use of video teleconferencing in the decision-making






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Shorten ‘seizure list’ +1 +2 +3 +6 0 +1 +1 +1 +3
Devolve work to
subsidiary bodies +1 +2 -3 0 +1 +1 0 +1 +3
Devolve work to
expert panels +1 +2 -3 0 +1 +1 -1 +1 +2
Devolve work to
PBC +1 +2 +3 +6 0 0 -1 0 -1
Resolve periodicity
problem +1 +2 0 +3 0 +1 0 +1 +2
Video
teleconferencing +1 +2 +3 +6 +1 +1 +1 +1 +4
SC Working Methods – Subsidiary Bodies
Recent debates on SC working methods have highlighted two interconnected issues:
the designation of the chairs of the subsidiary bodies and ‘penholdership’, i.e., the
question of who may draft resolutions. The current convention which regulates these
two issues prescribes a division of labor between the P5 and the E10: while the latter
chair the subsidiary bodies, the former take on the drafting of SC resolutions. This
arrangement, which was set up by the P5, is now being heavily contested. Many states
are no longer willing to accept the practice that the Chairs of the Council’s subsidiary
bodies are determined exclusively by the P5 and designated exclusively to elected
members. The PREP of Switzerland echoed the sentiments not only of the S5 when he
stated that “the designation of the chairs of subsidiary bodies by the five permanent
members only, and of the elected members only, is an anachronism.”398
398 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6672, 2011.
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From the perspective of the E10, it is deplorable that the P5 show only little interest in
consulting them on their preferences and, much worse, that they often act against their
stated interests. When Portugal assumed its seat on the Council in 2011, e.g., it made
it known to the P5 that it wished to chair the Informal Working Group on
Documentation which is responsible for the Council’s working methods. The US,
however, dreaded the Portuguese activism in this area and ensured that Bosnia-
Herzegovina was assigned the chair of the group.399 Since the latter has less resources
and staff, which means that solely by carrying out the routine administration of the
group it will already reach the limits of its capacity, this prevents undesired initiatives
with regard to the Council’s working methods. This effect is amplified by the fact that
the P5 designate the chairs only slightly in advance and thereby leave the E10 with
scarce time to prepare for their mandates. Many Member States feel that the division
of labor between chairmanship and penholdership allows the P5 to keep the E10
occupied with administrative tasks. Especially the sanctions committees are very
technical and are therefore assigned to states which the P5 want to ‘keep busy’ while
they themselves focus on politically more significant decision-making.400
It is reasonable to expect that the abolition of the convention on chairmanship would
somewhat decrease the categorical difference between the permanent and elected
members and thereby promote an atmosphere of respect among the Council members
(MOM +1). In terms of effectiveness, it would give the SC more flexibility in
nominating the most adequate Chairs for its subsidiary bodies. For instance, would it
not make sense to designate France as the Chair of the Sanctions Committee on the
DRC rather than Azerbaijan (FUNC +2)? On the other hand, the exclusive
399 Interview at a Permanent Representation of a UN Member State, New York, 6 June 2012.
400 Interview at a Permanent Representation of a UN Member State, New York, 8 June 2012.
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designation of the Chairs to elected members guarantees rotation in these offices. If
France were indeed to become Chair of the Sanctions Committee on the DRC, there
would be the danger that it would, over the years, monopolize the office for the very
reason that it would be regarded as the technically most appropriate candidate. In this
perspective, the rotation of Chairs guarantees a more balanced participation in the
work of the subsidiary bodies. China, e.g., has argued that the current convention
prevents the committees from being chaired by states with vested interests.401
However, if more participation in the work of the subsidiary bodies equals less
participation in the drafting of resolutions and the correlated decision-making, which
in practice it often does, in sum total the E10 remain disadvantaged (SYN 0). Hence,
it would be desirable to abolish the current convention on chairmanship.
It is probably also because the P5 see this convention as a mechanism to keep the
peace amongst themselves that they will not agree to its abolition (OPP -1). The
support for such a modification goes way beyond the S5 and includes NAM and many
others, such as Germany402 (SUP +1). Although agreement on an outright abolition of
this convention is unlikely in the near future, there is some room for negotiations
regarding, e.g., a more open discussion on the distribution of chairs and an earlier
designation of these in order to allow for more preparation (NEG +1).
The P5’s quasi monopoly on drafting resolutions has come under fire as well. The
PREP of India found very clear words for expressing his opinion on penholdership:
“Quite apart from the fact that it takes quite a while to understand what the concept of
a pen holder is and which member is holding which pen for which issue, it is difficult
401 Interview at a Permanent Representation of a UN Member State, New York, 6 June 2012.
402 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6870, 2012.
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to understand why pen holding should basically be a monopoly of permanent
members, with concentration in even fewer fingers.”403 Holding the pen bestows the
responsibility for drafting resolutions upon the respective state and thereby grants it
political leadership on a particular issue.
Although the P5 usually prefer to keep their fingers on the pen, occasionally they
permit elected members to take the lead. Most recently, Germany has had the
privilege of being allowed considerable leeway in drafting resolutions. As one of the
world’s strongest economic powers involved in several military operations overseas
and having one of the largest permanent missions in New York, Germany was a
natural candidate for leadership. However, since other states, such as India, which
also have strong capabilities, have not received such preferential treatment, this is not
the sole explanatory factor. Germany’s advantage is that it is embedded in a strongly
integrated region which includes two of the five permanent members. Its close ties to
France and the UK afford more access to the inner circles of the SC.404 Yet, the
willingness of the P5 to make exceptions also depends very much upon the issue at
hand. Whereas Germany was allowed to take the initiative on the situation in
Afghanistan, it was denied the right to draft a resolution when it intended to become
active concerning the situation in Yemen.405
Abolishing the current exclusive convention on penholdership would somewhat
diminish the structural inequality between the P5 and the E10 and would thereby
promote an atmosphere of mutual respect (MOM +1). Since the P5 already now allow
403 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6672, 2011.
404 Interview at a Permanent Representation of a UN Member State, New York, 15 June 2012.
405 Interview at a Permanent Representation of a UN Member State, New York, 6 June 2012.
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for exceptions in cases in which there is, in terms of effectiveness, a clearly
appropriate candidate, not much would change in this regard (FUNC 0). By reducing
the P5’s ability for exclusive decision-making, opening up penholdership to the
elected members would increase the transparency of the SC and increase the
opportunities for outside input (SYN +3). While the P5 are opposed to abolishing the
convention on penholdership, India, and with it the majority of the UN membership,
are strongly in favor of such a reform406 (SUP +1/OPP -1). Since there will be no
change in this regard if the P5 do not agree, some Member States are pushing efforts
at compromise. Portugal is currently attempting to establish the practice of co-
penholdership in the SC. This would allow elected members to draft resolutions and
take leadership on issues in conjunction with one of the P5. While this would
somewhat dilute the exclusiveness of P5 leadership, they would still remain in control
of which states to accept as co-penholders and, as senior partners in this cooperation,
they could flexibly define the role of their co-penholders. It seems that this
compromise has some chances for success407 (REQ 0/NEG +1).
A further topic debated in 2011 is the involvement of the Chairs of the PBC’s
Country-Specific Configurations in Council deliberations. The SC often invites some
of these Chairs to participate in its open debates if the issue at hand is related to the
work of the respective configuration. The PREP of Mexico suggested promoting and
expanding this practice to other types of meetings: “we should maintain the practice
of inviting the Chairs of the country-specific configurations of the Peacebuilding
Commission to participate in debates that involve issues that are on their agenda.
406 Interview at a Permanent Representation of a UN Member State, New York, 15 June 2012.
407 Interview at the Office of a NGO involved with the Security Council, New York, 12 June 2012.
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This could be extended to informal consultations as well.”408 One step in this direction
is for Council members to become involved with the chairs of the PBC through the
convention of interactive dialogues.409
Further involving the Chairs of the Country-Specific Configurations in the SC’s
deliberations promises to strengthen the coherence between the different bodies of the
UN – the PBC in itself is a tool for achieving systemic coherence – and would,
furthermore, increase the Council’s outside input, thereby promoting the deliberative
synergy within the system (SYN +3). There is strong support for the involvement of
these chairs: France, Germany and the UK and most of the WEOG actively promote
this initiative, as do Brazil and some of the TCCs, while the US agrees less
enthusiastically410 (SUP +1). However, especially Russia, but also China, are more
cautious about this involvement from the outside.411 The PREP of New Zealand
indirectly pointed out the likely reason for this reluctance: “We urge the Council to
build on recent positive steps to increase meaningful interaction with the
Peacebuilding Commission, particularly with the Chairs of country-specific
configurations […] Such interactions need not impinge on the Council’s powers and
prerogatives. Indeed, properly handled, they have the potential to augment the quality
and legitimacy of its deliberations”412 (OPP 0). Since the establishment and
promotion of the involvement of the PBC in the Council’s deliberations is largely a
408 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6672 (Resumption 1), 2011.
409 What’s in Blue: Insights on the Work of the Security Council, “Peacebuilding Commission Open
Debate and Interactive Dialogue”, 11 July 2012, http://whatsinblue.org/2012/07/peacebuilding-
commission-open-debate-and-interactive-dialogue.php
410 Interview at a Permanent Representation of a UN Member State, New York, 15 June 2012.
411 Interview at a Permanent Representation of a UN Member State, New York, 6 June 2012.
412 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6672 (Resumption 1), 2011.
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matter of setting precedence and of reiteration, it is likely that there will be more
development in this area (REQ 0/NEG +1).
Finally, the proposal has been made to revive the Military Staff Committee (MSC).
The MSC is a special case in that it is the Council’s only subsidiary body that was set
up by the UN Charter itself. It is composed of military staff from the P5 and is
mandated to “advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the
Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace
and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the
regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.”413 It is, however, also one of
the most insignificant subsidiary bodies in practice. The Cold War turned the MSC
into a stillbirth and even after the collapse of the Soviet Union it never came
anywhere close to fulfilling its mandate. In 2001, the Russian Federation put forward
a comprehensive proposal to revive the MSC and enable it to live up to its purpose.
The Russian position paper argued that “[a] more active use of the capacities of the
Military Staff Committee to strengthen the United Nations potential in the field of
maintenance or restoration of peace and security would organically coincide with
efforts to increase the effectiveness of the United Nations and its Security Council.”414
Although in 2005 the UN membership had officially “request[ed] the Security
Council to consider the composition, mandate and working methods of the Military
Staff Committee”415 and the Russian delegation pushed the initiative for several years,
in practice, it did not gain much support. In 2008, the PREP of the Russian Federation
413 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, Article 47,
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml
414 United Nations Security Council, “Position Paper on the Military Staff Committee“, UN Doc No.
S/2001/671, 2001.
415 United Nations General Assembly, “2005 World Summit Outcome”, UN Doc No. A/60/L.1, 2005.
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repeated the standpoint “that increasing transparency in the work of the Council
could benefit from the Russian initiative on reinvigorating the Military Staff
Committee to ensure the relevant level of military expertise as the Council develops
the military aspects of its peacekeeping operations.”416 Yet, so far all the Russian
delegation was able to achieve is the SC’s anemic assurance that it “will continue to
review the role of the Military Staff Committee”417
The problem of the initiative is that the wider membership does not perceive itself to
have any interest in strengthening an institution that does not guarantee it any type of
participation. More importantly, the US is opposed to reviving the MSC because it
does not want to afford the Russian Federation institutionalized influence on military
operations in which it does not participate (SUP 0/OPP -1). Since this proposal would
strengthen the predominance of the P5 in the Security Council and work towards the
exclusion of other inputs, it is not desirable (SYN -3). The Military Staff Committee







SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Modify Convention
on Chairs +1 +2 0 +3 0 +1 -1 +1 +1
Modify
Penholdership +1 0 +3 +4 0 +1 -1 +1 +1
More involvement of
PBC 0 0 +3 +3 0 +1 0 +1 +2
Revive Military Staff
Committee 0 0 -3 -3 0 0 -1 0 -1
416 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.5968, 2008.




So far, the academic literature has approached the task of improving the legitimacy
and effectiveness of the Security Council as a matter of reforming its membership and
voting procedures. Although several commentators have pointed out that it is the
working methods of the Council in which real progress is feasible,418 up until now, the
relevant literature has completely neglected this issue. This chapter has taken up the
challenge of analyzing proposals for reform of the Council’s working methods, and
the results provide a strong argument for the potential of procedural innovations in
this area. Unlike the prospects of one single revolutionary reform of the UN Charter,
innovations in the area of working methods have the potential to bring about
meaningful change incrementally through many relatively modest adjustments. In
fact, in the course of the last decades, it is this type of change that has made it possible
for the SC to adapt to its changing environment, while the debate on the reform of its
composition and voting arrangements, on the other hand, has remained in deadlock
throughout.
This analysis demonstrates that improvement is possible in a wide range of areas, be it
the format of the meetings, the opportunities for outside input, the availability of
information, the agenda, or the subsidiary bodies. Concerning a formalization of the
Council’s procedures and responsibilities, however, it seems that, at the moment, little
can be done. This is regrettable since, contrary to Edward Luck’s argument that the
Council’s rules of procedure must remain provisional in order to guarantee flexibility,
there is no reason to believe that a formalization of the PRP would indeed diminish
418 See e.g., Nico Schrijver, “Reforming the UN Security Council in Pursuance of Collective Security”,
Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 12 (1), 2007, p. 135; Thomas Weiss and Karen Young,
“Compromise and Credibility: Security Council Reform?”, Security Dialogue, 36 (2), 2005, p. 152.
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the Council’s ability to adapt. Instead, this would increase both the transparency as
well as the accountability of the SC.
Enhancing the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Council’s decision-making
procedures by reforming its working methods is a process that builds on many
moderate steps towards improvement. There are, however, some promising
innovations that deserve to be singled out. One distinctly important innovation would
be to improve the quality and quantity of the TCC meetings. As everyone stands to
profit from it, there is, in principle, no significant opposition to such an improvement.
Rather, the success of this proposal simply requires more of an effort from all parties
involved. The P5 should provide insightful information and avoid presenting the
TCCs with pre-established decisions, whereas the TCCs need to give valuable input
and engage proactively. Unless both sides send adequately qualified and authorized
staff to these meetings, there will be no improvement.
Another distinctly promising area of reform is the role of regional organizations. Both
the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the Council would benefit significantly from
the improvement of the regional organizations’ roles of functioning as conveyor belts
for the perspectives of its members into the SC and of serving as the Council’s main
points of contact on issues concerning regional conflicts. Although there are some
differences of opinion on how this could be implemented in practice, regional
organizations today enjoy unprecedented levels of perceived legitimacy at the UN,
and there is much potential for a progressive enhancement of their role. Finally, it
would be highly recommendable to dilute the standing convention on penholdership.
Such a reform would be especially important because it would allow the E10 to take
210
political leadership on individual agenda items and therefore grant them considerable
influence, thereby diversifying the sources of input into the Council’s decision-
making. The Portuguese proposal for co-penholdership would be a first significant
step in the right direction.
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VI. Relations between the SC and the GA
Introduction
This chapter will analyze those reform proposals that target the relationship between
the Security Council and the General Assembly. Efforts to increase the cooperation
and synergy between these bodies face the challenge that, in general, the UN
membership perceives this relationship within the framework of a rivalry for
influence and therefore often reacts hypersensitively to alterations in the institutional
‘balance of power’. First and foremost, many feel that the SC has progressively
encroached on the prerogatives of the GA in the last decades, but vice versa, the P5
also warn against too much involvement of the GA in issues of peace and security.419
On the other hand, the interaction between the Assembly and the Council also bears
419 For more detail see chapter ‘The Politics of UN Reform’.
212
with it the promise of inclusive decision-making, and hence it is not only essential for
the Member States’ perception of the legitimacy of the organization but it is also of
crucial importance to the concept of the UN as a deliberative system.
Evaluation
SC-GA Relations – Coordination
The progressive dilution of clear boundaries between the fields of policy for which
each institution is responsible has led to significant overlap in the work of Assembly
and Council. This development has not only sparked debates on ‘encroachment’, but
there have also been complaints about duplication of work, and more importantly,
lack of coordination of the simultaneous efforts made by these bodies. One of the
most straightforward suggestions to remedy this situation is the institutionalization of
meetings between the presidents of the GA and the SC. In 2006, the Council officially
encouraged the President of the SC to hold such meetings for better coordination on a
regular basis.420 Although some such sessions were already taking place, as of 2009,
there was still some confusion in the UN membership as to why the proposal to hold
regular meetings between the presidents “never came to fruition.”421 Although in the
meantime, the Presidents now usually meet at least once a month, the frequency of the
meetings still very much depends upon the individuals in office.422 The wider
membership has recently shifted the focus of its demands away from the quantity to
the quality and continuation of these meetings.423
420 United Nations Security Council, “Note by the President of the Security Council”, UN Doc No.
S/2006/507, 2006, paragraph 51.
421 United Nations Security Council, “Workshop for Newly Elected and Present Security Council
Members”, UN Doc No. S/2009/193, 2009.
422 Interview at the United Nations Secretariat, Department of Political Affairs, New York, 7 June
2012.
423 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6672, 2011.
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As the Egyptian representative, speaking on behalf of NAM, pointed out, meetings
between the presidents of the GA and the SC promise to promote “increased
coherence and complementarity among those organs in a mutually reinforcing
manner”424 and are thereby conducive to synergy in the UN system (SYN +3). Thus,
it would be desirable to firmly establish and improve the quality of regular meetings
between the presidents. The biggest challenge in this regard is the monthly rotation of
the Council presidency. As James Sutterlin explains, these meetings “have not been as
helpful as hoped in bringing the two organizations into closer rapport, partly because
of the monthly rotation of the Council presidency and partly because the meetings
have been more for information exchange than for discussing possible collaborative
undertakings.”425 These two problems are, of course, interconnected: scheduling the
program of the GA is a very cumbersome process that requires much time and
circumspection. The Presidents of the SC, on the other hand, usually do not have the
time for the type of long-term planning necessary to organize collaborative
undertakings with the GA. Since the presidents of the two bodies can meet at best
three or four times before the end of the month, it is a challenge to build up an
effective work relationship in time. Although there have been some successful
precedents, the rotation of the Council presidency therefore remains a considerable
challenge for the organization of collaborative undertakings (REQ 0).
The necessity of early scheduling has not gone unnoticed in the UN membership: in
2008, the Argentinian representative suggested that meetings of the President of the
GA “with the Security Council president of the coming month could be organized in
424 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6672, 2011.
425 James Sutterlin, “Some Thoughts - Mostly Cautionary - on the Recommendations of the High-level
Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change”, in: Reforming the United Nations for Peace and Security,
New Haven: The Yale Center for the Study of Globalization 2005, p. 177.
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relation to the Council’s agenda.”426 This proposal, however, entails the problem that
it is the Council who would need to arrange its agenda according to that of the
Assembly. Obviously, the P5 are somewhat reserved towards such a one-sided affair
(OPP 0). Yet, the support for improving the meetings between the presidents of GA
and SC is strong and goes well beyond NAM (SUP +1). Much depends on the details,
and it is likely that some practical compromise may evolve that will more or less
promote the quality and quantity of these meetings (NEG +1).
One specific way in which the presidents can go beyond the exchange of information
and towards a more proactive collaboration is the coordination of thematic debates in
the GA and the SC. As the Japanese representative explained in 2008, such
coordination greatly increases the deliberative synergy between these institutions: “As
the Security Council and the General Assembly have their own responsibilities and
memberships, cross-cutting issues such as conflict prevention, peacebuilding, climate
change and other relevant matters deserve substantive discussion in both organs, and
one organ can make useful inputs to others based on those discussions”427 (SYN +3).
Ideally, the discussion in the GA would take place well ahead of the respective
discussion in the SC, so that the latter can incorporate the input from the former in its
decision-making. In terms of feasibility, the challenges are very much the same as
with the coordination between the presidents of the GA and the SC in general, i.e.,
organizational complications and the reserved attitude of the P5. Despite this, it is
likely that there will be more coordinated thematic debates in the future. That said, the
426 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.5968 (Resumption 1), 2008.
427 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.5968, 2008.
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successful coordination of thematic debates also depends upon the specific topic to be
debated. As mentioned above, there is general disagreement in the membership as to
which topic may be discussed in which forum. It will obviously be more complicated
to coordinate two thematic debates if a large portion of the membership feels that one
of these debates should not be held to begin with.
K. Venkata Raman suggests that the Secretary-General (SG) play a more active role
in the coordination of the SC and the GA. According to him, the SG should consult
with the wider membership more often and then confer those perspectives to the
SC.428 It is questionable, however, whether the involvement of the SG in the relations
between these two institutions is generally desirable. The SGs were never meant to
become directly involved in the intergovernmental deliberations at Turtle Bay.429
Instead, as the heads of the Secretariat, they were mandated to organize the
administrative support for these deliberations to run smoothly. Nonetheless, the SGs
have in fact often assumed very political roles and have at times also been heavily
involved in the relationship between the GA and the SC. But the involvement of SGs
is usually motivated by extraordinary circumstances such as a deadlock in
intergovernmental negotiations of primary importance or by the desire to mobilize the
membership in pursuit of a greater cause.
The rationale behind this reluctance is the necessity for the SGs to keep adequate
distance from the intergovernmental process of decision-making. Unless they want to
jeopardize their perceived neutrality, the SGs cannot afford to be perceived by the
428 K. Venkata Raman, “Law, Politics and United Nations Enforcement of Peace”, in: Eric Fawcett and
Hanna Newcombe (eds), United Nations Reform: Looking Ahead after 50 Years, Toronto: Dundurn
Press 1995, p. 165.
429 Except for the function mandated in article 99.
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membership as an additional actor in the decision-making procedures of the UN.
Perceived neutrality is one of the most important assets for the office of SG: if they
lose this asset, they also lose their ability to mediate and propel the negotiations
between governments by their extraordinary interventions. Such interventions of the
SGs are political exclamation marks that lose their significance if used after every
sentence. It is no coincidence that the only clearly political right the UN Charter
confers to the SGs is the task of ringing the tocsin by bringing “to the attention of the
Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of
international peace and security.”430 The SGs can be administrators, sometimes
mediators and motivators, but never coordinators. The routine task of coordinating the
SC and the GA should be left to the presidents of these bodies who are by mandate
much more intrinsic to the respective intergovernmental deliberations (FUNC 0).
It is highly unlikely, moreover, that the SGs would have the necessary time for the
task of effectively coordinating the SC and the GA. The agenda of the SGs is a zero-
sum game: every task added deducts from the time available for those functions that
are more essential to this office, i.e., administration, representation, and mediation
(REQ -1). In addition to this, large sections of the membership are not particularly
keen on ‘politicizing’ the office of the SG. The majority of NAM perceives the SGs to
be catering to the needs of the SC rather than to those of the GA. On the other hand,
the US tends “to look askance at any figure with the standing or charisma to
constitute a force of its own.”431 As the SGs’ routine involvement in the UN’s
decision-making procedures would be perceived by many as taking these out of the
430 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter XV, Article 99,
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter15.shtml
431 James Traub, “The Secretary-General’s Political Space”, in: Simon Chesterman (ed.), Secretary or
General: The UN Secretary-General in World Politics, Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University
Press 2007, p. 201.
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SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Increase interaction
between PGA & PSC 0 0 +3 +3 0 +1 0 +1 +2
Coordination of
thematic debates 0 0 +3 +3 0 +1 0 +1 +2
Coordination by the
Secretary-General 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 -1
SC-GA Relations – Accountability Mechanisms – SC Reports
The annual report of the SC to the GA is the accountability mechanism par excellence
between these two bodies. Article 24 of the UN Charter commands that “[t]he
Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the
General Assembly for its consideration.”432 Thus, at the end of every year, usually in
November, the President of the SC presents an overview of the Council’s activities in
the past 12 months to the GA. The annual report of the SC is highly significant to the
membership because it is both the most visible source of information about the work
of the Council as well as the primary symbol of the SC’s legal accountability to the
GA. This makes the report a prominent focal point for efforts to recalibrate the
balance between the two institutions.
With regard to the content of the annual report, the core demand of large portions of
the UN membership is that its introduction should be less descriptive and more
analytical: rather than simply listing the actions taken by the Council it should give
insight into the dynamics of decision-making. In 2011, the PREP of Egypt reiterated
the Non-Aligned Movement’s standpoint that “the annual report should elaborate the
432 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter V, Article 24,
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter5.shtml
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circumstances under which the Council adopts different outcomes, be they
resolutions, presidential statements, press statements or elements to the press. It is
imperative that the General Assembly be aware not only of the decisions adopted by
the Council, but also of the rationale, reasons and backgrounds of those decisions, as
well as the effectiveness and impact of those decisions on the situation on the
ground.”433
A further suggestion for improving the quality of the annual report is that it should not
only give account of the Council’s actions, but also explain its inaction on certain
issues. The Permanent Representative of Mexico, e.g., stated that “[i]n order to
ensure greater transparency in the Council’s work, Mexico recommends that the
report make mention of situations brought to the attention to the Council but on which
the Council decided that no action needed to be taken.” In the same statement, it was
also suggested to include more detailed information on the work of the subsidiary
bodies in the report: “my country believes it indispensable that it contain concise
information on the work of all the Council’s subsidiary bodies, such as the sanctions
committees and the Working Group on Documentation, inter alia, as these are
integral part of the report.” 434
Are these suggestions for the improvement of the annual report desirable? While they
would not have any direct impact on the quality of the deliberations in the GA or the
SC and would not aid these institutions in fulfilling their systemic functions, they
would certainly promote deliberative synergy within the system by improving the
433 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV/6672, 2011.
434 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.5968, 2008.
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transparency of the Council’s work, by providing for some accountability, and
moreover, by creating communication between the two bodies (SYN +3).
The endeavor to improve the content of the annual report began in 2002 when, mainly
at the initiative of Singapore, it was decided to put more effort into its conception.
Ever since, the first draft of the report is always written already in July. But even
though the report of 2002 was indeed more explanatory and concise than those before
it, in the succeeding years the analytical edge of the reports slowly wore off and the
little improvement that had been made was lost again.435 In recent years, Viet Nam,
Uganda, Nigeria, Germany, and Colombia have been responsible for the drafting of
the report and have renewed the efforts to improve its analytical introduction with,
however, only moderate success. The Permanent Representative of India called the
report of 2011 a “bland summary.”436 It is not that there was not enough support for
these suggestions: to this day most of the UN membership calls for such
improvements to be made; it is not that the opposition was too strong to be overcome:
while the P5 are not necessarily in favor of elevating the status of the report, they are
also not fiercely opposed to such attempts; the real problem is that the requirements
for making the report truly analytical, explanatory, and comprehensive are formidable
(SUP +1/OPP 0).
The annual report to the GA is based on the consensus principle, meaning that all of
the Council members must agree to its content. While it is sometimes possible to
forge consensus on individual resolutions, it is harder to unify the various
435 Security Council Report, Security Council Working Methods – A Work in Progress?, New York
2010, p. 16.
436 United Nations Department of Public Information, “’Opaque, non-inclusive’ Security Council must
pursue lasting, candid interaction with entire United Nations membership, General Assembly
delegations say”, UN Doc No. GA/11168, 2011.
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perspectives on how and why this or that resolution came about. It is nearly
impossible, however, to combine all of these into a comprehensive narrative
interpretation of the work of the Council over an entire year. Lydia Swart relates that
“[a]ccording to one source, the General Assembly’s request for improved annual
reports was met with derision - and even audible laughter - in the Security Council.
This source added that the permanent members evidently believe that the Security
Council’s 15 members are unlikely to ever agree on anything beyond the facts that
contributed to the outcomes.”437 Even Singapore, one of the most proactive Member
States regarding the reform of the Council’s working methods, had to recognize this
problem. In 2008, the PREP stated that “we have asked repeatedly for a more
analytical annual report. But, that is seldom achieved, because, understandably, it is
difficult to square the viewpoints of 15 Council members”438 (REQ -1).
Up until 1993 the annual report was discussed and adopted behind closed doors, but
following a review of its working methods in that year, the SC decided to adopt the
report in a public meeting. In 2002, Singapore suggested opening the speakers’ list at
these meetings in order to enable a public debate on the content of the report.
Although this idea was put into praxis that same year, this public debate turned out to
be not only the first but also the last of its kind. Since it lacked the support of the P5,
the Singaporean initiative was disregarded in subsequent years. In 2008, however,
Viet Nam, being the drafter of the report that year, circumvented the necessity of
approval by the P5 and convened an informal meeting with the wider membership in
order to receive additional input regarding its content. This initiative was continued in
437 Lydia Swart, „Revitalization of the Work of the General Assembly“, in: Managing Change at the
United Nations, New York: Center For UN Reform Education 2008, p. 25.
438 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.5968 (Resumption 1), 2008.
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the following years: Uganda (2009), Nigeria (2010), Germany (2011), and Colombia
(2012) all decided to hold such informal meetings before they finalized their drafts.
Although some Member States are unsatisfied with the productivity of these informal
meetings,439 their continuation would definitely improve the deliberative synergy
between the SC and the GA. These meetings afford the wider membership the
opportunity to give their input on the annual report, and by allowing them to gain
insight on the process of its drafting, they increase the transparency of the SC without
having any direct effect on these institutions’ systemic functions or on the
deliberations within them (SYN +3). Hence, it would be desirable to maintain the
‘good practice’ of holding informal meetings with the wider membership during the
process of drafting the annual report.
There is both strong support as well as strong opposition to the involvement of the
wider membership in drafting the SC report. As mentioned above, the P5 averted the
establishment of open debates on the report, but current developments indicate that
their attitude towards surrogate informal meetings is more flexible. In presidential
note 922 of December 2012, they approved that “presidencies in charge of preparing
the draft introduction to the report may consider organizing, where appropriate,
interactive informal exchanges of views with the wider membership”440 (OPP 0). Most
of the wider membership is strongly in favor of such meetings, which is the reason
why they have now been held four years in a row (SUP +1).
439 Interview at a Permanent Representation of a UN Member State, New York, 15 June 2012.
440 United Nations Security Council, “Note by the President of the Security Council”, UN Doc No.
S/2012/922, 2012.
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The advantage of these meetings is that their informal nature makes the support of the
P5 unnecessary as long as none of the latter hold the July presidency which is
responsible for drafting the report (REQ +1). In that regard, it would be important to
have members who are willing to engage the membership presiding in the month of
July in the next two or three years. The better the meetings have established
themselves, the higher the political cost for any of the P5 to break with such a
tradition. Indeed, in late 2012, the US representative already acknowledged the
practice as a ‘tradition’: “In July, the Council President traditionally meets with
Member States to solicit views on the annual report of the Security Council to the
General Assembly. The United States, as Council President for July 2013, looks
forward to continuing that practice and to receiving suggestions on ways to enhance
the report”441 (NEG 0).
Since 2004, the annual report has been presented to the GA in a joint debate together
with a discussion of SC reform. As speakers tend to prioritize the latter, this has had
the effect that the report has received much less attention than it had previously. In
2011, Germany asked the presidency of the GA to again “separate the debates on the
annual report and on the issue of Security Council reform in order to allow for a
more focused debate on both issues.”442 The President of the GA agreed and
scheduled a morning meeting for the former and the afternoon meeting of the same
day for the latter issue.443
441 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6870, 2012.
442 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV/6672, 2011.
443 United Nations Department of Public Information, “’Opaque, non-inclusive’ Security Council must
pursue lasting, candid interaction with entire United Nations membership, General Assembly
delegations say”, UN Doc No. GA/11168, 2011.
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In future GA sessions as well, the two issues should be debated separately. This does
not only improve the communication between the GA and the SC, but also promotes
the GA’s systemic function by providing for a more clear and transparent justification
of the Member States’ policies on these issues (FUNC +2/SYN +3). Since both those
states that prioritize a substantive reform of the SC and those states that value
procedural reforms above all perceive themselves to profit from the increased
analytical clarity this separation of the two issues provides, there is strong support for
this innovation444 (SUP +1/OPP +1). The only obstacle might be the question of in
how far the schedule of the GA can accommodate the additional time requirements of
having two separate debates, but in 2011, this problem was managed well (REQ 0).
One matter of contention are the monthly assessments of the outgoing presidencies of
the SC. In 1997, the Council decided that such assessments may be made by those
states that wished to give an overview of the work accomplished under their
presidencies and that these assessments, although not representative of the views of
the SC as a whole, would be attached to the annual report.445 These assessments have
since established themselves as an undisputed practice of the outgoing presidencies.
As with the annual report, the main point of contention is the content of these
assessments. In 2011, e.g., the Portuguese PREP stated that “[a]ssessments are useful
instruments that will increase awareness of the work of the Council once they are
circulated among the wider membership. They should provide useful insights from the
perspective of the presidencies, not mere factual descriptions. More thought should be
put into improving the analytical aspects of the assessments, as they are the source of
444 Interview at a Permanent Representation of a UN Member State, New York, 15 June 2012.
445 United Nations Security Council, “Note by the President of the Security Council”, UN Doc No.
S/1997/451, 1997.
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the introduction of the Security Council’s annual report.”446 A more radical
suggestion was made by the Nordic Countries in 2008: “regular reports of the
Security Council to the General Assembly, with an assessment by each outgoing
presidency, could be instituted.”447
More analytical and explanatory assessments would indeed improve the transparency
of the SC, strengthen communication with the GA and thereby promote deliberative
synergy. The same can be said of the proposal to turn the assessments into regular
reports to the GA (SYN +3). Regarding the feasibility of improving the content of the
assessments, as with the annual report, there is strong support and only moderate
opposition to this proposal (SUP +1/OPP 0). Unlike the annual report, however, the
imperative to ‘square the viewpoints of 15 Council members’ is less strong. Since the
assessments do not represent the opinion of the SC as such and therefore involve
much less negotiation and coordination among the Council members, it would be
easier, relatively speaking, to make the content more analytical. It is up to those states
that are in support of this proposal to set examples by improving the content of their
assessments, as was done by the Portuguese presidency in November 2011.448 Should
this be the case, the P5 might still choose to ignore these innovations and carry on
with business as usual. As with the informal meetings on the annual report, the key
question is whether it is possible to change the status quo by coordinated persistence
(REQ 0/NEG 0).
446 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV/6672 (Resumption 1), 2011.
447 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.5968, 2008.
448 What’s in Blue: Insights on the Work of the Security Council, “Annual Report Adoption”, 6
November 2012, http://www.whatsinblue.org/2012/11/annual-report-adoption.php
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The situation is very different with regard to the proposal to turn the assessments into
monthly reports to the GA. In this case, there is strong opposition from the P5 who
neither want to make these assessments obligatory, nor show interest in increasing the
oversight of the GA over the minutiae of the Council’s work (OPP -1). Both the
practical requirements for such a proposal, as well as the negotiations on it, are
complicated by the need for consensus among all the Council members (REQ -1/NEG
-1).
As quoted above, the UN Charter also requires that ‘special reports’ of the SC were to
be made to the GA ‘when necessary.’ So far, this provision has been totally neglected
by the Council. For this reason, the General Assembly in 2005 sent out a reminder
and decided “to invite the Security Council to submit periodically, in accordance with
Article 24 of the Charter, special subject-oriented reports to the General Assembly for
its consideration on issues of current international concern.”449 As the representative
of the Philippines explained in 2008, the hope is that such “periodic reporting would
enable the General Assembly and the general membership to gain a more current
appreciation of the status of matters before the Council.”450
Special subject-oriented reports would promote deliberative synergy by increasing the
transparency of the SC as well as by improving communication with the GA (SYN
+3). The problem is, however, that, as Luck puts it, “frequent reporting could make it
that much harder for an already overburdened Council to devote sufficient time and
449 United Nations General Assembly, “A strengthened and revitalized General Assembly”, UN Doc
No. A/RES/59/313, 2005.
450 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.5968, 2008.
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attention to its wide-ranging substantive work.”451 This would lead to a deterioration
of the Council’s systemic function and would also diminish the deliberative quality
within the SC by lessening the time available for the adequate justification of
assertions and validity claims (MOM -1/FUNC -2).
The problem with the special subject-oriented reports is not that the opposition were
unassailable: while the P5 show no interested in them, they are not adamantly
opposed to it either452 (OPP 0). The real challenge lies in mobilizing the resources for
such reports. For this proposal to move forward, it would require a dedicated SC
member to devote considerable time and effort in the pursuit of the greater good of
transparency and accountability. At the moment, none of the Council members is
ready to take up the burden of setting a precedent by making the drafting of a subject-
oriented report its priority.453 The underlying problem is, of course, that once Member
States assume their responsibilities on the Council, they are usually too caught up in
daily affairs to pursue overarching projects. For the initiator, moreover, there is the
danger that, after dedicating considerable resources to such a report, it would not
obtain the approval of the SC or that it would be watered down to insignificance in the
respective negotiations, as is the fate of many a grand initiative at the UN (REQ -1).
Although the initiative has lost some momentum – after 2005 the Assembly no longer
included the invitation for special subject-oriented reports in its resolutions on the
revitalization of the General Assembly – support for this proposal is still strong. In
451 Edward Luck, “Reforming the United Nations: Lessons from a History in Progress”, in: Jean Krasno
(ed.), The United Nations: Confronting the Challenges of a Global Society, Boulder, Co; London:
Lynne Rienner 2004, pp. 359-397.
452 Interview at a Permanent Representation of a UN Member State, New York, 6 June 2012.
453 Interview at a Permanent Representation of a UN Member State, New York, 6 June 2012.
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2011, NAM restated its demand for such reports454 (SUP +1). Since much would
depend on the topic and the specific content of these reports, there is some space for






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Improve annual
report 0 0 +3 +3 -1 +1 0 0 0
Informal meetings on
the annual report 0 0 +3 +3 +1 +1 0 0 +2
Single-issue debate
in the GA 0 +2 +3 +5 0 +1 +1 0 +2
Monthly assessments 0 0 +3 +3 0 +1 0 0 +1
Monthly assessm. to
the GA 0 0 +3 +3 -1 +1 -1 -1 -2
Special subject-
oriented reports -1 -2 +3 0 -1 +1 0 0 0
SC-GA Relations – Accountability Mechanisms – GA Oversight
An alternative type of accountability mechanisms are those that aim to establish
oversight of the GA over the SC rather than relying solely on the information
provided by the latter. According to Swart, some “Member States see a role for the
General Assembly in evaluating the work of the Security Council, allowing for more
checks and balances in the United Nations.”455 In this perspective, the plenary debate
on the annual report of the SC should be used for a more comprehensive evaluation of
the Council’s performance. If deemed necessary for this task, informal consultations
following the plenary debate should be held in order to crystallize the “matters to be
brought to the attention of the Security Council.”456
454 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV/6672, 2011.
455 Swart, Revitalization of the Work of the General Assembly, p. 24.
456 United Nations General Assembly, “Revitalization of the work of the General Assembly”, UN Doc
No. A/RES/58/126, 2004, paragraph A.4.
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By affording more time for the consideration of the issue and by providing a more
interactive informal forum complementary to the formal plenary debate, additional
consultations on the report of the SC would add to the deliberative quality of the
respective deliberations of the GA (MOM +1). The appendant elaboration of a list of
issues to be brought to the attention of the SC would provide it with additional input
and thereby improve the deliberative synergy between the two institutions (SYN +3).
Since the SC reports, however, continue to lack analytical content, they are a less than
ideal basis for the GA’s deliberations on the performance of the Council. Some are
skeptical, therefore, as to whether such additional deliberations would yield any
meaningful outcomes457 (REQ 0). Whereas previous resolutions indicate that the
Assembly is generally in support of these measures,458 the P5 are obviously neither
interested in extending the deliberations on the performance of the Council nor
particularly keen on the SC receiving ‘instructions’ from the GA (SUP +1/OPP -1).
The bargaining chips on this issue are in the hands of the Assembly who can, of
course, regulate its own agenda and communications (NEG +1).
Another proposed method of increasing the GA’s oversight of the SC is to clarify and
codify the responsibilities and obligations of the elected members and thereby
promote the accountability of the latter to the rest of the UN membership.459 While
the GA’s regional groups already have some such mechanisms – some more extensive
than others – there is no overarching regulation of the elected members’
457 Swart, Revitalization of the Work of the General Assembly, p. 25.
458 United Nations General Assembly, “Revitalization of the work of the General Assembly”, UN Doc
No. A/RES/58/126, 2004, paragraph A4; United Nations General Assembly, “Strengthening of the
United Nations System”, UN Doc No. A/RES/51/241, 1997, annex.
459 E.g., Kishore Mahbubani, “The Permanent and Elected Council Members”, in: David Malone (ed.),
The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, Boulder; London: Lynne Rienner
2004, p. 253-266; Edward Luck, “Rediscovering the Security Council: The High-level Panel and
Beyond”, in: Reforming the United Nations for Peace and Security, New Haven: The Yale Center for
the Study of Globalization 2005, pp. 126-152.
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responsibilities to their constituency. Regardless of whether the constituency in
question is the Assembly as a whole or only the respective regional group,460 there is,
according to this perspective, a need to define a general minimum standard for the
elected members’ responsibilities to their constituency. By setting standards and
putting additional pressure on the elected members to justify their performance on the
Council in the GA, the codification of their responsibilities would benefit the systemic
function of the latter (FUNC +2). Moreover, such a codification would in all
likelihood increase the expectations towards the elected members to take into account
the perspectives of their constituency in the decision-making procedures of the SC.
This would increase the deliberative synergy between the Assembly and the Council
(SYN +3).
It is somewhat unclear exactly how the codification of the responsibilities of elected
members could be put into practice. One possible way would be for the GA to adopt a
resolution that enumerates these responsibilities. The problem is, however, that it is
legally debatable, to say the least, whether the Assembly may prescribe a Member
State how to act on the Council. From the vantage point of the SC, this would
constitute an outside interference into its own jurisdiction. Beyond that which is
prescribed in it, the Charter clearly leaves the determination of internal functions and
procedures up to each of the main institutions themselves. On the other hand, a
resolution of the SC would, of course, lead to the reverse problem of interfering with
the GA’s jurisdiction. A clean solution would be an amendment of the Charter itself,
but this obviously entails rigid formal obstacles.
460 It is the GA who elects the members, but the candidates are predetermined by the regional groups.
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A further problem is the question of representation as such: in how far is it possible
for one state to represent others in the Council? As discussed elsewhere, the equation
between regional proximity and political proximity fails too often in practice to hold
in theory.461 Even if it were not for the regional factor, there is still the problem of
state sovereignty. Can a state be expected to represent other states if this would
require it to act against what it perceives to be its national interest? It could be argued
that a state can represent the regional discourse, but in most cases, there are several
competing discourses on each region. Even if there were no such competition, the
regional discourse would always remain secondary to the state’s delegated
representativeness of its people (REQ -1). It is for this very dilemma that there is not
much momentum for this proposal in the UN membership (SUP 0). Many Member
States are highly sensitive to any attempt to circumscribe state sovereignty. The P5,
furthermore, do not stand to gain from the prospect that GA mandates might tie down
the elected members in the Council’s deliberations, making them less susceptible to
persuasion or manipulation (OPP -1). Since a codification of the responsibilities of the
elected members could vary widely both in content as well as in precision, there is
much space for negotiation regarding this matter (NEG +1).
The participants to the second Conference for a More Democratic United Nations
(CAMDUN) held in 1991 made a more far-reaching proposal to increase the GA’s
oversight of the Council. They suggest that the Assembly should establish a
committee of 15 members, representative of all of the world’s regions, that should
watch over the activities of the SC.462 This ‘Permanent Committee of the General
Assembly’ would closely follow the performance of the Council and report its
461 See chapter ‘The Politics of UN Reform’.
462 Vicenç Fisas, Blue Geopolitics: The United Nations and the Future of the Blue Helmets, London;
East Haven, CT: Pluto Press 1995, p. 20.
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observations and assessments to the GA. It is doubtful, however, whether the
Permanent Committee of the GA, if put into practice, would promote the free flow of
information between the two bodies. There is, for instance, no reason to assume that it
would gain more insight into the work of the Council than any individual Member
State could acquire via briefings from its allies on the SC, from the President of the
SC, or even from NGOs.463 But more importantly, it is more likely that such a
committee would filter the flow of information between these bodies instead of
increasing it. If it were to fulfill its function of overseeing the SC, the committee
would have to interpret and evaluate its observations in order to compose its reports to
the GA. The result would be a constant debate on the correct interpretation of events
among the 15 committee members leading to the omission of information in those
cases in which no consensus can be found. In the best case scenario, the committee
would offer the GA a dogmatic interpretation of events. In the worst case scenario, it
would block the flow of information (SYN -3).
The requirements are formidable for setting up such a Permanent Committee of the
GA. If such a body were to be set up as a GA committee, as its proposers envision, it
would still require, for both legal and practical reasons, the unequivocal consent of the
SC in order to attain effective oversight of the latter. As with the codification of the
elected members’ responsibilities, an amendment to the Charter would seem more
appropriate. In addition to these obstacles, there is also the necessity of providing the
staff and resources required to fund such a permanent committee (REQ -1). The idea
of a Permanent Committee of the GA has never caught on with the UN membership
which is why, after more than 20 years, it remains only a suggestion (SUP -1/OPP -1).
463 Especially considering the work of NGOs such as Security Council Report.
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Hypothetically, however, there would be some space for negotiation as there is a
range of imaginable options regarding the precise function, working methods, and






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Add. consultations &
recommendations +1 0 +3 +4 0 +1 -1 +1 +1
Codify E10’s
responsibilities 0 +2 +3 +5 -1 0 -1 +1 -1
Permanent GA
Committee 0 0 -3 -3 -1 -1 -1 0 -3
SC-GA Relations – Decision-making
Some proposals for UN reform envision the GA acquiring the right to demand a
review of the decisions made by the SC. Joseph Camilleri suggests that in cases of
controversial decision-making by the Council, the Assembly should convene
emergency meetings in order to evaluate these actions. “If a majority of member states
were dissatisfied with the actions of [the] Council, the General Assembly would have
the power to require [it] to reconvene and review its handling of the relevant issues,
in the light of advice received from the General Assembly.”464
The crucial question concerning this proposal is whether there would be any legal
force to the GA’s instructions. If so, then the Assembly would have to be endowed
with law-making powers which presently it does not possess. Such a reform, which is
discussed further below, would entail a number of bigger questions regarding the
nature of the UN. Another problem is that this would greatly inhibit the SC from
fulfilling its systemic function. The authority of the Council, and thereby the
decisiveness of the UN as a whole, is dependent upon the perception that its
464 Joseph Camilleri, “Major Structural Reform”, in: Esref Aksu and Joseph Camilleri (eds.),
Democratizing Global Governance, London: Palgrave Macmillan 2002, pp. 257.
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resolutions are the definite result of a meticulous process of decision-making, that
these resolutions are binding by law and, most importantly, that they give dependable
guidance for the Member States’ policy decisions. Once every SC resolution were
issued with the GA’s right to recall, this perception would dwindle, and with it, the
decisiveness of the Council.
Such a right would, moreover, not only threaten the Council’s authority, but also risk
creating both inconsistency in the Member States’ policies and confusion in UN
mandated operations. What if the SC authorizes an operation, but this authorization is
recalled by the GA three days later? Considering the need to organize an emergency
session by assembling the requests of the “majority of the Members of the United
Nations”465, to debate the issue at hand and to compose instructions for the SC that
find the approval of two thirds of the membership, three days is an over optimistic
time frame. Even just three days would already suffice for the development of
irreversible dynamics on the ground. It is obvious that a right for the Assembly to
require the Council to review its decisions could easily conjure up hazardous
situations. It is for this very reason that in a domestic context, decision-making
prerogatives on matters of security are categorically separated between the executive
and the legislative, and it is always either the one or the other who has either the right
to declare war or the right to deploy troops, or both. If the GA is to have any legally
binding decision-making powers at all in matters of global peace and security, then
these must be exclusive and complementary to those of the SC instead of being
revisionary (FUNC -2).
465 United Nations General Assembly, “Uniting for Peace“, UN Doc No. A/RES/377(V)AA, 1950.
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If the GA, as Camilleri seems to suggest, could merely give advice to the SC, then the
post-facto nature of this mechanism becomes the key problem. Why would the SC
pay any regard to the GA’s input if it has not done so before? In all likelihood, the
Council members would be even less susceptible to input from the GA after they have
already made their decisions. Neither would the SC be keen on standing corrected,
nor would the Council members be more likely to change their minds after potential
operations have begun rather than before. It is reasonable to expect that the input of
the GA would, instead, merely be acknowledged in an inconsequential pro-forma
session. There is the danger, moreover, that such a mechanism would promote a
mentality among Council members that they are required to listen to the GA only after
they have taken the decisions and established the facts, rather than before (SYN -3).
Since a right for the GA to demand a review of the SC would require an amendment
to the Charter, the legal obstacles are considerable (REQ -1). Although some parts of
NAM might be well-disposed to the idea, it is not seriously being considered in the
membership and the P5 would not allow it (SUP 0/OPP -1). The proposal does not
leave much room for negotiation (NEG -1).
Michael Reisman suggests a mechanism that would require the SC to take into
consideration the perspectives of the GA before any decisions are made. The idea is
that a ‘Chapter VII Consultation Committee’ would have to be activated before the
Council may authorize the use of force. This committee “should be composed of
twenty-one members of the Assembly, representing a range of regions and interests, to
be selected annually by the Assembly. A protocol would be established, by which the
Security Council would immediately notify the committee whenever it planned to
move into a chapter VII decision mode. The President of the Council and the
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Secretary-General would promptly meet with the committee to share the Council's
information and views and solicit the committee's views, which would be reported to
the Council. Throughout the crisis, the Council and committee would remain in
contact in this fashion. As a result, the Council would always be apprised of
representative Assembly views and the Assembly, for its part, would have the full
benefit of the Council's perspective.”466
The need to consult the Chapter VII Consultation Committee in case it considers the
authorization of enforcement measures would have a negative effect on the SC’s
ability to fulfill its systemic function. This mechanism would not only require
additional time and delay the Council’s decision-making, but it would also make the
achievement of consensus more difficult (FUNC -2). On the other hand, this
committee would increase the deliberative synergy between the two bodies. Unlike
the proposal for a right of review, it would be purely consultative and ensure that
outside input makes its way into the Council during its deliberations instead of after
(SYN +3). Since this proposal would require the approval of both the SC and the GA,
the requirements for establishing this committee would be formidable. The budget for
additional staff and resources would also have to be taken into consideration (REQ -
1). There is presently no momentum in support of this proposal in the GA, and it is
reasonable to expect strong opposition from the P5 and others that are concerned
about the effectiveness of the Council (SUP 0/OPP -1). Since the main point of
contention would be the essence of the committee, i.e., the requirement for prior
consultation, there would not be much room for negotiation (NEG -1).
466 Michael Reisman, “The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations”, American Journal of
International Law, 87 (1), 1993, p. 99.
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Another type of proposals that envision the establishment of committees as mediators
between the GA and the SC suggests, unlike Reisman, that these should have regular
decision-making powers rather than merely consultative rights. E.g., David Steele
proposes a ‘Permanent Commission of the Security Council’ that, standing between
the GA and the SC, would predetermine the peaceful settlement of disputes between
Member States.467 Aidan Hehir suggests taking the issue of military interventions out
of the hands of the SC altogether: “the authorization of intervention would have to
become the sole preserve of an international body, within the UN, comprising officials
elected by the General Assembly to represent the UN and not individual states. This
group would be tasked with determining, on the basis of existing international law
and reports from objective observers on the ground, when a situation required
external intervention.”468
Instead of promoting the deliberative synergy in the UN system, such committees
would, if they were established, constitute independent players in the decision-making
process and curb the influence of both Council and Assembly. It is not clear why it
should be assumed that these institutions would take into account the perspectives of
non-members any more than does the SC. Moreover, the suggested committees would
stand in competition to the Council and would diminish its authority, limit its
jurisdiction, and generally inhibit its ability to effectively govern global peace and
security. Such competition could in practice very well lead to problematic situations
in terms of governance. If, e.g., the body suggested by Hehir were to determine
against the will of the SC that there is the need for an intervention, would this mean
that any resulting operation would remain beyond the authority of the UN, equipped
467 David Steele, The Reform of the United Nations, London: Crome Helm 1987, pp. 111-132.
468 Aidan Hehir, Humanitarian Intervention after Kosovo: Iraq, Dafur, and the Record of Global Civil
Society, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2008, p. 130.
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with a blank check for the ensuing actions? Or would the Council be expected to
govern an operation it never supported? Or would the authorizing body rule in a state
of emergency instead? Obviously, all of these options are highly problematic (FUNC
-2).
Equipping committees with the decision-making powers envisioned in these proposals
would require an amendment of the Charter. Also, additional financial burdens would
have to be taken into consideration (REQ -1). Not only is there no support for these
proposals in the membership, but it is generally unlikely that a significant number of
Member States would perceive them to be in their interest. From the perspective of
NAM, there is the concern that the very nature of such committees would erode the
principle of state sovereignty, and for the P5, in any case, such an enfeeblement of the
SC would be wholly unacceptable (SUP -1/OPP -1). The idea to move decision-
making to a special committee is not negotiable (NEG -1).
Some proposals for reform aim to increase the direct involvement of the GA in the
governance of global peace and security. As it is, the GA is already very much
engaged with issues of peace and security. Articles 11, 13, and 14 of the Charter
clearly spell out the right of the GA to deal with these matters, and it is not unusual
for them to make up more than a third of the total items on the agenda of the
Assembly.469 The real matter of contention is article 12 which determines that
“[w]hile the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the
functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make
469 The number for 1993 is 42,4 %. See Erskine Childers and Brian Urquhart, Renewing the United
Nations System, Uppsala: Dag Hammersköld Foundation 1994, p. 130.
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any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security
Council so requests.”470
This article was obviously meant to safeguard the Council’s primary responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace and security, but many contest its exclusivity.
Some, such as Vicenç Fisas, call for the reform of article 12 “so that the General
Assembly can make recommendations and influence the decisions of the Security
Council.”471 A less direct approach is that of promoting the mechanism set up by the
Uniting For Peace resolution (UFP). Rather than attempting to change the article, the
approach taken by the UFP is to interpret the Council’s exercise of its functions in a
narrow way: as long as the SC is not taking action in respect of any dispute or
situation, it is neglecting its function rather than exercising it. The UFP determines
that “if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members,
fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter
immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations […].”472
Since its adoption in 1950, the provisions of the UFP have been invoked only eleven
times.473 In the opinion of NAM, the UFP mechanism should be simplified in order to
make it more readily applicable.474 In 2011, the representative of Indonesia stated that
470 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter IV, Article 12,
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter4.shtml
471 Fisas, Blue Geopolitics, p. 11.
472 United Nations General Assembly, “Uniting for Peace“, UN Doc No. A/RES/377(V)AA, 1950.
473 Dominik Zaum, “The Security Council, the General Assembly, and War: The Uniting for Peace
Resolution”, in: Vaughan Lowe et al. (eds.), The Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought
and Practice since 1945, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008, p. 159.
474 Spencer Zifcak, United Nations Reform: Heading North or South?, London; New York: Routledge
2009, pp. 46-47.
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there was a need to clarify “the functions and powers of the General Assembly on the
issues of international peace and security, which are not regulated under Chapter V
of the Charter in its present language. In a scenario where the Council does not take
action on a case that is clearly threatening international peace and security, the
Assembly should have the power to make recommendations, even if the Council does
not request it to do so.”475
Jean Krasno and Mitushi Das recommend that “the Uniting for Peace resolution
should be viewed with a renewed perspective in order to increase the effectiveness of
the United Nations in combating the challenges posed by threats to the peace in an
increasingly complex world and when narrow state interests threaten UN action.”476
Yet, both the reform of article 12 and the simplification or accentuation of the UFP
would amplify the competition of the GA with the SC instead of promoting
deliberative synergy between these bodies. Article 12 only forbids the Assembly to
issue recommendations in a specific situation and does not prevent it from debating
the respective matters, consulting with the Council or conveying its views to the latter
through various alternative mechanisms.
Recommendations from the GA, however, would potentially lead to a situation in
which the UN issues contradicting instructions to its Member States and would
generally entail the same negative effects with regard to authority, effectiveness, and
governance that were discussed in the context of decision-making by commissions.
Dominik Zaum also draws negative conclusions from his analysis of the UFP: “In
475 United Nations General Assembly, “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the
membership of the Security Council and related matters“, UN Doc No. A/66/PV.51, 2011.
476 Jean Krasno and Mitushi Das, “The Uniting for Consensus Resolution and Other Ways of
Circumventing the Council”, in Bruce Cronin and Ian Hurd (eds.), The UN Security Council and the
Politics of International Authority, London: Routledge 2008, p. 191.
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light of the deep and acrimonious divisions between the G-77 and Western countries
that emerged in the wake of the Iraq war and the 2005 world summit, and the
penchant of some of its members for symbolic politics with little consideration for the
impact of such politics on the reputation of the UN as a whole, greater involvement by
the Assembly would reduce the effectiveness and credibility of the UN rather than
strengthen it”477 (FUNC -2).
Moreover, current events demonstrate that the UFP has not been forgotten: in the
aftermath of the Chinese and Russian veto on a resolution condemning the actions of
the Syrian government against its own population in February 2012, some Arab and
Western diplomats entertained the idea of resorting to the UFP mechanism. However,
since there were strong concerns of alienating China and Russia, and since the P3 did
not want to strengthen a mechanism that might eventually turn against them, the idea
was quickly dismissed. This episode indicates that promoting the UFP is not a matter
of simplifying or clarifying its procedures, but instead, it is primarily due to political
reservations that it is not applied more often.478 As Swart points out in a general
observation regarding the UFP, “[r]esorting to a vote in the General Assembly on such
highly politicized issues would likely risk the alienation, and possibly the
disengagement, of certain Member States.”479
For obvious reasons, both of these proposals face strong opposition from the P5 and a
number of other Member States (OPP -1). A reform of article 12 does not leave much
room for negotiation. The P3’s rejection of considering the UFP even in a situation in
477 Zaum, The Security Council, the General Assembly, and War, p. 173.
478 Kosovo is another example. See Krasno and Das, The Uniting for Consensus Resolution and Other
Ways of Circumventing the Council, pp. 186-187.
479 Swart, Revitalization of the Work of the General Assembly, p. 24.
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which its application would not be detrimental to its interests indicates that the same
conclusion can be drawn with regard to a simplification of the UFP mechanism (NEG
-1). Whereas a reform of Article 12 would, of course, require an amendment of the
Charter, the UFP is entirely in the hand of the GA (REQ -1/REQ 0). Also, the former
proposal does not carry any momentum in the membership, whereas the latter is on
the agenda of NAM (SUP 0/SUP +1).
Finally, there are those who believe that the GA should entirely take over the role of
the SC by acquiring both its ability to adopt legally binding resolutions as well as its
full responsibility for global peace and security. In 2011, the Venezuelan
representative stated that “[w]e believe that General Assembly resolutions should be
binding, that every country should be obliged to comply with them and that this organ
should exercise full responsibility in matters of international peace and security.”480 If
put into practice this proposal would make the SC obsolete and radically diminish the
decisiveness of the UN’s decision-making on issues of global peace and security.
The very existence of the SC is based on the realization that a body as big as the GA,
with its almost 200 members, is too unwieldy to respond to crisis situations with the
required speed and decisiveness. At the time of the foundation of the UN, when the
prospective Assembly was to be not even a third of today’s size, there was a general
consensus among the founders that a smaller body was needed to function as the
executive in situations of conflict. There is no reason to assume that this judgement
would be any more wrong today than it was back then. Moreover, as this proposal
would in all likelihood frequently lead to situations in which the GA adopts
480 United Nations General Assembly, “Report of the General Assembly”, UN Doc No. A/66/PV.50,
2011.
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resolutions that lack the support of any of its most powerful members, the UN’s
ability to enforce its resolutions would decrease significantly, thus lessening its
authority and threatening to eventually bring about its irrelevance to the governance
of global peace and security (FUNC -2). The proposal to grant the GA the right to
adopt legally binding resolutions would require a fundamental overhaul of the
Charter, and only a very small minority of the membership actively pursues this goal
(REQ -1/SUP 0). The P5 and many others are adamantly opposed to any such






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
GA right to require
review of decisions 0 -2 (-3)
481 -2 -1 0 -1 -1 -3
Ch.VII Consultation
Committee 0 -2 +3 +1 -1 0 -1 -1 -3
Commission
decision-making 0 -2 0 -2 -1 -1 -1 -1 -4
Reform of Charter
article 12 0 -2 0 -2 -1 0 -1 -1 -3
Simplify UFP
procedure 0 -2 0 -2 0 +1 -1 -1 -1
Legally binding GA
resolutions 0 -2 0 -2 -1 0 -1 -1 -3
Conclusion
Too often the relationship between the SC and the GA is conceptualized in an
antagonistic framework in which the activities of one body necessarily infringe upon
those of the other. Following the example set by most of the UN membership, the
relevant literature focuses largely on the rivalry between the two institutions.482
Although the institutional balance needs to be taken into account, and the
membership’s respective sensitivities place significant limits on the possible extent of
481 Only if non-binding.
482 See, e.g., Zaum, The Security Council, the General Assembly, and War; Swart, Revitalization of the
Work of the General Assembly.
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deliberative synergy between the SC and the GA, this should not overshadow the
prospects of cooperation and complementarity between the two institutions. This
chapter demonstrated that there are several promising options for strengthening the
relationship between the Council and the Assembly in order to improve the legitimacy
and effectiveness of the UN’s decision-making within the framework of a deliberative
system. The key to such improvement lies in the widening and deepening of
interinstitutional coordination, in complementary debates within the two bodies, in
creating opportunities for Member States to give their input into SC deliberations and
in reinforcing the SC’s accountability to the GA.
Regarding accountability, there are several steps that can be taken in order to enhance
the annual report of the SC to the GA, but the most important measure would be an
enhancement of the monthly assessments of the Council’s presidencies. Since these
assessments are incorporated into the annual report, they could function as the basis
for its improvement. It is in these assessments in which the respective presidencies
have some degree of freedom to create an analytical narrative of events that is more
revealing to the reader than the mere compilation of facts which characterizes the
annual report.
There is little cause for optimism concerning the proposals that aim for a more
proactive oversight of the Assembly over the Council. Programmatic
recommendations given to the SC by the GA on the basis of the annual report would
be both recommendable and feasible. But it is unlikely that a codification of the
responsibilities of the elected members will be achieved in the near future, and
proposals such as the one for a Permanent Committee of the General Assembly would
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only harm the deliberative synergy between the two institutions. Finally, there is
nothing to gain from placing some of the Council’s decision-making powers in the
hands of the Assembly. One notable exception is Reisman’s idea of a Chapter VII
Consultation Committee which could, in theory, improve the deliberative synergy
between the SC and the GA. In practice, however, such a committee is simply
impossible to establish.
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VII. Relations between the SC and Civil Society
I. Introduction
In a conversation with a top-level representative of the UN Secretariat in New York, I
was asked about my research. In my response I reached the point where I dealt with
the relationship between Non-Governmental Organizations and the Security Council.
The immediate reaction to this was: “But the NGOs are with the General Assembly!”
This is representative of a general attitude obviously still prevalent in even the highest
echelons of the Secretariat. The traditional view expressed in this reaction is based, of
course, on the fact that NGOs obtain their formal accreditation at the UN from the
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Moreover, the majority of NGOs deal with
issues that do not fall into the traditional understanding of matters of international
peace and security, the domain of the SC.
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Since the end of the Cold War, however, the role of the SC in global politics has
undergone a significant transformation. The Council has expanded the interpretation
of its mandate to include affairs that in previous times generally were understood to
fall into the categories of economic or social issues, and today “the Council's
decisions affect nearly all NGO constituencies - including human rights,
humanitarian relief, disarmament, governance, and the concerns of women and
children.”483 The NGO community at the UN has now successfully established
regular consultations with the members of the SC and in some cases it has even
authored Council resolutions.484 In his analysis of NGO interaction with the SC,
Martin Binder comes to the conclusion that “[a]lthough more detailed case studies
will be required in order to trace the influence of NGOs in the Security Council
decision-making process, the impact of SC-NGO interaction on a number of issues is
fairly apparent.“485 This chapter will evaluate those proposals for reform that aim to
increase the influence of Civil Society on the SC, be it via NGOs or via specially
selected representatives.
II. Evaluation
SC-CS Relations – SC Initiatives
One of the primary demands of the NGO community at the UN is to gain more access
to the UN premises in New York. Strictly speaking this suggestion does not aim at a
reform but at a restoration of lost privileges. At the turn of the century, the UN
Secretariat started to become more restrictive towards NGO representatives and
decided to close down their access to the second floor of the Conference Building.
483 http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/ngo-working-group-on-the-security-council.html
484 See chapter ‘The United Nations as a Deliberative System in Practice’.
485 Martin Binder, “The Politicization of International Security Institutions: The UN Security Council
and NGOs”, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Discussion Paper SP IV 2008-305,
2008, p. 16.
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Since the delegates’ lounge as well as the entrances to both the SC and ECOSOC are
located on this floor, this came as a major blow to the lobbying efforts of the NGO
community.486 As Cora Weiss from Hague Appeal for Peace relates, the UN has since
progressively tightened its security measures making it “very hard to move around the
UN these days compared to 10 years ago.”487
Giving the NGO representatives more access to the UN premises would certainly
create more opportunities for interaction with members of the SC. It is these informal
interactions on a personal level, taking place in the lounges and hallways at the UN,
that can provide the NGO representatives with first-hand information on the
developments within the Council. Moreover, physical proximity enables the NGOs to
bring their opinions across in conversation as well as through the targeted
dissemination of information materials. At Turtle Bay, personal networks are
invaluable political assets, and the advocacy NGOs in particular depend on these
opportunities to establish connections with the Member States’ representatives (SYN
+3).
For the Secretariat to increase the access of NGOs at the UN, three interconnected
issues would have to be dealt with. It would need the support of the Member States, it
would have to address security concerns, and it would have to find some way of
managing the ever-growing numbers of NGO representatives. According to the
Secretariat, one of the main reasons for restricting the access for NGOs were its
security concerns. Two distinct factors play a role here: on the one hand, the turn of
the century had seen incidents in which representatives of Member States were
486 James Paul, “Civil Society and the United Nations”, in: Heidi Moksnes and Mia Melin, Global Civil
Society: Shifting Powers in a Shifting World, Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet 2012, p. 69.
487 Interview with Cora Weiss, President, Hague Appeal For Peace, New York, 9 November 2010.
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accosted by NGO affiliates inside the UN premises488 and on the other hand, 9/11
greatly exacerbated the fear of terrorism in most of the world, but nowhere more so
than in New York City. Considering that the current Chief of Security himself took
part in rescuing victims of the attacks on the Twin Towers, one can deduce what
impact this event has had on the perceptions of those who are responsible for security
at the UN. From my own experience, I know that there is no security briefing at the
UN headquarters in which the fact that it has been declared a target by Al-Qaeda is
not mentioned at least once. If NGO access is to be improved, the security concerns of
the Secretariat will have to be addressed. It will not suffice to try to convince them
that NGOs are peaceful.
An interconnected reason for restricting the physical access of NGO representatives
was that the constant growth in numbers of accredited NGOs had left many officials
with the impression that the UN was ‘flooded’ with them.489 It is in the interests of the
NGOs themselves that the delegates of the Member States feel comfortable on the UN
premises and therefore remain ready for conversation instead of being overwhelmed
by those who seek their attention. Hence, if NGOs are to have meaningful interaction
with the delegations, it will be necessary to manage the access of the more than 3500
accredited NGOs in a way that balances their physical access with the need for
maintaining an environment that is conducive to deliberation (REQ 0).
Much of the UN membership is currently opposed to the idea of increasing NGO
access. In the past, the US played an important role in promoting more restrictive
488 Chadwick Alger, “The Emerging Roles of NGOs in the UN System: From Article 71 to a People’s
Millennium Assembly”, Global Governance, 8 (1), 2002, p. 98.
489 Paul, Civil Society and the United Nations, p. 69.
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policies,490 and together with those states that take a dismissive stance towards NGOs
in principle, they form a sizable opposition to any such proposal (OPP -1). On the
other hand, even those Member States that are the most sympathetic to the cause of
the NGOs cannot disregard the concerns regarding local security and the growing
number of representatives (SUP 0). Considering the wide variety of possible
improvements of access to the UN premises, there is some space for negotiation and
progress in this matter and although it is unlikely, it is not impossible. The key
challenge for the NGOs is to formulate suggestions that address the concerns of the
membership and of the Secretariat which could then be used by sympathetic Member
States to make a more compelling case to the rest of the membership for increasing
NGO access (NEG +1).
The Arria-Formula meetings are the only format that allows NGOs to participate
directly in the consultations of the members of the SC. As discussed elsewhere, the
prospects for a more frequent recourse to this format are promising.491 However,
much of its present popularity rests on its new found utility for holding consultations
with non-Council members or international organizations, rather than with NGOs.
Many regard consultations with the latter more negatively and either refuse to
participate in these meetings or do so half-heartedly (OPP -1). Thus, some NGOs
have lost faith in the utility of these meetings: according to one NGO representative,
“the Arria-Formula meetings have become completely useless and inconsequential
and have become a tool for them to say they have taken care of the NGOs.”492
490 Paul, Civil Society and the United Nations, p. 69.
491 See chapter ‘Security Council Working Methods.’
492 Interview with Paul Mikov, UN Representative, World Vision, New York, 9 November 2010.
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The convention of seminars that bring together Council members with NGO
representatives could be an alternative to the Arria-Formula meetings. In 2004, the
Cardoso Report, which had been initiated by then Secretary-General Kofi Annan with
the objective of generating new ideas for civil society engagement with the UN,
suggested the installation of “experimental series of Security Council seminars to
discuss issues of emerging importance to the Council. Serviced by the Secretariat,
these would include presentations by civil society and other constituencies as well as
United Nations specialists, such as special rapporteurs.”493 Although such SC
seminars have so far not been installed as regular practice, the idea is not dead. In
fact, some Council members have held individual seminars with NGO representatives
during their presidencies. In 2011, the French representative advertised the idea in the
Council: “during its presidency in May, France organized a debate on the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (see S/PV.6539) that brought together the main
stakeholders as well as other Congolese officials. The meeting was preceded by a
seminar with non-governmental organizations that made it possible to consolidate
consensus on a complex issue. We believe that such an exercise, including broad
agreement, could be useful and productive.”494
Establishing the practice of holding regular SC seminars with NGO representatives
would definitely improve the deliberative synergy between the Council and the NGO
community at the UN. If these seminars are held well before the respective debate in
the Council itself, they offer the NGO representatives the opportunity to participate in
shaping the very premises of the Council’s deliberations (SYN +3). For the Council
493 United Nations General Assembly, “We the peoples: civil society, the United Nations and
global governance”, UN Doc No. A/85/817, 2004, chapter V.
494 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6672, 2011.
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members themselves, these seminars can also serve as very informal opportunities for
initial and tentative debates and hence as indicators for the positions that are likely to
arise in the SC. Moreover, such informal debates on more equal terms between the
representatives of Council members and those of NGOs may promote their mutual
respect (MOM +1).
Such seminars do, of course, require considerable organizational capacity. Much
depends on the Council presidency’s ability to time the seminar adequately, to
convince the other members of the utility of the seminar, to select a group of
participants who will be perceived as legitimate stakeholders and who can provide
insights helpful to the SC’s particular task, and, if necessary, to fly in stakeholders
from the region in question. Obviously the Member State holding the presidency will
need to have a particularly high interest in the issue in order to make the additional
effort of convening such a seminar, as was the case with France regarding the
situation in the DRC (REQ 0). The opposition to this proposal is, as with the
involvement of NGOs in the work of the SC in general, strong (OPP -1). However, in
this case the advantage is that, firstly, the idea is proactively supported by some
permanent members and secondly, convening such informal seminars does not require
the approval of the entire Council, which leaves the supporters in a good bargaining
position (SUP +1/NEG +1). For these reasons, these seminars may very well become
more frequent and establish themselves as regular Council practice.
A related proposal is that of holding SC retreats with NGO representatives. In the
2009 workshop for incoming Council members, one representative suggested “some
Arria-formula meetings in the format of a retreat to permit a more in-depth
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discussion.”495 This idea is based on the existing SC practice of going on retreats at
least twice a year. Both the workshop for newly elected and present SC members as
well as the annual Security Council Retreat with the Secretary-General bring together
the PREPs in an informal environment in order to discuss general issues regarding the
function and work of the Council.496
Such retreats would have the same advantages as do the above mentioned SC
seminars with NGO representatives. In fact, given the extended amount of time
available for deliberation, these retreats could possibly have an even greater effect on
the deliberative synergy and respect between the Council and the NGO community at
the UN (MOM +1/SYN +3). In terms of feasibility, however, the proposal for retreats
faces more challenging obstacles. Because retreats are more time consuming and also
require additional resources, there is slightly less support. Unlike the seminars, none
of the P5 have shown any proactive interest in SC retreats with NGO representatives
(REQ 0/SUP 0). When the proposal was put forward in the SC workshop, others were
quick to respond that “time is scarce”497 and that such retreats were impractical.
Although it takes place only once a year, the Security Council Retreat with the
Secretary-General itself has received its fair share of criticism from the membership
(OPP -1).
But even if there were agreement on the utility of retreats with NGOs, the tight
schedule of the SC would only allow for a very limited number of these events
495 United Nations Security Council, “Workshop for Newly Elected and Present Security Council
Members”, UN Doc No. S/2009/193, 2009, session II.
496 What’s in Blue: Insights on the Work of the Security Council, “Security Council Retreat with the
Secretary-General”, 3 April 2012, http://whatsinblue.org/2012/04/security-council-retreat-with-the-
secretary-general.php
497 United Nations Security Council, “Workshop for Newly Elected and Present Security Council
Members”, UN Doc No. S/2009/193, 2009, session II.
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throughout the year. In contrast to the SC seminars, SC retreats have so far been a
much more consensual endeavor, based on the participation of all the Council
members, which means that the bargaining position of the supporters of this proposal
is comparatively weaker (NEG 0).
Another potential way of increasing NGO input is for the Council members to include
civil society representatives in their delegations. Some Member States frequently
apply this practice in the GA, but it is basically nonexistent in the SC. According to
James Sutterlin, all of the Member States should adopt the inclusion of NGO
representatives as a common practice.498 As Sutterlin writes, this practice would open
“a channel for civil society input and also spread a better understanding of the United
Nations in the home country.”499 It would, furthermore, provide the NGO
representatives with direct insight into the Council’s deliberations and thereby greatly
increase their understanding of its dynamics (SYN +3).
There is, however, a danger that the inclusion of NGO representatives in the
delegations of Member States might negatively affect their independence, both
perceived and actual. Other delegations could begin to closely associate NGOs with
particular Member States, viewing them as their extensions, rather than as actors in
their own right, and the NGOs could in fact become overly dependent on the hosting
state’s continued support and be more influenced by the regular members of the
delegation than vice versa. Clearly, this would inhibit the NGOs from fulfilling their
function of giving input that is perceived as promoting the common good (FUNC -2).
498 Sutterlin, James, “Some Thoughts - Mostly Cautionary - on the Recommendations of the High-level
Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change”, in: Reforming the United Nations for Peace and Security,
New Haven: The Yale Center for the Study of Globalization 2005, p. 178.
499 Sutterlin, Some Thoughts, p. 178.
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Especially international NGOs have, therefore, to tread carefully when considering an
invitation to join the delegation of a Member State. Although it is up to the discretion
of the individual Member States to take outsiders on board, and those that regularly
apply this practice in the GA might very well begin to do the same more often in the
SC as well, the problem could arise that the unilateral inclusion of NGO
representatives in the deliberations of the SC will induce the other Council members
to outsource the more sensitive discussions, and possibly the actual decision-making
as such, to other venues. For this reason, such a practice would need to be acceptable
to all of the key actors in the respective debate. The procedures for the accreditation
of delegates, furthermore, are much stricter for the SC than they are for the GA, and
certain conventions on confidentiality would have to be taken into consideration500
(REQ 0/SUP +1/OPP -1/NEG +1).
The field missions of the SC, which have the objective of giving the Council members
on-the-ground perspectives of the situations on its agenda, are another opportunity for
interaction with civil society. In 2004, the Cardoso panel recommended “[e]nsuring
that Security Council field missions meet regularly with appropriate local civil society
leaders, international humanitarian NGOs and perhaps others, such as business
leaders. United Nations Headquarters and field staff should facilitate the
meetings.”501 In 2010, the SC explicitly addressed this recommendation in Note of the
President 507, which “encourage[s] Security Council missions to continue to avoid
restricting their meetings to those with governmental interlocutors and interlocutors
500 Interview at the United Nations Secretariat, Department of Political Affairs, New York, 7 June
2012.
501 United Nations General Assembly, “We the peoples: civil society, the United Nations and
global governance”, UN Doc No. A/85/817, 2004, chapter V.
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of conflict parties and to hold, as appropriate, meetings with local civil society
leaders, non-governmental organizations and other interested parties.”502
Today, such meetings have indeed become part of the standard repertoire of Council
missions. Yet, since the organization of the itinerary of the field missions is in the
hands of the lead country on the country-specific situation in question, the degree of
direct engagement with civil society depends on that country’s attitude. It has become
standard to have at least one meeting with civil society representatives. One
particularly interesting example is, when during a Council mission to Sierra Leone in
May 2012, the UK organized a meeting with Civil Society representatives which
afterwards developed into an impromptu question and answer session between some
of the Council members and local women’s groups held under the shade of a mango
tree.503
Even in those cases in which these missions provide only very limited time for
consultations, they still offer various opportunities for civil society actors to get their
message across. When during a four-day mission to Haiti in February 2012, the
Council members visited the base of the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
(MINUSTAH), e.g., they encountered groups of demonstrators chanting anti-
MINUSTAH slogans.504 This may very well have contributed to the fact that the SC
members returned to New York with a reinforced sense of urgency regarding the need
502 United Nations Security Council, “Note by the President of the Security Council”, UN Doc No.
S/2010/507, 2010.
503 What’s in Blue: Insights on the Work of the Security Council, “Council Visiting Mission to Africa:
Sierra Leone”, 24 May 2012, http://whatsinblue.org/2012/05/council-visiting-mission-to-africa-sierra-
leone.php
504 What’s in Blue: Insights on the Work of the Security Council, “Dispatches From Haiti Council
Visit”, 15 February 2012, http://whatsinblue.org/2012/02/wib-dispatches-council-mission-to-haiti-14-
february.php
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to limit the military component in the reconstruction of Haiti. In a briefing on the
mission, the PREP of the US, Susan Rice, who had led the mission, reported that
many Haitians “shared a desire to see the mission eventually leave, with strengthened
Haitian institutions taking on its responsibilities.”505
In 2012, the South African representative concluded that “[g]iven the usefulness of
such visits, including mini-missions, the Council may wish to consider increased field
visits.”506 As the Haitian case demonstrates, it is not only the additional time spent
with members of civil society, but the very nature of these missions itself that
promotes the deliberative synergy between them and the SC (SYN +3). On the other
hand, these missions, which usually include most of the PREPs, are very time
consuming and therefore put additional strain on the Council’s agenda. Although
lower-level representatives can take the posts of the PREPs in the Council chambers
and, in exceptional cases, the Council can set up an official meeting outside of New
York, the decision-making capabilities of the SC are somewhat limited during these
missions.507 Additional Council missions would therefore risk obstructing the
effective work of the SC (FUNC -2).
These missions also require a fair amount of additional resources and, considering the
security of the delegation, can only be conducted if the situation on the ground is
relatively stable (REQ 0). There is much support for promoting Council missions as a
means “for members of the Council to better understand the reality and to speak
505 United Nations Security Council, “Briefing by Security Council mission to Haiti”, UN Doc No.
S/PV.6724, 2012.
506 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6870, 2012.
507 What’s in Blue: Insights on the Work of the Security Council, “Consultations on Visiting Mission to
West Africa”, 17 May 2012, http://whatsinblue.org/2012/05/consultations-on-visiting-mission-to-west-
africa.php
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directly with local stakeholders,” as the French representative put it in 2011508 (SUP
+1). The strength of the opposition very much depends upon the individual mission
proposed, rather than on the practice as such (OPP 0). There is, therefore, much room
for negotiation, and the question whether there will be more Council missions and
whether these will dedicate more time to consultations with civil society
representatives will largely depend upon the nature of the situations on the agenda of






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Increase physical
access for NGOs 0 0 +3 +3 0 0 -1 +1 0
More Arria-Formula
meetings 0 0 +3 +3 +1 +1 -1 0 +1
SC seminars with
NGO reps +1 0 +3 +4 0 +1 -1 +1 +1
SC retreats with
NGO reps +1 0 +3 +4 0 0 -1 0 -1
NGO reps in SC
delegations 0 -2 +3 +1 0 +1 -1 +1 +1
SC Missions 0 -2 +3 +1 0 +1 0 +1 +2
SC-CS Relations – CS Initiatives
Rather than relying solely on the Council’s ability for innovation, the NGO
community at the UN promotes its own initiatives for institutionalizing its
relationship with the SC. One of these is the NGO Working Group on the Security
Council (NWG). Since the academic literature has, so far, mentioned the Working
Group only in passing, the evaluation of this innovation warrants some detail.
508 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6672, 2011.
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Founded in the mid-1990s, the NWG currently has 34 member organizations,
including humanitarian, human rights, disarmament and faith-based NGOs.509 The
members of the group are all large and well-known international NGOs who maintain
an office in New York and whose agenda significantly overlaps with that of the SC.
Membership is granted upon successful application and the payment of the
membership fees.510 Each NGO has a representative in the NWG, and while they are
allowed to send other people to the meetings as well, only the designated
representative is allowed to actively participate. Usually the NWG invites the
permanent representatives of current SC members; but there are also frequent
meetings with incoming and recent members, specialized mission staff, UN officials
such as the PGA or the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and occasionally even
Foreign Ministers. The number of attendees various greatly: the Council members
often bring a team of experts, and many of the NGO representatives are selective not
only according to their own schedule but also based on the nature of the meeting. If
the invitee is a representative of the P5, e.g., attendance will usually be higher than if
one of the smaller elected Council members is invited.511 Currently, these meetings
take place about four times per month.512
The meetings normally are held either in the Church Center of the United Nations,
located directly across from the UN Headquarters, or in the Member States’
permanent missions. They are always off the record, scheduled to last about 90
minutes, and the standard format is to begin with an opening statement by the invitee
509 Although WILPF currently has no designated representative on the WG, it is still part of the group.
510 Interview with Joseph Donnelly, International Delegate to the UN, Caritas Internationalis, New
York, 5 November 2010.




followed by a question-and-answer session. Since time is limited, the individual NGO
representatives are asked to confine themselves to one question each. The invitee or
one of the experts on his team – or sometimes both – will directly respond before the
next NWG member asks a question. Most of the coordination between the NWG
members is ad-hoc: among the humanitarian NGOs, e.g., “there is a tacit agreement
that someone will ask about this, then another about that, so that all the crises on the
SC agenda are covered.”513 The rules of procedures require the NGO representatives
to ask questions rather than make statements. As one representative put it: “if they
make a statement and don’t ask a question, the chair will go after them after the
meeting.”514
The NWG meetings promote the deliberative synergy between the SC and NGO
community at the UN in multiple ways. First of all, the meetings bring the NGO
representatives face to face with members of the SC. This simple fact alone is
invaluable for many of the NWG members who otherwise cannot easily establish
personal contact with these people. Even for a representative of such a prominent
NGO as Médicines Sans Frontières (MSF), Fabien Dubuet, “sometimes it can be the
first time to meet an ambassador and get to know him.”515 The NWG makes it
possible for the SC members to maintain contact with a relatively large group of
NGOs without investing excessive amounts of time. For them the NWG is
convenient, and those NGOs whom the ambassadors otherwise do not have the time
to meet profit from this. One call can bring a state representative in touch with an
entire network of NGOs: when, e.g., the Austrian Foreign Minister, Michael
513 Michelle Brown, Refugees International.
514 Interview with Fabien Dubuet, UN Representative, Médicines Sans Frontièrs, New York, 15
October 2010.
515 Fabien Dubuet, Médicines Sans Frontièrs.
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Spindelegger, came to New York in May of 2010, he had only to contact the NWG
and immediately a meeting was set up.516 As one of the NWG members put it: “in the
UN today there is greater appetite for engaging NGO networks; not 5000 NGOs, but
the existing networks.”517
The most basic objective of the NWG is the exchange of information and, as some of
the NGO representatives would say, mutual education. According to James Paul from
Global Policy Forum (GPF), “NGOs knew nothing about the Security Council”518
when they first started the Working Group. The NWG was the first venue in which
NGOs could get first-hand information about the SC and the issues on its agenda. It
helps the NGOs to understand the dynamics and positions in the SC and since the
meetings are off the record, ambassadors often give information they would not
provide publicly.519 In the words of Joseph Donnelly, representative of Caritas
Internationalis, it is “like taking your SC Council class once or twice a month because
there’s always an update on something that you didn’t know.”520
On the other hand, SC members often profit from the information NGOs provide. In
the view of Weiss, the SC members “really depend on us because we are the hands
and hearts and heads on the ground and we know what’s going on in the field, and
many of them don’t have the capacity and the people to find out what’s going on out
there.”521 One of the early supporters of the NWG, Ambassador Juan Somavía of
Chile, confirms that in many cases NGOs have crucial information of the facts on the
516 Interview with James Paul, Executive Director, Global Policy Forum, New York, 13 October 2010.
517 Joseph Donnelly, Caritas Internationalis.
518 James Paul, Global Policy Forum.
519 Joseph Donnelly, Caritas Internationalis.
520 Joseph Donnelly, Caritas Internationalis.
521 Cora Weiss, Hague Appeal for Peace.
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ground “much of which never gets on the table of the Security Council.”522 In this
regard, the NWG provides a convenient access point for SC members to tap the pool
of information provided by an entire network of NGOs. Donnelly explains that often
“they realize we know more and they are open to that, but they won’t come knocking
on NGOs doors. The Working Group provides the more formal appropriate agenda to
say: we’re interested.”523
Consequently, for many of the NWG members the meetings are not only about what
the invitees can tell them concerning the dynamics in the Council, but also about
telling the SC members “what they need to know.”524 This exchange of information
often leads to a process of confidence building between NGOs and Member States,
and therefore the NWG meetings are a unique opportunity for delegations that are
“not accustomed to dealing with NGOs.”525 In this way, these encounters promote
mutual respect between the SC members and the NGO representatives, and the more
meetings there are, the more confidence will be built (MOM +1).
The issue of ‘mutual education’ leads to the question of in how far NGOs should use
the NWG meetings for attempts to influence the policies of the SC members. The
views on this differ within the NWG itself: there is about a half-half split in the
membership between operational NGOs on the one hand and advocacy and think tank
type NGOs on the other. Just like MSF, many of the former “do not view it as a group
that is trying to influence the SC”.526 For these organizations, attempts at influencing
522 Juan Somavía, The Humanitarian Responsibilities of the United Nations Security Council: Ensuring
the Security of the People, New York: Global Policy Forum 1996.
523 Joseph Donnelly, Caritas Internationalis.
524 Joseph Donnelly, Caritas Internationalis.
525 Interview with Andrew Tomlinson, Head, Quaker UN Office, New York, 10 November 2010.
526 Fabien Dubuet, Médicines Sans Frontièrs.
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SC members are limited to very technical issues necessary to keep their operations on
the ground running smoothly: these issues can be very simple, such as visa problems,
or more serious, such as kidnappings of their members. In the perspective of these
NGOs, the NWG is not an advocacy forum as this “was not the way it was
conceived.”527
Many of the other NGOs would starkly disagree with this and argue that since its
inception one of the purposes of the NWG has been to provide them with “an
opportunity for advocacy and pressure”528, as Paul puts it. Very often the main
objective is to bring issues which have not been given adequate attention to the
delegations and urge that these be placed on the SCs agenda. But the NWG members
also attempt to influence the policies on existing agenda items by presenting credible
and well-targeted evidence from the field together with high-quality analyses of the
problems at hand.529 Donnelly reports that he found “repeatedly really timely
synergies where you can see by the look on their faces that they think: that’s
something I didn’t know.”530
What most of the NGOs appreciate much more than the opportunity to influence the
SC members within these meetings is the NWG’s ability “to empower and inform
members to better influence the Council themselves.”531 The meetings “can serve as
entry points, and in bilateral discussions it is more likely to change opinions.”532
Often there is important follow-up after the meetings and informal contacts are
527 Fabien Dubuet, Médicines Sans Frontièrs.
528 James Paul, A Short History of the NGO Working Group, New York: Global Policy Forum 2010.
529 Paul, A short history of the NGO Working Group.
530 Joseph Donnelly, Caritas Internationalis.
531 Interview with Scott Paul, Fellow, Campaign For Innocent Victims in Conflict, email
correspondence of 2 November 2010.
532 Andrew Tomlinson, Quaker UN Office.
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established.533 The NWG has been successful at securing NGOs a place in the
Council’s environment by making both sides familiar with each other. Donnelly
recounts that “I have been frequently stopped on the street by either the permanent
representative or one of the staff experts to say: Mr. Donnelly, in the meeting the
other day you said…”534 The NWG creates an informal dynamic of interaction
between NGO representatives and SC delegations that goes beyond the meetings
themselves. As Paul Mikov from World Vision explains, it is “outside of those
meetings where the more dogged kind of work of advocacy takes place where there is
significant room for influence, depending on the issue and the Member State in
question, and this space has grown over the years.”535
Furthermore, since the meetings help the NWG members to better understand the
dynamics within the Council, e.g. which Member State supports which position, what
they would vote for independently and what their allegiances are, they are supportive
of a “divide and conquer mentality” on the part of the NGOs. “By being in [the NWG]
you hear how they talk to each other and you see the gaps.”536 This knowledge can
then be used to refine advocacy strategies and choose targets more precisely. An
increase of the frequency of these meetings would, consequently, further strengthen
the deliberative synergy in the UN system (SYN +3).
Moreover, the meetings of the NWG often facilitate consensus among its members.
Even though the NWG members do not coordinate the meetings amongst themselves
beforehand, the group does serve its members as a network for “cross-fertilization
533 Interview at the Office of a NGO involved with the Security Council, New York, 12 November
2010.
534 Joseph Donnelly, Caritas Internationalis.
535 Paul Mikov, World Vision.
536 Joseph Donnelly, Caritas Internationalis.
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and mutual reinforcement.”537 In the meetings, NGOs sometimes hear information
from other NGOs they had not heard before, and often the shared concerns and
perspectives voiced by various members may support the individual representatives in
the pursuit of organizational objectives. “How often do NGOs sit down one on one
and talk with their colleagues?”, Donnelly asks. “It doesn’t happen a great deal
because we’re so busy. So if you work on a specific issue, like Somalia, but we never
had a discussion on this issue and you sit in the meeting and the ambassador says
something about it and suddenly five hands go up, it’s great because you can see
some sort of coalition building right there. This has been very useful. It helps us to
learn from each other”538 (MOM +1).
Would it be feasible to increase the quantity and duration of the NWG meetings as to
further deepen the relationship between its members and the SC? In terms of the
requirements, the fact that the meetings are organized by the NGOs themselves is both
a curse and a blessing. The positive side of this is that they have the control over the
entire process and are able to push the agenda on their own initiative. The negative
side is that they themselves have to pay the bills. This is a considerable challenge for
the NGOs at the UN and it could prove to be the stumbling block for the NWG.
When, e.g., the MacArthur Foundation cut its funding of GPF – the NGO that is the
organizing force behind the NWG – the frequency of the meetings temporarily
decreased to about two per month because of a lack of staff and resources.539 Another
obstacle is the increasingly tight schedule of the SC, which makes it “tremendously
difficult to pin down the ambassadors and get a meeting”540 (REQ 0).
537 Paul Mikov, World Vision.
538 Joseph Donnelly, Caritas Internationalis.
539 James Paul, Global Policy Forum.
540 James Paul, Global Policy Forum.
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There is strong support for the NWG in the UN membership: In general, Austria,
Chile, and Italy have been highly involved with the group. The only SC members that
did not meet with the NWG in 2011 were China, Gabon, and Nigeria. On the other
hand, France, Germany, Portugal, South Africa, and the UK convened with the group
on a regular basis. Somewhat surprisingly, the Council member that met with the
NWG most often is India. When India was elected to the Council, many of the NGOs
were particularly keen on confronting it with the humanitarian consequences of its
policies regarding the Kashmir conflict.541 It seems that, contrary to the expectations
held at the UN, this has not harmed India’s willingness to cooperate with the NWG.
Throughout the year, the US usually holds at least some meetings with the group,
whereas the Russian Federation gets slightly less involved. The only permanent
member that is strictly opposed to the NWG is China. Its last meeting with the group
dates back to 2006. In general, however, it appears that there is much willingness on
the side of the UN membership to engage with the NWG (SUP +1/OPP -1). Hence,
the possibility of increasing the frequency of the meetings seems to depend primarily
on the organizational capacity of the NWG in terms of both acquiring the necessary
resources as well as identifying the gaps in the personal agendas of the PREPs (NEG
+1).
Another innovation from outside the UN is the NGO Security Council Report (SCR).
Founded in 2005, this organization represents a common endeavor of academics and a
number of governments interested in increasing the transparency of the SC. Its
mission statement is “the belief that consistent, balanced, high-quality information
about the activities of the United Nations Security Council and its subordinate bodies
541 This point was raised in several of the interviews with NGO representatives.
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is essential to the effective performance of the Council and that this information
should also be available to a wider group of stakeholders and the general public.”542
To this end, SCR publishes monthly reports on the work of the SC, a regular feed on
daily developments called ‘What’s in blue’, as well as special reports on outstanding
issues. In the 2008 debate on SC working methods, the representative of Australia
described the work of SCR as “external auditing.”543 SCR’s main donors are the
governments of Canada and Norway, as well as the Hewlett and MacArthur
Foundations. A further 14 governments also financially support SCR, only two of
which are not from the Western European and Others Group: Kuwait and Singapore.
SCR has not reached out to the P5 for funding as to not become financially dependent
upon those it is meant to audit. Columbia University provides SCR with office space
and staff.
Obviously, the term non-governmental organizations is particularly misleading in the
case of SCR and, given its background, it comes as no surprise that it works in a very
diplomatic and uncritical fashion. This, however, does not inhibit it from fulfilling its
function of increasing the transparency of the SC. Indeed, since SCR receives funding
from a particular set of governments, it is essential that it strive for neutrality and
objectivity in its reporting lest it be perceived as a tool of particular interests. The
diplomatic sensitivity of its staff has enabled the success and popularity of the
organization and guarantees its continued access to information.
542 http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.1074741/k.84B6/MISSION_AND_P
URPOSE_IN_FULL.htm
543 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.5968, 2008.
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Naturally, its relations are closest with some of the elected members: in 2012 these
were, in particular, Azerbaijan, Germany, Guatemala, Portugal and Togo. But the
organization also has good access to the P5, including China and Russia, although the
quantity and quality of the information varies from case to case. Firstly, much
depends on the personal relationships with individual staff members. Secondly, if the
Member States have strong interests at stake, they are more reluctant to pass on
insightful information. Thirdly, the P5 often value unanimity higher than transparency
and therefore prefer to coordinate their positions amongst themselves before they give
out information. For SCR’s staff this means that they have to attempt to tap as many
sources of information as possible in order to puzzle together an accurate picture of
the situation in question.
SCR has been beneficial to both Member States and the general public. Especially
smaller Member States that do not have the capacity to observe the daily
developments in the Council profit from the SCR’s reports, and indeed in many cases,
the latter will – given its connections – have better access to information. In 2011, the
representative of Costa Rica stated: “I should add that from the non-governmental
point of view, the Security Council Report website has contributed fundamentally to
well-informed, systematic and rigorous monitoring of the activities of the Council.”544
The general public is allotted the availability of an unprecedented wealth of
information on the work of the SC and, as a matter of fact, this research has itself
greatly profited from this source. It is, therefore, reasonable to expect that an
expansion of SCR activities would further increase the transparency of the Council
(SYN +3).
544 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6672 (Resumption 1), 2011.
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In the last years, SCR has increased its staff so as to enable real-time coverage of the
Council’s activities. It is currently receiving additional funding for an expansion of its
activities with regard to the incoming SC members. The objective is to formalize and
deepen its relationships with these states in order to support them in capacity building
for their term on the Council. Fostering good relationships with incoming Council
members at a very early stage does not only enable these states to better pursue their
goals and increase the effectiveness of the SC, but it also has the added benefit for
SCR of already having established close contacts to these delegates once they assume
their mandates. When, e.g., Guatemala took its seat on the Council in 2012, it
received much assistance from SCR. Later on the organization profited from the
willingness of Guatemala’s delegates to pass on insightful information.
Not all states take up this offer of cooperation. SCR has, e.g., reached out to all those
states aspiring for the Asian seat for 2013, i.e., Bhutan, Cambodia and South Korea,
but only the latter took up the offer of assistance.545 Saudi-Arabia, on the other hand,
is now already engaged in capacity building for its expected Council membership in
2014. To this end, Saudi-Arabian diplomats are enrolled in courses at Columbia
University in which SCR takes part as well. Often the organization even sends its staff
on missions to the capitals of the states it is advising, as was most recently the case
with Rwanda. The competitive advantage SCR has over the ‘Annual Workshop for
Newly-Elected Members’ organized by the permanent mission of Finland is that it
provides these states with more comprehensive and targeted information and training
than they can acquire in bulk on one weekend. The efforts by Finland and those
545 South Korea won the election.
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planned by SCR, nevertheless, also have the potential to complement each other and
together to increase the effectiveness of the Council (FUNC +2).
Since SCR enjoys the strong support of a number of affluent governments and large
foundations, it does not struggle with budgetary problems (SUP +1). Presumably, the
most challenging aspect of extending its ‘auditing’ activities would be that the more
information SCR acquires on the developments behind the scene and the more
detailed its reporting becomes, the more diplomatic skill will be required in avoiding a
clash with those Member States that have a more reserved attitude towards the need
for transparency in the Council’s work. Those representatives who provide the SCR
with these insights are, furthermore, dependent upon its sensitive handling of this







SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
NGO Working
Group on the SC +2 0 +3 +5 0 +1 -1 +1 +1
Security Council
Report 0 +2 +3 +5 +1 +1 -1 +1 +2
SC-CS Relations – CS Assemblies
There is a long tradition of proposals for a non-governmental assembly to be created
either via a transformation of the GA or in addition to it.546 The more conventional
branch of these proposals calls for the establishment of what John Dryzek et al. term
the ‘popularly elected global assembly’ (PEGA).547 One of the oldest and most
546 Johan Galtung recommends nothing less than four additional assemblies: Johan Galtung,
“Alternative Models for Global Democracy” in Barry Holden (ed.) Global Democracy: Key Debates,
London; New York: Routledge 2000, pp. 143-161.
547 John Dryzek, André Bächtiger and Karolina Milewicz, “Toward a Global Deliberative Citizens’
Assembly”, Global Policy, 2 (1), 2011, pp. 33-42.
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prominent of these proposals is Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn’s World Peace
Through World Law of 1966 in which the authors suggest transforming the GA into a
popularly elected body.548 In 1987, the International Network for a UN Second
Assembly published an appeal to the GA to “to mandate a study on the proposal for a
UN Second Assembly, to be carried out by a UN Expert Group or an Independent
International Commission.“549
The Campaign for a More Democratic United Nations organized three large civil
society conferences in the early 1990s in order to discuss and promote the idea of
establishing such a bicameral system.550 In 1994, Erskine Childers and Brian Urquhart
advocated the creation of an inter-parliamentary assembly within the UN which could
serve as a stepping stone for the establishment of a PEGA.551 More recent variations
of these proposals have been made, inter alia, by the Global Governance Reform
Project (2000), Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss (2001), UBUNTU (2004), and the
Committee for a Democratic U.N. (2010).552
548 Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn, World Peace Through World Law: Two Alternative Plans,
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1966.
549 International Network for a UN Second Assembly, Appeal to the United Nations General Assembly
to consider the proposal for a UN Second Assembly, 1987,
http://www.earthrights.net/archives/gpa/unsa.html
550 Frank Barnaby (ed.), Building a More Democratic United Nations: Proceedings of CAMDUN-1,
London; Portland: Cass 1992.
551 Erskine Childers and Brian Urquhart, Renewing the United Nations System, Uppsala: Dag
Hammersköld Foundation 1994.
552 Joseph Camilleri, Kamal Malhotra and Majid Tehranian, Reimagining the Future: Towards
Democratic Governance. A Report of the Global Governance Reform Project, Melbourne: La Trobe
University 2000; Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss, “Toward Global Parliament”, Foreign Affairs, 80
(1), 2001, pp. 212-220; UBUNTU: World Forum of Civil Society Networks, Proposals to Reform the
System of International Institutions: Future Scenarios, 2004,
http://www.reformwatch.net/fitxers/seminari_eng.pdf; Andreas Bummel, Developing International
Democracy: For a Parliamentary Assembly at the United Nations. A Strategy Paper of the Committee
for a Democratic U.N., Berlin: Committee for a Democratic U.N. 2010,
http://www.kdun.org/resources/2010strategy_en.pdf
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A PEGA would definitely promote the articulation and justification of diverse
standpoints on a highly visible and transparent platform (MOM +1). One important
issue which all of these proposals neglect, however, is the question of how the
proposed assemblies would interact with the SC and what this would entail for the
overall institutional balance in the UN. This problem is reduced, instead, to the
question of whether the PEGA would be able to pass binding laws or whether it
would function solely as an advisory organ to the GA. Either option would entail
problems which these proposals fail to address in a satisfactory fashion. If the PEGA
were endowed with law-making powers, would this mean that it could overrule the
SC? As explained in respect to the proposal of giving such powers to the GA, this
would diminish the authority of the Council and could lead to hazardous situations on
the ground.553
If the PEGA were to be merely an advisory organ, then the problem becomes one of
legitimacy rather than legality. The argument for such an advisory function is that the
PEGA’s recommendations would reflect a democratically more legitimated output
than that of the SC or the GA and would, therefore, put pressure on the latter two to
follow its advice. Although this could probably work in some cases, it is also clear
that situations would arise in which the PEGA says one thing, the GA another, and the
SC does something else. As a result, these competing claims to legitimacy would
damage the legitimacy of the UN as a whole instead of increasing that of its
governance of issues of global peace and security. In other words, a conflict of
legality simply becomes one of legitimacy, which in the present context of global
peace and security can have very similar consequences (FUNC -2).
553 See chapter ‘Relations between Security Council and General Assembly.’
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A further problem concerning the idea of a PEGA is that on a global level, people’s
solidarities towards each other are not yet strong enough to support aggregative
decision-making in cases of controversy. The logic of solving problems of interest by
‘counting heads’ requires that the losing minority not see the resulting decision as a
forceful imposition by the majority. But it is, e.g., highly questionable whether the
citizens of the countries of the geopolitical North would accept the idea that the
citizens of a handful of countries from the geopolitical South could determine their
fate. Joseph Nye criticizes that “treating the world as one global constituency implies
the existence of a political community in which citizens of around 200 states would be
willing to be continually outvoted by more than a billion Chinese and more than a
billion Indians.”554
Without this sense of solidarity and community, the losing minority will perceive the
outcome of the aggregative process as a forceful imposition, i.e., the tyranny of the
majority.555 As Michael Zürn points out, at present, international organizations cannot
rely on existing solidarities but “must contribute to democratization by facilitating the
emergence of transnational political communities and transnational communication
channels, and thus in the medium term improve the institutional scope for direct
democratization.”556 Dryzek et al. rightly warn that a PEGA could split into regional
blocs instead of political parties, which would entail a centrifugal dynamic much like
it exists today, e.g., in the Belgian parliament, thereby deepening the cleavages in the
554 In Heikki Patomäki and Teivo Teivainen, A Possible World: Democratic Transformation of Global
Institutions, London; New York: Zed Books 2004, pp. 148
555 For a discussion of the fundamental conditions for direct democracy in the context of IOs, see, e.g.,
Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, “Is Global Democracy Possible?”, European Journal of International
Relations, 17 (3), 2011, 519-542; Chris Brown, “International Poltical Theory and the Idea of World
Community”, in: Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.), International Relations Theory Today,
Cambridge: Polity 1995, pp. 90-109.
556 Michael Zürn, “Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems”, Government and Opposition, 39 (2),
2004, p. 287.
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global electorate rather than creating the solidarity necessary for a world
community.557
Moreover, there is the problem that “[i]n transnational elections, voters generally
have no idea what is at stake, and there is no government to be formed. This matter is
not one of voter ignorance. It is because the connection between vote and
consequence is extremely tenuous.”558 Dryzek et al. use the elections for the European
Parliament as an example to demonstrate that this results in votes that are based on
expressive preferences rather than being issue-oriented. The electorate tends to use
these elections, e.g., to express its judgment on the performance of national
governments instead of indicating how it expects European issues to be handled.
Votes of protest are more common at the European level than they are in national
elections, strengthening those types of parties that feed off such votes, which are often
racist or xenophobic. In the current state of global politics, a PEGA would, therefore,
be detrimental to deliberative synergy within the UN system instead of promoting it
(SYN -3).
There are, moreover, tremendous obstacles regarding the feasibility of these
proposals. Most of the UN membership is strictly opposed to an assembly that would
effectively compete with their governments’ authority in global politics. As Dryzek et
al. point out, China and the US are particularly hostile to proposals for a PEGA. The
overwhelming majority of the political class of the US believes that there should be
no authority above that of the US constitution, and China, the principled champion of
state sovereignty, has no history of competitive elections on the national level.
557 Dryzek, Bächtiger and Milewicz, Toward a Global Deliberative Citizens’ Assembly, p. 36.
558 Dryzek, Bächtiger and Milewicz, Toward a Global Deliberative Citizens’ Assembly, p. 35.
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In fact, the opposition to a PEGA may well be stronger than even Dryzek et al.
believe it to be. According to them, it is “doubtless some states with good global
citizenship credentials (such as Sweden) would support the idea.”559 Although
Sweden, e.g., does indeed have comparatively good global citizenship credentials, it
does not seem at all certain to assume that its government would willingly subject its
fate to an assembly in which its representative would be outnumbered by a ratio of
something around 1:720. Again, the root of the problem is the lack of a sufficiently
well-developed sense of world community. Should the assembly consist of less than
700 parliamentarians, Sweden could even end up without its own representative – a
problem that would be even more acute for all those states that are significantly
smaller than Sweden. As Dryzek et al. point out, a guarantee of at least one
representative per Member State would, on the other hand, entail a significant degree
of distortion in any reasonably sized assembly. The PEGA might be, moreover, a
particular problem for those states that are committed to proportional representation
as these systems require multi-member constituencies560 (SUP -1/OPP -1/NEG -1).
Finally, there is the problem of arranging the necessary resources for such a major
project. This question as well is routinely neglected by those who propose a PEGA.
One of the icons of the movement for a Parliamentary Assembly, Dieter Heinrich,
argues that “[a] more effective UN would ultimately save governments money. The
cost of the UNPA should be regarded as an investment in wiser global decision-
making that could help solve many global problems before they become expensive
559 Dryzek, Bächtiger and Milewicz, Toward a Global Deliberative Citizens’ Assembly, p. 35.
560 Dryzek, Bächtiger and Milewicz, Toward a Global Deliberative Citizens’ Assembly, p. 36.
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nightmares.”561 There is no conclusive evidence, however, to support the assumption
that the UNPA, or any other PEGA, would necessarily increase the effectiveness of
the UN. As argued above, in the present circumstances, the opposite seems more
likely. It is, moreover, wrong to present the world’s financial needs as a zero-sum
calculation. It is the availability of resources that determines which problems will be
dealt with and not the other way around: the problems of this world are infinite. Some
advocates of these proposals cite the world-wide expenditure on arms and argue that
the cost of a PEGA would be miniscule in comparison.562 Yet, they fail to make a
convincing case for why they think these expenditures would be cut and why the
resultant savings would not be invested in programs that are more popular with
domestic electorates, such as health care, pensions, education, etc., rather than in a
PEGA (REQ -1).
Dryzek et al. suggest an alternative to such elected assemblies: in their view a
‘deliberative global citizens’ assembly’ (DGCA) would avoid many of the problems
the proposals for a PEGA encounter. The idea is to establish an assembly that would
issue recommendations based on extensive deliberation between randomly-selected
citizens. This assembly could be permanent or issue-specific and temporary. It would
number about 1000 members which would result in ballot districts of roughly seven
million people.563 Most of the deliberation would take place in smaller groups in order
to enable face-to-face dialogue before discussion in the plenary.
561 Dieter Heinrich, “A United Nations Parliamentary Assembly”, in: Eric Fawcett and Hanna
Newcombe (eds), United Nations Reform: Looking Ahead after 50 Years, Toronto: Dundurn Press
1995, p. 99.
562 Dieter Heinrich, The Case for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly, Berlin: Committee for a
Democratic U.N. 2010, p. 33.
563 Dryzek et al. talk of one participant for every six million, but the world population is in fact much
closer to 7 billion than it is to 6 billion.
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As with a PEGA, a DGCA would promote the articulation and justification of diverse
standpoints on a highly visible and transparent platform (MOM +1). The DGCA’s
emphasis on deliberation would probably somewhat mitigate the centrifugal force
which a PEGA’s focus on aggregative procedures would conjure. Also, since a
DGCA would not require elections, the problem of the voters’ lack of knowledge
about the issues on the UN’s agenda would become irrelevant. As Dryzek et al.
explain, however, the majority of the randomly selected members of the assembly
would in all likelihood be relatively uneducated and would require some guidance on
the issues at stake. The members of the assembly would be provided with
“information and access to advocates from different sides of an issue and with expert
testimony” and the meetings would be facilitated by experts “in order to increase the
constructiveness of the dialogue, uphold mutual respect and civility, and minimize
(for example) ad hominem arguments, deception, stereotyping, personal attacks and
withholding of information.”564
Obviously, the role of the facilitator in leading the deliberations would necessarily be
crucial, and the high degree of varying and conflicting cultural attitudes of the
participants would further amplify this importance. Not only does this arrangement
carry with it a somewhat patronizing element, but it also brings up the question of
how those who are to present their perspectives to the participants, those who are
available to educate them upon request, and those who guide the deliberations are to
be chosen. All these people will have a decisive influence on the outcome of the
deliberations, and their appointment would in turn require a democratically legitimate
564 Dryzek, Bächtiger and Milewicz, Toward a Global Deliberative Citizens’ Assembly, p. 36.
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selection procedure, which would bring the problem of legitimate decision-making in
global governance full circle.
But more importantly, the method of educating randomly selected participants would
defeat the purpose of the entire exercise which is the promotion of input from public
spheres, be they global or domestic, into the deliberations within the DGCA and the
UN in general. If the assumption is that the participants would have to be educated,
the flow of the transmission between the public sphere and the empowered sphere
would be reversed. According to Habermasian theory, societal problems should be
identified in the lifeworld, discussed in the public sphere, and then settled in
empowered institutions. A DGCA would reverse this process: the problems would be
identified by empowered institutions who then, by choosing certain presenters,
experts, and facilitators, would act as gatekeepers between an isolated empowered
sphere (the DGCA) and the free flow of information in the public spheres. The output
of the DGCA would then guide the deliberations in the public spheres and thereby
form peoples’ perceptions of their lifeworld.
The core of the problem is that the participants would be divested of any
representivity and accountability through either delegation or discourse. As Dryzek et
al. write, the “citizen participants would have no bonds of electoral accountability to
particular constituencies”565 and as they would be presented with various discourses
rather than presenting these themselves, neither would they be accountable in a
discursive sense. The DGCA’s purpose would effectively boil down to the hope that
the cultural variation within the membership would, in sum, produce some degree of
565 Dryzek, Bächtiger and Milewicz, Toward a Global Deliberative Citizens’ Assembly, p. 38.
278
cultural objectivity in judging pre-configured policy options, but even this is no more
than an optimistic assumption (SYN -3).
Just as a PEGA, a DGCA would, moreover, evoke a conflict of legitimacy with the
UN (FUNC -2). Dryzek et al. argue that China and the US would be more likely to
agree to a DGCA than to a PEGA because, unlike the latter’s, the former’s structure
would not resemble any domestic institution, and it would not be necessary to hold
elections. In their view, e.g., the “United States problem is likely to be ameliorated
because an assembly based on random selection from the citizenry does not look like
a direct challenger to the US congress; it is simply a very different kind of beast […]
politicians may simply not know what to make of it.”566 This perspective assumes that
it is the nature of the assembly that determines whether it would be perceived as
competition.
It is, however, much more likely that the determining factor would not be its nature
per se, but the legitimacy it would entail. No matter whether the assembly’s powers
are to be merely communicative or not, it would establish a claim to legitimacy that
competes with the respective intergovernmental decision-making procedures. US
politicians, and others, do not have to understand the beast in order to fear it. For this
reason, it is unlikely that governments would have a more favorable attitude towards a
DGCA than they would have towards a PEGA. The establishment and maintenance of
the former is, furthermore, just as dependent upon the availability of large amounts of
funding as is the latter (REQ -1/SUP -1/OPP -1/NEG -1).
566 Dryzek, Bächtiger and Milewicz, Toward a Global Deliberative Citizens’ Assembly, p. 37.
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A third category of proposals for a civil society assembly are those that suggest a
forum for associations rather than individuals. In 1982, the UK Medical Association
for the Prevention of War proposed “that Article 22 of the UN Charter be amended to
create a subsidiary body for the General Assembly. The new body would represent the
views of NGOs.”567 In 1995, The Commission on Global Governance recommended
“an annual Forum of Civil Society consisting of representatives of organizations to be
accredited to the General Assembly as 'Civil Society Organizations'. The Forum
should be convened in the General Assembly Hall sometime before the Annual
Session of the Assembly. International civil society should itself be involved in
determining the character and functions of the Forum.”568 Maria Murazzani suggests
turning the Conference of NGOs with Consultative relationship to the United Nations
(CONGO) into a subsidiary organ of the GA.569
In May of 2000, Secretary-General Kofi Annan invited more than 1400 civil society
representatives to the Millennium NGO Forum at the UN in New York. In addition to
discussing the issues on the agenda of the UN, the participants agreed to establish an
assembly of civil society organizations which was to meet ahead of the annual session
of the GA at least every two or three years.570 This plan, however, never materialized,
be it for the lack of substantial political support, the cost associated to such fora, or
the absence of consensus on a strategy of how to organize and structure this assembly
among the NGOs (REQ -1/SUP 0/OPP -1). This last point touches upon the problem
of decision-making in an Associational Assembly. Since NGOs are discursive
567 Keith Suter, “Reforming the United Nations”, in: Ramesh Thakur (ed.), Past imperfect, Future
UNcertain: The United Nations at Fifty, Houndsmill; Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 1998, p. 250.
568 Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood: The Report of the Commission on
Global Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995, p. 260.
569 Maria Murazzani, “NGOs, Global Governance, and the UN: NGOs as the ‘Guardians of the Reform
of the International System’”, Transition Studies Review, 16 (2), 2009, p. 508.
570 Falk and Strauss, Toward Global Parliament, p. 214.
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representatives, they have a mandate to argue their case, but cannot legitimately
possess aggregative voting rights,571 meaning that this assembly would have to
operate on a consensus principle.
Considering the size of both the Millennium NGO Forum as well as CONGO, which
has over 500 member organizations, finding a consensus on substantial issues other
than NGO participation itself seems very ambitious, no matter how highly one values
the power of deliberation. If a consensus were to be achieved in such a forum, it
would be very likely that there really was no issue of decision-making to begin with.
But if the assembly is not able to produce any meaningful and coherent output, it
would merely function as a formally restricted platform for institutionally
inconsequential deliberation (MOM +1). Would it be worthwhile to put this much
effort into deliberations that might be carried out more vividly and interactive in the
unrestricted space of an emerging global public sphere?
There is a danger, furthermore, that the formalized public display of disharmony
among the NGOs could be instrumentalized by some Member States to discredit their
efforts, providing them with a welcome excuse to ignore NGO input altogether. As
Nora Keon warns, such an assembly “could risk violating the very logic of how civil
society operates and undermining the legitimacy on which its contribution to global
governance is based.”572 The same issues regarding decision-making and misplaced
formalization also apply to Tatsuro Kunugi’s suggestion of an inclusive assembly
571 See chapter ‘Promoting a Deliberative System.’
572 Nora McKeon, The United Nations and Civil Society: Legitimating Global Governance – Whose
Voice?, London; New York: Zed Books 2009, p. 184.
281
consisting of states, NGOs, TNCs as well as international organizations, and to other






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
PEGA +1 -2 -3 -4 -1 -1 -1 -1 -4
DGCA +1 -2 -3 -4 -1 -1 -1 -1 -4
Associational
Assembly +1 0 -3 -2 -1 0 -1 0 -2
Conclusion
Although there are numerous proposals for a Civil Society Assembly, none of them
have any prospects for implementation in the near future. Regardless of the specific
nature of the assembly, at present, the world is simply not ready for such an
institution. This is not purely a question of feasibility: even if these assemblies were
to be created, they would not have the beneficial effects on UN decision-making
promised by their advocates. Dryzek et al. have succinctly pointed out the
shortcomings of the proposals for a PEGA, but their own scheme for a DGCA is itself
highly problematic both in terms of feasibility and desirability. The main problem is
that the members of such an assembly would, in effect, be representative neither in the
aggregative, nor in the discursive sense. The obstacles for an associational assembly
seem somewhat less daunting, yet the very essence of such an institution seems to be
incompatible with the nature and character of NGOs. Instead of overregulating the
channels for civil society input into the decision-making procedures of the UN, it
would be more appropriate to multiply and diversify the opportunities for interaction.
573 Tatsuro Kunugi, “Enhancing the Poltitical Accountability of the United Nations via Multi-
stakeholder Synergy”, in: Sumihiro Kuyama and Michael Fowler (eds.), Envisioning Reform:
Enhancing UN Accountability in the Twenty-First Century, Tokyo; New York; Paris: United Nations
University Press 2009, pp. 193-214. An example for another such hybrid proposal is Andrew Kuper,
Democracy beyond Borders: Justice and Representation in Global Institutions, Oxford: Oxford
University Press 2004,  pp. 163-171
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Rather than creating additional empowered spheres, it is necessary to better connect
those that already exist to the public sphere.
With regard to the UN’s decision-making procedures on issues of global peace and
security, there are a number of innovations that could improve the interaction between
the SC and civil society.  Although many civil society representatives have reason to
complain about the quality of some of these meetings, the Arria-formula remains the
primary gateway for NGOs to become directly involved in the SC’s discussions and,
in those cases in which the Council members show genuine interest in considering
additional perspectives, these sessions are unique opportunities for influencing the
Council’s decisions. It would, therefore, be advisable to improve the quantity and
quality of these meetings. The same applies to the SC seminars with NGO
representatives. Since they allow the NGOs to participate in the shaping of the very
foundations of the subsequent deliberations in the Council, these seminars are an
excellent occasion for contributing meaningful and effective input. The SC’s
missions, as well, provide great opportunities to give input into its deliberations.
Directly experiencing the situation on the ground rather than just talking about it in
the Council chambers in New York often leaves a deep impact on the Council
members, and there is great potential for the NGOs to expand their role in this
process.
Furthermore, both of the initiatives driven by NGOs themselves are very promising.
The work of Security Council Report is presently already highly commendable and
strongly benefits the wider UN membership, NGOs, academia, and civil society in
general. Due to SCR, the public now enjoys access to an unprecedented wealth of
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information on the decision-making processes of the Council. SCR’s plans to expand
its activities can only be encouraged. The NGO Working Group on the Security
Council fulfills a slightly different function: while SCR provides transparency to the
public, the NWG provides transparency only to its own members. The benefit of this
more limited approach is that the Council members are more likely to pass on
sensitive information in the confidential meetings of the NWG. This information, as
well as the more general insights the NGOs gain in these meetings, aid them in
targeting effectively their input into SC deliberation. An increase and enhancement of
these meetings is, therefore, highly recommendable.
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VIII. Overview of Evaluation Results






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Addition of
permanent members -1 -2 -3 -6 -1 +1 -1 -1 -2
Addition of elected
members 0 -2 -3 -5 -1 +1 -1 -1 -2
Ad hoc addition of






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Abolish permanent
membership 0 -2 0 -2 -1 0 -1 -1 -3
Senatorial seats -1 -2 0 -3 -1 0 -1 -1 -3
Re-electable
membership 0 +2 0 +2 -1 +1 -1 0 -1
Moral superpower
seat 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -4
Conditions for








SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Regional seats (e.g.
EU) 0 -2 +3 +1 -1 0 -1 -1 -3
Regional rotation 0 0 0 0 -1 +1 -1 0 -1





SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Abolition of veto +1 -2 0 -1 -1 +1 -1 -1 -2
Fewer veto members 0 0 0 0 -1 +1 -1 -1 -2





SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Qualitative limitation
of veto 0 0 0 0 -1 +1 -1 0 -1
Quantitative
limitation of veto -1 -2 0 -3 -1 0 -1 0 -2
Qualified veto 0 0 0 0 -1 0 -1 0 -2
Refer vetoes to the
GA 0 -2 +3 +1 -1 0 -1 0 -2
Explain vetoes to the








SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Negative vote
without veto 0 +2 0 +2 -1 +1 -1 0 -1
Indicative voting 0 0 0 0 -1 +1 -1 -1 -2








SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Replace consultation
with open meetings 0 -2 0 -2 0 +1 -1 -1 -1
Orientations debates 0 -2 +3 +1 0 0 0 0 0
Wrap-up sessions +1 0 +3 +4 +1 +1 0 0 +2
Horizon-scanning
sessions 0 +2 0 +2 0 +1 -1 +1 +1
Briefings on
Consultations 0 0 +3 +3 -1 +1 +1 +1 +2
Briefings on






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
More TCC meetings 0 +2 +3 +5 0 +1 +1 0 +2
Arria-formula and
interactive dialogues 0 0 +3 +3 +1 +1 0 0 +2






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Amendment of rule
37 of the PRP 0 0 0 0 -1 0 -1 -1 -3
More Groups of
Friends 0 +2 -3 -1 +1 +1 0 +1 +3
Regional Orgs. as
‘conveyor belts’ 0 0 +3 +3 -1 +1 +1 +1 +2
Regional Orgs. as






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Reversal of speaker’s
list in open debates +1 0 +3 +4 0 +1 -1 0 0
More time for






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Timely circulation of
drafts 0 0 +3 +3 0 +1 -1 0 0
Compilation and
distribution of stats 0 0 +3 +3 0 0 -1 +1 0
Integration of






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Announcement of
expert meetings 0 0 0 0 0 +1 -1 0 0
Announcement of
subsidiary meetings 0 0 0 0 0 +1 -1 +1 +1
Deadline for
announcement 0 0 +3 +3 0 +1 0 0 +1
Descriptive titles for







SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Formalization of
Rules of Procedure 0 0 +3 +3 -1 +1 -1 -1 -2
Codification of
responsibilities +1 0 +3 +4 -1 +1 -1 -1 -2
Institutionalization of






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Shorten ‘seizure list’ +1 +2 +3 +6 0 +1 +1 +1 +3
Devolve work to
subsidiary bodies +1 +2 -3 0 +1 +1 0 +1 +3
Devolve work to
expert panels +1 +2 -3 0 +1 +1 -1 +1 +2
Devolve work to
PBC +1 +2 +3 +6 0 0 -1 0 -1
Resolve periodicity
problem +1 +2 0 +3 0 +1 0 +1 +2
Video






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Modify Convention
on Chairs +1 +2 0 +3 0 +1 -1 +1 +1
Modify
Penholdership +1 0 +3 +4 0 +1 -1 +1 +1
More involvement of
PBC 0 0 +3 +3 0 +1 0 +1 +2
Revive Military Staff
Committee 0 0 -3 -3 0 0 -1 0 -1






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Increase interaction
between PGA & PSC 0 0 +3 +3 0 +1 0 +1 +2
Coordination of
thematic debates 0 0 +3 +3 0 +1 0 +1 +2
Coordination by the






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Improve annual
report 0 0 +3 +3 -1 +1 0 0 0
Informal meetings on
the annual report 0 0 +3 +3 +1 +1 0 0 +2
Single-issue debate
in the GA 0 +2 +3 +5 0 +1 +1 0 +2
Monthly assessments 0 0 +3 +3 0 +1 0 0 +1
Monthly assessm. to
the GA 0 0 +3 +3 -1 +1 -1 -1 -2
Special subject-







SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Add. consultations &
recommendations +1 0 +3 +4 0 +1 -1 +1 +1
Codify E10’s
responsibilities 0 +2 +3 +5 -1 0 -1 +1 -1
Permanent GA






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
GA right to require
review of decisions 0 -2 (-3) -2 -1 0 -1 -1 -3
Ch.VII Consultation
Committee 0 -2 +3 +1 -1 0 -1 -1 -3
Commission
decision-making 0 -2 0 -2 -1 -1 -1 -1 -4
Reform of Charter
article 12 0 -2 0 -2 -1 0 -1 -1 -3
Simplify UFP
procedure 0 -2 0 -2 0 +1 -1 -1 -1
Legally binding GA
resolutions 0 -2 0 -2 -1 0 -1 -1 -3






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Increase physical
access for NGOs 0 0 +3 +3 0 0 -1 +1 0
More Arria-Formula
meetings 0 0 +3 +3 +1 +1 -1 0 +1
SC seminars with
NGO reps +1 0 +3 +4 0 +1 -1 +1 +1
SC retreats with
NGO reps +1 0 +3 +4 0 0 -1 0 -1
NGO reps in SC
delegations 0 -2 +3 +1 0 +1 -1 +1 +1






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
NGO Working
Group on the SC +2 0 +3 +5 0 +1 -1 +1 +1
Security Council






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
PEGA +1 -2 -3 -4 -1 -1 -1 -1 -4
DGCA +1 -2 -3 -4 -1 -1 -1 -1 -4
Associational
Assembly +1 0 -3 -2 -1 0 -1 0 -2
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Synthesis of proposals that are both highly recommendable and feasible





SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Explain vetoes to the






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Wrap-up sessions +1 0 +3 +4 +1 +1 0 0 +2
Horizon-scanning
sessions 0 +2 0 +2 0 +1 -1 +1 +1
Briefings on
Consultations 0 0 +3 +3 -1 +1 +1 +1 +2
Briefings on






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
More TCC meetings 0 +2 +3 +5 0 +1 +1 0 +2
Arria-formula and
interactive dialogues 0 0 +3 +3 +1 +1 0 0 +2






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Regional Orgs. as
‘conveyor belts’ 0 0 +3 +3 -1 +1 +1 +1 +2
Regional Orgs. as






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Integration of






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Deadline for
announcement 0 0 +3 +3 0 +1 0 0 +1
Descriptive titles for






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Shorten ‘seizure list’ +1 +2 +3 +6 0 +1 +1 +1 +3
Resolve periodicity
problem +1 +2 0 +3 0 +1 0 +1 +2
Video






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Modify Convention
on Chairs +1 +2 0 +3 0 +1 -1 +1 +1
Modify
Penholdership +1 0 +3 +4 0 +1 -1 +1 +1
More involvement of







SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Increase interaction
between PGA & PSC 0 0 +3 +3 0 +1 0 +1 +2
Coordination of






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Informal meetings on
the annual report 0 0 +3 +3 +1 +1 0 0 +2
Single-issue debate
in the GA 0 +2 +3 +5 0 +1 +1 0 +2






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Add. consultations &






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
More Arria-Formula
meetings 0 0 +3 +3 +1 +1 -1 0 +1
SC seminars with






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
NGO Working
Group on the SC +2 0 +3 +5 0 +1 -1 +1 +1
Security Council
Report 0 +2 +3 +5 +1 +1 -1 +1 +2






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Re-electable








SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Negative vote






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Reversal of speaker’s
list in open debates +1 0 +3 +4 0 +1 -1 0 0
More time for






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Timely circulation of
drafts 0 0 +3 +3 0 +1 -1 0 0
Compilation and






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Institutionalization of







SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Devolve work to






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Improve annual






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Codify E10’s






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Increase physical
access for NGOs 0 0 +3 +3 0 0 -1 +1 0
SC retreats with
NGO reps +1 0 +3 +4 0 0 -1 0 -1






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Formalization of
Rules of Procedure 0 0 +3 +3 -1 +1 -1 -1 -2
Codification of






SYN DS REQ SUP OPP NEG FS
Monthly assessm. to




The comparative analysis of more than 50 proposals for the reform of the UN’s
decision-making procedures on issues of international peace and security does not
only provide valuable insights into the feasibility and desirability of the individual
suggestions, but many lessons can be drawn from integrating these evaluations into a
bigger picture. There are certain patterns in the overview of the evaluations that
indicate current tendencies and likely future developments in the decision-making
procedures. Based on an analysis of these factors, a number of recommendations
directed at the UN membership and the NGO community at the UN regarding the
process of reforms are provided in the closing section.
Current and Future Developments
Formal Stasis
As Ian Hurd points out, “external change need not reduce the Council’s effectiveness
even in the absence of formal change, as long as the informal practice of the Council
adapts to the new environment.”574 This thesis sheds light on this process of adaption
and demonstrates that, contrary to common perception, the SC is evolving constantly.
Since the Council is the focal point of the UN’s decision-making procedures on issues
of global peace and security and needs to ensure both its connection to the rest of the
UN as well as its continued decisiveness in a changing environment, this ability to
evolve is of central importance to the prospects of a deliberative system.
574 Ian Hurd, “Security Council Reform: Informal Membership and Practice”, in: Bruce Russett (ed.),
The Once and Future Security Council, New York: St. Martin’s Press 1997, p. 137.
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This flexibility does not, however, apply to its formal arrangements on membership
and voting, and the evaluation confirms the negative outlook for any changes in the
composition of the SC. Except for the idea of re-electable membership, which is
discussed further below, none of the proposals that aim at either an expansion or a
modification of its membership obtain a feasibility score better than -2. This is
because the opposition to any of these proposals is fierce, the requirements for putting
them into practice are very demanding and the negotiations are stuck in unpromising
deadlock. When I told a diplomat at the UN that I had attended the informal
consultations on the question of equitable representation on the SC in 2010 and asked
about those of 2012, the answer was unambiguous: “The only thing that has changed
is that two years have passed.”575 Even if something were to change eventually and
one of these proposals were to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority in the GA,
there would still remain a high probability that at least one of the P5 might not ratify
the amendment to the Charter. Opinions vary as to who would be most likely to block
an amendment, China, Russia or the US, but there is agreement that all of them must
be considered as obstacles to such reform.576
Yet, this formal stasis should not be cause for concern: if put into practice, the
relevant proposals would neither improve the effectiveness nor the legitimacy of the
Council. Much to the contrary, such reforms would likely have negative effects in this
regard. At the moment, expansion would not only risk the marginalization of the
wider UN membership as well as promote exclusion and inequality within the
Council, but it would also lead to a more cumbersome and inflexible decision-making
process. The limitations inherent to any intergovernmental decision-making body
575 Interview at a Permanent Representation of a UN Member State, New York, 15 June 2012.
576 Steward Patrick, “UN Security Council Reform: Is it Time?”, Council on Foreign Affairs,11
January 2012, http://www.cfr.org/global-governance/un-security-council-reform-time/p27037
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make it easy to argue the need for sweeping change in the UN’s procedures on global
peace and security. But the wide-spread belief that reform is essentially a choice
between a change in membership or remaining at the status quo, which has been
cultivated fervently over the last 20 years, is, in reality, obstructive to progress.
Much time and energy is spent on the pursuit of a goal that still, after all these years,
remains elusive: both the SC and the GA regularly debate the issue in both formal and
informal sessions which seldom generate any news; Member States sometimes
organize conferences and informal meetings outside of the UN in order to discuss
reform of the membership and to build coalitions; the academic and public debate as
well is bent on this issue, thereby binding capacities for critical reflection and creative
imagination which could be used to more effect in other areas of reform; and worst of
all, as the recent attempts of the S5 to push the reform of the Council’s working
methods demonstrate, the progress and improvement of decision-making procedures
is often taken hostage by the debate on expansion.577 This enduring fixation on
Council membership, moreover, constantly raises the stakes for the parties involved,
as now every compromise may be perceived as a waste of the sunk costs that have
accrued over the last 20 years. Ironically, the more effort is invested in this project,
the less likely is its realization.
Efforts for improvement of the UN’s decision-making procedures on global peace and
security, including both those that strive for grand reform, such as Council expansion,
as well as those that aim for change in its working methods, etc., have been
misdirected in many different ways. Hence, there is a need for the UN Member States,
577 See chapter ‘The Politics of UN Reform.’
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NGOs, academia and the general public to take a fresh look at the present situation,
identify the inherent possibilities and restrictions, and reorder preferences and policies
accordingly. By providing a comprehensive overview of the various options for
reform as well as a systematic and comparative analysis of the desirability and
feasibility of each individual proposal, the present thesis may provide some guidance
for exactly this task. Even those who might reject the normative foundations of the
evaluation or others who might debate the accuracy of the political analysis may find
the established framework helpful as a means of orientation or may use the evaluation
of certain proposals as inspiring points of departure for further debate.
The Dynamics of Growing Demand
Many have pointed out that the Council has become increasingly active since the end
of the Cold War. In all probability, this trend will continue, although possibly in
different directions. The legal basis for the growth of its activities is its ever
expanding definition of the concept of international security. But while in the 1990s
the most decisive expansion of the Council’s authority was into what had hitherto
been considered as exclusively internal affairs of the Member States, today it
increasingly extends its reach into various functional issue areas. Although the two
cannot be easily separated and at least to some degree they have always gone hand in
hand, the argument can be made that the focus of expansion has shifted from
‘international’ to ‘security’. In terms of the Copenhagen School, securitization is no
longer predominantly based on a change in the target referent, i.e. humans rather than
states, but on the nature of the threat.578
578 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder,
CO; London: Lynne Rienner Publishers 1998, p. 32
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The Council is not only expanding its authority with regard to the target referent and
the nature of threats, but also concerning its means of action. While it was in the past
primarily conceived as a diplomatic emergency room that had the unique right to
respond to international crises by authorizing the use of force, today the SC is
becoming increasingly involved in proactive regulatory activities. In legal terms,
keeping in mind its “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security”579, the Council is not only reinterpreting the concepts of
‘international’ and ‘security’, but also that of ‘maintenance’. The best example for
these changes is its involvement in fighting terrorism: The nature of the threat is not
the traditional armed conflict between or within states but terrorism conducted by
individuals, and the target referent is individual safety rather than state survival. This
also means that the traditional range of tools was found to be inadequate, which led
the SC to pass resolutions of an entirely new quality, requiring the Member States to
adopt certain domestic regulations, as well as extending the authority of the Council
into the global financial system.580
The expansion of the SC’s authority has sparked much protest from NAM which
admonishes its infringements on the prerogatives of the GA. While the complaints
about a power-grab of the Council are justified to a certain degree and some
permanent members certainly promote these developments, it also has to be
acknowledged that they are strongly propelled by dynamics inherent to the present
structures of global politics and that the mere denunciation of the Council’s practices
will, therefore, not suffice to stop them. The complex set of dynamics referred to as
579 United Nations Charter, Chapter V, Article 24,
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter5.shtml
580 Ian Johnstone, The Power of Deliberation: International Law, Politics and Organizations, Oxford,
New York: Oxford University Press 2011, p. 95-111.
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globalization entails both the growing awareness of problems that can be efficiently
dealt with only on the global level, as well as the further creation of such problems.
This increases the pressure on global institutions to address these issues with some
level of effectiveness.
These problems are then often pushed upon the SC because, in comparison to the GA,
it is an efficient decision-making body which can enforce certain measures without
the need for universal consensus. The efforts of the Small Island States to securitize
climate change in order to increase the global perception of urgency and to place the
issue on the agenda of the SC are a case in point. Since their immediate survival is
threatened by the rising sea levels, they have good reason to alarm the world. From
the perspective of these states and their people, the question of who is to deal with the
problem they face has become absolutely secondary to the pressing exigency of
dealing with it as soon as possible. If neither the GA nor global conferences promise
any progress, they, in their desperation, naturally turn to the Council.
The Polymorph Security Council
Considering the decades of formal stasis, it is widely held that the structures of the SC
are outdated581, but beneath the surface, the SC is a highly flexible institution that has
proven its capability to adapt to changing environments. Because of the growing
demand, the agenda of the SC will continue to expand and the problems it faces will
further diversify. This, in turn, has a tremendous impact on the Council’s decision-
making procedures. Firstly, because more and more decisions need to be made, the
traditional open meetings, which are the only format in which resolutions may be
581 For a compilation of these opinions, see Ian Hurd, “Myths of Membership: The Politics of
Legitimation in UN Security Council Reform”, Global Governance, 14 (2), 2008, p. 201.
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adopted, are becoming increasingly mechanistic and devoid of meaningful debate.
The actual deliberations are being outsourced into other formats. Secondly, since
today the Council needs to address a range of diverse challenges, the formats for
deliberations have to be adapted to these issues. In order to guarantee effective
decision-making, the deliberations must accommodate the need for specialization, the
specific sources of input required to make informed judgments, as well as the
management of the case-specific range of tools that can be applied.
The result of these developments is twofold: On the one hand, the SC is becoming
increasingly flexible concerning the format of its meetings. While once there was only
the distinction between open and private meetings, today there are TCC meetings,
Arria-formula meetings, interactive dialogues, the Kosovo model, horizon-scanning
sessions, various briefings and more. This flexibility goes so far that today the
Council members will even hold an impromptu meeting with civil society
representatives beneath a mango tree in Sierra Leone.582 As the evaluation of the
feasibility of these formats indicates, they will, in all likelihood, play a more and more
important role in the Council’s conduct of business, and it is reasonable to expect that
the range of formats at its disposal will further expand in order to address qualitatively
new challenges.
On the other hand, the Council is outsourcing its deliberations to other fora, including
its subsidiary bodies and various expert panels. The number of the former has been
growing slowly but steadily over the last years, and, as SC diplomats will confirm,
582 What’s in Blue: Insights on the Work of the Security Council, “Council Visiting Mission to Africa:
Sierra Leone”, 24 May 2012, http://whatsinblue.org/2012/05/council-visiting-mission-to-africa-sierra-
leone.php
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expert panels have become more important.583 The creation of the Peace-Building
Committee can in itself be seen as an attempt to outsource the deliberations on a
specific range of issues to another forum. As the number of fora connected to the
Council increases, it functions as the central nexus of an expanding network of
deliberative moments. There is tremendous potential for further research on both the
empirical and the normative aspects of the procedures and functions of this network.
Together, the diversification of its formats and the expansion of its network of fora
create what could be termed the ‘Polymorph Security Council’. Beneath the surface of
formal stasis and driven by the dynamics of growing demand, the one Council is
becoming an increasingly flexible and adaptive shape shifter. Already today, it is
sometimes hard for even the Council members to identify the exact formal nature of
the particular meeting they are attending and the lines between what counts as
meetings of the Council, meetings of Council members and non-Council meetings are
fading. As the evaluation of the related efforts for reform demonstrates, current
developments do not indicate a slowing down of this dynamic.
Fluid Membership
A prominent characteristic of the Polymorph SC is the remarkable variation in the
composition of its diverse deliberative moments. Depending on the particular format
of the forum in question, it is neither guaranteed that all of the Council members – not
even the P5 – will participate, nor that all but the Council members may participate.
Instead, a range of diverse actors, be it TCCs, specially-affected Member States,
regional organizations, the chairs of the PBC or civil society representatives, might
583 Security Council Report, Security Council Working Methods – A Work in Progress?, New York
2010, p. 9.
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find themselves sitting at the table. The only constant is that when it comes to a vote,
there are 15 members – not more, not less.
In addition to the variation in its composition, there are more and more efforts to
smooth the transition between the elected members in order to lessen the disruptive
effect on the work of the Council. As of now, the incoming members are already
included in some of the Council’s deliberations before the official beginning of their
terms, and the calls for earlier and deeper integration are getting louder. Also, both the
demand and the offers for the early preparation of the incoming members have grown.
Some prospective members, such as Saudi-Arabia, begin preparing their diplomats as
early as two years before they assume their mandates. The workshop for newly
elected Council members organized by the Finish government has by now firmly
established itself.
Apart from this, Security Council Report is broadening its individualized consulting
of prospective Council members and cooperates with Columbia University in offering
them preparatory courses. There is also a growing tendency for outgoing Council
members to be included beyond the end of their terms in some of the deliberations on
issues they had been particularly involved in. Unless the definition of Council
membership is reduced to the possession of formal voting rights, it is, considering
both the variation in the quantity and quality of the participants in the various
deliberations as well as the stretching out of the beginning and the end of formal
Council membership beyond its legal point of definition, possible to detect a tendency
towards a phenomenon that could be termed ‘Fluid Membership’.
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Specialized Lobbying Clusters
On the one hand, the advantage of the Polymorph SC is that it creates opportunities
for the direct participation of diverse actors in its decision-making procedures and
provides multiple access points for input from the outside. On the other hand, the
Polymorph SC generates problems of transparency and accountability. It is becoming
more difficult to trace at which point in the institutional process the most crucial
deliberations are held, when the decisions are taken and who exactly has been
involved in this process. The procedural flexibility of the Polymorph SC is, of course,
also more prone to misuse. Since they have the most experience and best knowledge
of its complex procedures, the P5 especially are tempted to simply outmaneuver
differing opinions.
One example for the misuse of this flexibility is that uncomfortable briefings to the
wider membership are sometimes avoided by retrospectively coining consultations of
the whole into informal negotiations. There is also the danger that the Council’s
procedures of decision-making themselves will become increasingly politicized and
that disagreements over the appropriate format and forum for specific deliberations
might occur more often. The wide range of procedural issues touched upon in the
evaluation of reform proposals is a very telling indicator for the potential for
disagreement on the Council’s appropriate conduct of business.
For these reasons, many outside actors are now less concerned with the question of
whether it will be possible for them to participate and more focused on the question of
how to contribute to the Council’s decision-making process in the most effective way.
Since the SC as well as the outside actors face a scarcity of time and resources in this
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process, it is essential for the input to be targeted precisely. This, in turn, requires
considerable experience with the complex procedures of the Polymorph SC, political
wisdom regarding the internal decision-making procedures of the most relevant
Council members and familiarity with the character of their representatives as well as
specialized knowledge of the issue area. All these factors have to be molded into
individualized case-by-case approaches to effective participation in the decision-
making process.
This emphasis on the quality rather than the quantity of input propels the importance
of lobbying networks and might, in future, lead to an increasingly functional
separation between and within these networks. As the NGO Working Group on the
Security Council demonstrates, the formation of networks is especially important for
NGOs. Concerning the UN membership, as the evaluation of reform proposals shows,
the role of regional organizations in facilitating and coordinating input into the
Council’s deliberations is likely to increase in the immediate future.
The same applies to the Groups of Friends and similar informal networks whose
comparative advantage is that their issue-oriented composition, as opposed to the
membership-oriented composition of the regional organizations, is better geared to the
requirements for specialization necessary for effective participation in the decision-
making procedures of the Polymorph SC. A possible combination of both would be
the formation of issue-oriented subgroups within the regions which could then,
depending on the relative compatibility of interests concerning the case at hand,
merge with each other across regional boundaries in order to form what could be
termed ‘Specialized Lobbying Clusters’ that provide the specialization and clout
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necessary for targeted and effective input as well as a higher degree of




The evaluation confirms the assumption that, in the context of a reform of the UN’s
decision-making procedures on issues of global peace and security, issue-linkage does
not increase a proposal’s prospects of being implemented. If, from the entire list of
proposals for reform, only those are selected that are desirable, i.e. with a score above
0, and these selected proposals are then reduced to those for which a breakthrough in
negotiations could possibly make a crucial difference with regard to their feasibility,
i.e. with a score from -2 to +2, the result is a list of proposals each of which is
opposed by the P5, or in a few cases, individual permanent members. Since, on the
other hand, none of the proposals are strongly backed by any of the P5, there is no
potential of quid pro quo arrangements. Accordingly, in this particular context, issue-
linkage does not offer any positive effect that could justify taking the risks described
above. A recent example of these risks is the S5’s unsuccessful attempt to pass a
resolution in the GA that would have recommended a package of reforms of the
Council’s working methods.584 Given the complex debates and sets of interests every
single reform proposals brings with it, it is wiser to refrain from aiming for grand
reform and to take, instead, small incremental steps towards a greater goal.
584 See chapter ‘The Politics of UN Reform.’
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Cooperate with the P5
As mentioned above, the main obstacle to the realization of most of the reform
proposals are the P5. This opposition to change is not at all surprising given the fact
that in the status quo, they are the ones most privileged. The resulting sluggishness in
the P5’s attitude to efforts for improvement of the Council’s working methods can
evoke frustration in any aspiring reformer. It is this sluggishness that caused the S5 to
pursue a resolution on working methods in the GA in the hope of increasing the
pressure from outside the SC and thereby pushing the P5 towards reform. The latter,
however, would have none of this and used their combined influence in the GA to
prevent the resolution from being passed. China especially used its leverage on some
of the African states with the result that none of them followed the S5’s invitation to
discuss the draft resolution.
The lesson to be learned here is that it is futile to confront the P5 on these matters and
that there is, therefore, simply no way around attempting to convince them of the
benefits of reform by patient and persistent argumentation. Of course, such an
approach does not guarantee success either, but at least it does not risk building up a
general repugnance of the P5 towards such efforts, which might make future attempts
for change even harder. One factor that might aid in the task of persuading the P5 is
that contrary to Edward Luck’s concern that “[i]t is questionable […] whether all of
the transparency and reporting measures called for would result in a more efficient or
effective Security Council”585, the evaluation demonstrates that, with only two
exceptions, none of the proposals for a reform of the Council’s working methods
would have any negative impact on the effectiveness of the SC, a concern that the P5
585 Edward Luck, UN Security Council: Practice and Promise, London; New York: Routledge 2006, p.
124.
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routinely emphasize in their comments on reform. The UK PREP underlined in 2012
that when “we consider the question of working methods, Council members must be
careful not to give the impression that they are more interested in the process than in
the product. The key test of the Security Council will always be its effectiveness at
preventing and resolving conflict around the globe.”586 The evaluation shows that,
indeed, many proposals even promise to increase the Council’s effectiveness.
Strategic Disengagement
As discussed above, the negotiations on the reform of formal membership are stuck in
deadlock and it would, therefore, be wise for the G4 to disengage. They should not be
tantalized by the broad support they command in the GA as long as they cannot be
assured that this support has not only the quantity but also the quality needed in order
to secure reform. It does not suffice to have the support of, e.g., many African states if
China, Russia and the US continue to use their influence to bolster the internal
opposition in the African Group and thereby neutralize the G4’s efforts. The closer
the latter appear to reaching their goal, the more fiercely the opposition to their efforts
becomes. It is in these moments of truth that the UFC is joined by at least some of the
permanent members, who will always find some case-specific excuse for opposing the
reform proposal in question, as well as all of those undecided states who will in the
end always choose the less risky option of upholding the status quo. The G4 need to
come to terms with the fact that their situation is tantalizing in a very literal sense:
they need to wait until the tide of support in the GA rises high enough and until the P5
reach out far enough for them to have a reasonable chance to simultaneously take a
drink and pick the apple despite some degree of last-minute drawback from both.
586 United Nations Security Council, “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security
Council”, UN Doc No. S/PV.6870, 2012.
305
Until that moment has arrived, further attempts will cause, at best, only temporary
setbacks.
Hence it is advisable, from the perspective of the G4, to temporarily disengage from
the debate on the reform of SC membership. This does not require them to give up
their goals and give in to either the UFC or the status quo. A few years down the road
they might discover that their opportunity has come. It does, however, require them to
stop forcing the issue, which unnecessarily raises the stakes, and to reorder their
short-term policy preferences accordingly. Such a strategy might set free energies that
are currently tied up in the debate on expansion and dilute the respective cleavages in
the membership. This, in turn, could inject the reform process with a new dynamic
which eventually could very well develop favorably to the goals of the G4.
Some will argue that the relative influence of Germany and Japan will dwindle in the
next years and that, consequentially, they do not have any time to spare in pursuing a
reform that will institutionally lock in their leadership. It is, however, debatable
whether such a decline in importance will indeed occur and if it does, whether it will
be to such a stark degree that it would significantly affect their candidacy for
permanent membership. After all, in economic terms, both states today still play such
an outstanding role that they can afford some relative decline without losing this
special status.
If, moreover, it could be argued with relative certainty that Germany and Japan will in
five years’ time play a significantly less important role in the maintenance of
international peace and security than they do today, this argument would speak
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against their permanent membership just as strongly now as it would then. In such a
scenario, it would also be likely that some of the clout lost by these two would be
gained by Brazil and India and, therefore, the influence of the G4 as a whole would
not diminish. Even if such a shift within the G4 does indeed occur, there is no reason
for Germany and Japan to fear that they might then be left behind by Brazil and India.
Japan is the favorite candidate of the US, and since Germany’s influence in Europe is
momentarily growing rather than declining, it would in all likelihood still be needed
in order to ensure a significant number of European votes. Instead, Brazil and India’s
prospective growth should encourage the G4 to start a fresh attempt several years
down the road, when better chances at success might have developed.
Substantial Recommendations
Re-electable Membership
One promising option for infusing a new dynamic into the reform debate would be the
abolition of the rule that outgoing members cannot be immediately re-elected. As the
evaluation demonstrates, such a reform would be desirable for reasons of
effectiveness, and the G4 could play a crucial role in making this possible. The UFC
have proposed re-electable membership as part of their plans for the expansion of the
SC, and the P5 have no reason to obstruct such a reform. It is the G4 who are opposed
to re-electable membership because it is perceived as an integral part of the UFC
efforts to derail their quest for permanent membership. This case is another example
for the potentially negative effects of issue-linkage. If the proposal for re-electable
membership were detached from the UFC’s ideas in SC expansion, the G4 might find
that such a reform is in their best interest.
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The key is not to perceive it as part of a one-time reform of the Council’s
membership, but to regard it as a step in a process that might result, at a later point, in
permanent membership. If the proposal were successful, it would set a precedent for
the possibility of Charter amendment and break through some of the frontlines in the
membership, thereby creating a new dynamic in the reform process. Since re-electable
membership would lessen the chances of the small Member States to be elected onto
the SC, it is possible that a new divide would develop between them on the one hand
and the middle and great powers on the other hand. One problem with this approach is
that the detachment of re-electable membership from the proposals for the expansion
of the Council, which is the primary motivation for both the G4 and the UFC’s efforts
at reform, risks leaving it without the persistent driving force that is required for any
amendment of the charter to succeed. It is essential, therefore, that it be perceived as a
steppingstone towards the expansion of the Council.
Increasing Accountability
The example of resolution 1325 demonstrates that the traditional perception of the SC
and the GA as functionally separable mechanisms of global governance is losing its
empirical foundation. The responsibilities of the GA and the SC are no longer easily
separable by the division of fields of policy – if they ever where – and neither does
the domestic analogy of the Council as the executive, and the Assembly as the
legislative, components of governance seem appropriate anymore. Resolution 1325 is
not an executive measure in response to a crisis of global peace and security, it is the
result of a topical deliberation containing generally applicable imperatives and
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intentions. It is not the application of law, but rather the codification of law.587 Many
governments and commentators are critical of what often has been perceived as an
encroachment of the SC on the prerogatives of the GA and demand a return to the
categorical separation of issues of security on the one hand and social and economic
issues on the other. Its assumption of legislative functions has also sparked criticism:
Detlev Vagts, e.g., speaks of an ‘imperial’ institution imposing ‘hegemonic
international law’588.
As most of these complaints are raised by Southern voices, it is appropriate to ask if
the separation of security and economy is really in their interests or if it would not
make more sense to seek a revitalization of the GA in the framework of a deliberative
system that would strengthen the synergy between it and the SC. Resolution 1325
suggests that this type of deliberative synergy is more desirable than the functional
separation of the SC and the GA. As discussed above, the growing importance of the
SC is strongly propelled by dynamics inherent to the present structures of global
politics, and the mere denunciation of the Council’s practices will, therefore, not
suffice to stop them. In this regard, NAM should rather focus its energies on the
strengthening of deliberative synergy between the two decision-making bodies.
The promotion of accountability is one of the crucial elements in this endeavor. There
are some incremental steps the UN membership could take in the immediate future in
order to increase the Council’s accountability to the GA. Regarding the primary
587 Further examples for the SC as legislature are, amongst others, the resolutions on the protection of
civilians in armed conflict as well as the compulsory anti-terrorism measures introduced by the SC.
See, e.g., Ian Johnstone, “The Security Council as Legislature”, in Bruce Cronin and Ian Hurd (eds.),
The UN Security Council and the Politics of International Authority, London: Routledge 2008, pp. 80-
104.
588 Detlev Vagts, “Hegemonic International Law”, American Journal of International Law, 95 (4),
2001, pp. 843-848.
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symbol of this accountability, the annual report of the SC, it has to be understood that
the best and easiest way of improving its quality is to enhance the monthly
assessments of the Council’s presidencies. Since these assessments are incorporated
into the annual report, they could function as the basis for its improvement. It is in
these assessments in which the respective presidencies have some degree of freedom
to create an analytical narrative of events that is more revealing to the reader than the
mere compilation of facts which characterizes the annual report. Especially for the
elected members, the main challenge here is that at the end of their strenuous
presidencies, they keep in mind these benefits for the bigger picture brought about by
the assessments and mobilize their remaining energy to draft a high-quality report.
NAM should increase its efforts at coordinating such efforts and apply peer-pressure
on its members to deliver.
Another relatively feasible step in the direction of greater accountability is a
requirement for the P5 to justify to the GA each veto they cast. This reform, which
could be put into practice in various ways, would definitely increase the transparency
of the SC. Although it is likely that the P5 will meet such efforts with strong
reluctance, this proposal would not limit their privileges. In fact it would only obligate
them to a practice of justification they already now often adhere to voluntarily. It
might be possible, therefore, for a determined coalition of reformers to wear down
their opposition with persistence and targeted argumentation.
A somewhat more complicated, but not unrealistic, reform would be the codification
of the responsibilities of the elected members. Such a codification would strengthen
the ties between the elected members and the GA and increase the transparency and
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accountability of the SC. Since this reform does not necessarily require the consent of
the P5, it could be initiated by a resolution of the GA which could establish a practical
understanding on the responsibilities of the elected members. At a later point, this
practical convention could then, if deemed necessary, be legally upgraded by a
resolution of the SC or even an amendment of the Charter. Both the feasibility and the
desirability of such a reform would also depend, of course, on the concrete substance
of the responsibilities agreed upon.
Effective Input
As elaborated above, while the Polymorph SC offers various opportunities for direct
participation and many access points for outside input, at the same time it requires
much flexibility and expertise on behalf of the respective outside actors to ensure the
effectiveness of their input. One way of meeting these requirements while also
guaranteeing relatively high representativeness and combined clout would be the
formation of Specialized Lobbying Clusters. The informal nature of these clusters
would allow them to be composed of varying sub-groups, while at the same time
providing transparency as to the regional mandates of these groups. Such an
arrangement would be in line with the growing importance of regional organizations
at the UN, and much would depend on their internal mechanism regarding the
composition of the sub-groups. While most regions today already have specialized
committees for various subjects, these sub-groups would have to place a special focus
on targeted access to the Polymorph SC and the ability to effectively interlock with
their inter-regional equivalents.
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In general, both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the Council would benefit
significantly from the improvement of the regional organizations’ roles of functioning
as conveyor belts for the perspectives of its members into the SC and of serving as the
Council’s main points of contact on issues concerning regional conflicts. Although
there are some differences of opinion on how this could be implemented in practice,
regional organizations today enjoy an unprecedented level of perceived legitimacy at
the UN, and there is much potential for a progressive enhancement of their role. It is
even imaginable that sometime in the more distant future the proposal for regional
membership in the SC will be implemented.
With regard to the Council itself, it is essential, for reasons of both effectiveness and
deliberative synergy, that the quality of the TCC meetings be improved. The
importance of the TCCs has been widely acknowledged in principle, yet these good
intentions have failed to take root in practice. The P5, especially, need to make these
meetings worth the time of the TCCs by making more information available and
allowing these sessions to have a palpable impact on the Council’s decision-making.
The TCCs, on the other hand, must carefully ensure that they validate such efforts,
when and if they occur, with proactive engagement. Both sides should always attempt
to be represented by staff members who, rather than being overly dependent on
prepared statements and questions, are capable of interactive discussions on the
specific subject in question. Everyone, be it the P5, the TCCs or the UN as a whole,
stands to profit from an improvement of the TCC meetings, and it would definitely be
worth the additional effort.
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A more controversial proposal for reform is the modification of the SC’s conventions
on penholdership. Allowing the elected members to take the lead in the drafting of
country-specific resolutions would improve the Council’s decision-making
procedures in various ways: it would diminish the structural inequality in its
deliberations, it would lessen the P5’s exclusive decision-making, and by promoting
the participation of the elected members, it would indirectly increase transparency and
create more opportunities for outside input. The main challenge is that most of the
permanent members are strongly opposed to giving up their control over the drafting
process and, in the end, the fate of this proposal is largely in their hands. Portugal’s
efforts at promoting this proposal in the Council must, however, be commended and,
indeed, they have begun to bear fruit: the idea of co-penholdership, which would
allow for the combined leadership of an elected member and a permanent member is a
step in the right direction that at the same time factors in the concerns of the P5.
Together with the UK, which has been proactively in support of co-penholdership,
Portugal might thus be able to loosen up the Council’s convention on penholdership.
This analysis has demonstrated that, regarding the SC’s working methods,
improvement is possible in a wide range of areas, be it the format of the meetings, the
opportunities for outside input, the availability of information, the agenda, or the
subsidiary bodies.589 Concerning a formalization of the Council’s procedures and
responsibilities, however, it seems that, at the moment, little can be done. This is
regrettable since, contrary to Luck’s argument that the SC’s rules of procedure must
remain provisional in order to guarantee flexibility, there is no reason to believe that a
589 See “Overview of Evaluation Results: Synthesis of proposals that are both highly recommendable
and feasible.”
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formalization of the PRP would indeed diminish the Council’s ability to adapt.590
Instead, this would increase both the transparency as well as the accountability of the
SC.
NGO Input
For the NGOs, the Polymorph SC has the advantage that it opens up channels for their
input to an unprecedented degree. 20 years ago, it was unthinkable to suggest that
NGOs were participating in the Council’s deliberations, and even at the UN today
many do not grasp the full extent of the relationship between the SC and the NGO
community at the UN. The first and most important procedural innovation regarding
this relationship was the introduction of the Arria-formula meetings. Although civil
society representatives have reason to complain about the quality of some of these
meetings, the Arria-formula remains the primary gateway for NGOs to become
directly involved in the SC’s discussions and, in those cases in which the Council
members show genuine interest in considering additional perspectives, these sessions
are unique opportunities for influencing the Council’s decisions. The Arria-formula
meetings will continue to play an important role in the SC’s conducting of business,
maybe even more so in future than they do now, but the NGOs have to ensure, by
making good use of those meetings they secure, that they will not be detached from
this process. Since it is essential for the NGOs continued access that the Council
members value their influence, it is not recommendable to lobby for as many Arria-
formula meetings as possible, but instead to focus on achieving high-quality
deliberations. Although the attitude of the Council members is crucial in this regard,
there is much the NGOs themselves can do to raise the quality of the meetings.
590 Edward Luck, “A Council for All Seasons: The Creation of the Security Council and Its Relevance
Today” in: Vaughan Lowe et al. (eds.), The Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and
Practice since 1945, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008, p. 83.
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Firstly, the choice of topics is essential: the NGOs need to enter Arria-formula
meetings with a pre-established consensus amongst themselves on what issue to focus
on in order to have some impact on the Council members. Even if the exact topic of
the meeting is predetermined by the invitation, there needs to be a precise and
achievable target for which the NGOs can agree on a common strategy. One of the
challenges here is that the NGO representatives are torn between their discursive
accountability and the need to make compromises with both the representatives of
other NGOs as well as the Council members. Secondly, the NGOs need to make these
meetings interesting to the Council members by delivering additional high quality
information and truly insightful perspectives that are not only based on predictable
moral argumentation. If the Council members feel like they already know what they
will be told before the discussion has started, they will lose interest. The NGOs’ input
must be precise and detailed, vivid and startling, and, if possible, combine moral
argumentation with information that gives the Council members reasons to reconsider
their more instrumentally motivated calculations as well. As with SC reform in
general, it is easier to change things once people are engaged in change.
The same applies to the SC seminars with NGO representatives. In fact, since these
seminars have yet to establish themselves in Council practice and because their
convention requires the initiators to invest much time and work, the NGOs’ efforts at
achieving deliberations of high quality are even more essential. Since they allow the
NGOs to participate in the shaping of the very foundations of the subsequent
deliberations in the Council, these seminars are a great opportunity for giving
meaningful and effective input.
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The SC’s missions as well are a great opportunity for giving input into its
deliberations. Directly experiencing the situation on the ground rather than just talking
about it in the Council chambers in New York often leaves a deep impact on the
Council members, and for the NGOs to be part of this experience holds great
potential. The NGO community at the UN should ensure that they are not left out of
this process. One way of becoming involved would be to reach out to the local NGOs
that are consulted on these missions and to offer them information and assistance on
targeted lobbying of the Council members. However, since the borders between
assistance and prescription are fluid, there is a danger that this would dilute the
unmediated input of the local NGOs and thereby defeat the entire purpose of the
Council missions, which is to achieve direct and unmediated insight into the situation
on the ground. The NGO community at the UN would, therefore, be well advised to
tread lightly when becoming involved in these missions.
Proposals to establish a civil society assembly, on the other hand, need to be
decidedly rejected. In the current context of international politics, such an assembly
would not yield the benefits promised by its proposers, but would instead pose risks to
the legitimacy and effectiveness of the UN’s decision-making procedures on issues of
global peace and security, not to mention the potential waste of resources. Until the
fundamental conditions for a more direct democracy have been established on the
global level591, proponents of global democracy need to be wary of the temptation to
overregulate the channels for civil society input into the decision-making procedures
of the UN. Instead, it would be more appropriate to multiply and diversify the
591 For a discussion of these conditions in the context of IOs, see, e.g., Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, “Is
Global Democracy Possible?”, European Journal of International Relations, 17 (3), 2011, 519-542;
Daniele Archibugi, “Cosmopolitan Democracy and its Critics: A Review”, European Journal of
International Relations, 10 (3), 2004, pp. 437-473;
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opportunities for interaction, and rather than creating additional empowered spheres,
it is necessary to better connect those that already exist to the public sphere.
Transparency Providers
One of the most problematic characteristics of the Polymorph SC is its lack of
transparency. This is the area in which the involvement of NGOs can make a palpable
difference, and by shedding some light on its complex decision-making procedures,
they can contribute significantly to the strengthening of the UN as a deliberative
system. Knowledge of the decision-making processes of the Polymorph SC is the
indispensable basis for effective input from the outside. By acting as ‘Transparency
Providers’, NGOs can indirectly but strongly affect the decision-making of the
Council.
In this respect, the work of Security Council Report is highly commendable and
strongly benefits the wider UN membership, NGOs, academia, and civil society in
general. Due to SCR the public now enjoys access to an unprecedented wealth of
information on the decision-making processes of the Council. The NGO Working
Group on the Security Council fulfills a slightly different function: while SCR
provides transparency to the public, the NWG provides transparency only to its own
members. The benefit of this more limited approach is that the Council members are
more likely to pass on sensitive information in the confidential meetings of the NWG.
This information, as well as the more general insights the NGOs gain in these
meetings, aid them in targeting effectively their input into the Polymorph SC.
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One of the main reasons why the NGO community was successful in its efforts to
bring about resolution 1325, was the concerted nature of its approach. A range of
different NGOs came together to create and coordinate a comprehensive international
campaign, lobbying both the SC and national capitals. Regarding the diverse and
often competitive nature of the NGO community at the UN, as well as the difficulties
discursive representation entails for the attainment of a pragmatic consensus among
them, this cooperation is not self-evident. Yet, it is clear that from the perspective of
the NGOs this is the only viable path to success.
While the NWG is definitely a good example of the benefits of lobbying networks,
there is still much it could do to improve the cooperation between its members.
Outside of its meetings with the Council members, there is insufficient coordination
between the respective NGOs. The group as a whole would benefit from more
information sharing, mutual advice on lobbying and, in general, more detailed
coordination of their efforts. Similar to the considerations regarding the Arria-formula
meetings, it would be advisable to better prepare the meetings. The problem is, of
course, that there is disagreement among the members of the group as to the purpose
of the meetings and some even reject the very idea of using them for lobbying, which
severely complicates a coordinated approach. As discursive representatives, it is
challenging for the NGOs to engage in negotiation with each other on where to set the
preferences and which issues and perspectives to sacrifice.
In conclusion, this thesis has demonstrated that not only is there much to do with
regard to the improvement of the UN’s decision-making procedures on issues of
global peace and security, but that much can indeed be accomplished. Although
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comparably modest and realistic in its expectations, this thesis, by giving some
direction to the respective efforts of the UN membership, of civil society, and of
academia, provides a pragmatic approach to reform which gives reason for careful
optimism about the prospects for substantial progress towards more inclusive and
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